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portive of this project; I relied repeatedly on his brilliance in translating 
the reviewer responses and helping me hear them. It has been a pleasure 
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Bharatiya Bar Girls Union (Indian Bar Girls Union), Nityananda Hall, 
Mumbai, field observations:
In a large hall in Mumbai on an overcast July afternoon in 2005, some 
one hundred women have gathered to react to an imminent state-
wide ban on dance bars. The bar dancers are young, mostly in their 
midtwenties, dressed neatly in salwaar suits, trousers, and saris. Sev-
eral dance bar owners are also present, not far from where I sit, but it’s 
the women’s voices that reverberate throughout the hall as each steps 
to the microphone. One woman wonders how bar dancers could be 
robbed of their jobs because of what they wear while performing, since 
the women in Hindi films (aka Bollywood) and discos dress so much 
more revealingly. Why, then, doesn’t the government take notice of the 
film actresses? What about the women who perform in discos? Another 
woman counters state officials’ accusations that dancing in bars is “easy 
money,” lamenting the hardships of the work, the need to take loans 
from taxi drivers at times, among other indignities. Other bar danc-
ers are intent on distinguishing themselves from sex workers. Many of 
them wonder about the government’s claim to be “helping them” by 
closing the bars.1
With less than a month to go before some seventy-five thousand bar 
dancers lose their jobs due to a hastily passed state law, women’s con-
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cerns, anxieties, and anger are palpable at the union meeting. Mere 
months before, a prominent elected official unexpectedly proposed such 
a ban on dance bars—where fully clothed groups of women danced to 
popular Hindi film songs for a male clientele—initially applying only to 
the state capital, Mumbai, but then encompassing the entire western 
Indian state of Maharashtra. It is puzzling, the women note, that state 
officials singled out dance bars over brothels, Bollywood, and bars and 
discos at posh hotels. Even though the bars had been a staple of the pro-
vincial state’s nightlife for over two decades, subject to regulation, and 
a significant source of revenue, officials were now stridently condemn-
ing these bars for “corrupting rural youth” and “damaging the (state’s) 
culture.”2
Urging attention to these inconsistencies, the bar dancers at the meet-
ing ask why dance bars, why now, in order to understand (and overturn) 
the regional state’s edict. But interpreting the Maharashtra state’s capri-
cious actions is not easy, not least because of the confoundingly arbitrary 
discourses justifying the ban. The initial allegations of cultural depravity 
soon give way to criticisms that dancers are making “easy money,” then 
projections that they are helpless victims of sex trafficking who need 
to be rescued, views hotly contested by the women themselves. Indeed 
state pronouncements oscillating between blaming and saving women 
and officials’ empty promises of public assistance for the thousands who 
would be rendered unemployed lead to additional furious speculations 
at the meeting about the state’s intents and irrationalities.
Some eight hundred miles north, in the nation’s capital, New Delhi, 
another struggle for sexual justice is pivoting toward the state in ways 
that, too, are surfacing inconsistencies in discourses and practices of 
governance. Under way since 2001, these efforts are aimed at decrimi-
nalizing homosexuality by overturning the nationwide antisodomy law, 
Section 377, first introduced by the British colonial state in 1860 and re-
tained in the postcolonial penal code. Unlike the bar dancers reacting to 
the proposed shutdown, this struggle was initiated by Naz Foundation 
(India) Trust, an organization established to fight hiv/aids, as part of 
a strategy to seek rights and protections for same-sex sexualities, begin-
ning with a writ petition filed in the Delhi High Court against Section 
377. As the legal process unfolds, these petitioners are foregrounding in-
congruities in how Section 377 is applied—for example, the law is being 
used to harass and extort from vulnerable same-sex sexual subjects—
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and the irrationalities of administration, whereby the government is op-
posing decriminalization but the state-run National aids Control Orga-
nization is favoring it.
Coming to grips with these messy discourses, inconstant practices, 
and competing laws and policies through the edicts against dance bars 
or homosexuality underscores that states are fragmented and deeply 
subjective. Further, if subjectivity is redefined to mean not just inconsis-
tency and bias but also the passionate, the affective, and especially the 
sexual, then it animates a more critical view of the states’ injunctions on 
dance bars and same-sex sexual practices.3 Recognizing states as subjec-
tive expands the focus on the state’s impact on sexuality to asking how 
these instances of regulating sexuality serve states. Insofar as states are 
neither autochthonous entities nor mere material realities, a position I 
take, awareness shifts to how these preoccupations with managing sex-
ual practices, forms of sexual labor, and such are discursively producing 
“the state” and serving to achieve state-effect (after, Timothy Mitchell).4
In other words, these instances suggest that governing sexuality helps 
sustain the illusion that states are a normal feature of social life, unified 
and rational entities, intrinsically distinct from society, and indispens-
able to maintaining social order.
Most pressing, the issue of dance bars, which I discuss but briefly, 
and the criminalization of homosexuality that is the focus of this book 
underscore the expanding significance of sexuality to states. Unfolding 
as they are in the thick of liberalization’s aftermath in India, these sites 
compellingly signal how regulating sexuality through a variety of mech-
anisms assumes importance, especially at a time when states are under-
stood to be in decline. That is, states are seen to be diminishing due to 
the erosion of public services, the relentless drive to privatize, the ubiq-
uity of market-based logics that are exacerbated by transnational flows 
of capital, and the pressures of transnational political structures, such 
as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. While the sexual 
struggles emphasized in this book have kept Indian state institutions, 
practices, and discourses in the analytical foreground to an extent, wide-
spread perceptions elsewhere of the scaling back of the state due to the 
effects of neoliberalism have intensified attention to sexuality in other 
sites of governance: personal relationships, consumerism, the media, 
and more. Useful as these studies are, the cases energizing this book 
show that regional and national states may be retreating from some as-
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pects of social life, but the mandate to govern sexuality perpetuates the 
state as central, even crucial. The charades of the Maharashtra govern-
ment’s edict and the criminalization of homosexuality are cautionary 
accounts of how states continue to thrive by leaning heavily on sexuality’s 
arguable potential to engender widespread social chaos.
With the concept of sexual states, this book advances the argument that 
governing sexuality helps account for the idea and inevitability of states, 
especially when they are in flux. It shows that regulating sexuality in its 
various dimensions, such as behavior, marriage, sexual health and dis-
ease, fertility, sexual labor, media representations, and the sex industry, 
are crucial mechanisms through which states are generated and the ex-
pansions and modifications in governance are justified. And it hones the 
understanding that the institutions and agencies, spaces, routinized prac-
tices, and discourses composing states are thoroughly imbued by consid-
erations of sexuality. Efforts to decriminalize homosexuality and other 
sites of contestation flanking the book—closing dance bars, discourses 
of sexual violence, and policies against migration from Bangladesh—
are crucial in demystifying states, foregrounding as they are the iterative, 
multivalent forms of governance giving heft to the illusion of states. Sus-
tained attention to these instances offers insights into states’ impacts on 
vulnerable groups while also revealing how these and other constituen-
cies become implicated in upholding them.
Useful as the issues of dance bars and other cases explored at the end of 
the book are, it is the protracted struggle to decriminalize homosexual-
ity in the contemporary Indian context that provides insights into sex-
uality’s constitutive effects on states. When Naz Foundation sought the 
modification of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, the antisodomy 
law that declares “carnal intercourse against the order of nature,” so that 
it no longer pertained to adult, consensual, same-sex activity, it was not 
the first attempt at decriminalizing homosexuality. That honor belonged 
to the aids Bhedbhav Virodhi Andolan’s (aids Anti-Discrimination 
Movement, abva) attempt to repeal Section 377 dating back to 1994. But 
Naz Foundation’s legal initiative is distinctive and worthy of sustained 
attention because it inspired a national-level campaign, beginning grad-
ually, with the first cross-country coalition of activists and organizations 
aimed at securing rights for sexual and gender minorities.
Governing Sexuality, Constituting States 7
Unlike the bar dancers’ turn to the Maharashtra government as a re-
sult of its edict or the resort to national and Delhi-based state institu-
tions during a watershed in sexual violence against women, Naz Founda-
tion’s turn to the state was premeditated. Seeking to use the antisodomy 
law as a threshold for long overdue rights and equal citizenship for 
same-sexualities, it attempted to engage a variety of state sites at the na-
tional, regional, and local levels, including the courts, government, and 
the Delhi Police. Parsing “the state,” the Naz Foundation intervention 
gestured right from the start toward provisional and contextual under-
standings. As the campaign escalated, it yielded fresh insights, such as 
that the breadth of statecraft can get smaller as well as larger, from the 
local dynamics of policing to regionally specific patterns of governance, 
national-level agencies, and transnational discourses, and that what counts 
as the state is ever contingent.5
Presenting a rich, complicated, and performative arena animated by 
numerous constituencies, the Naz Foundation–led engagements of sex-
uality and state are best apprehended through fieldwork. One aspect of 
my research was focused on the Naz Foundation–led legal challenge, 
the gradual emergence of a nationwide political campaign, and the po-
sitions of supporters and detractors; the other was aimed at unraveling 
“the state” by pursuing the antisodomy law through a variety of state 
institutions, agencies, and practices. Spanning five major metropolitan 
sites—Bangaluru, Chennai, Kolkota, Mumbai, and New Delhi—my field-
work also included Naz Foundation; its legal representative, Lawyers’ 
Collective hiv/aids Unit; a range of sexuality rights, children’s rights, 
and nonfunded groups; and hiv/aids organizations with a stake in this 
conflict. These forays unearthed concerns about the nature and impact 
of the antisodomy law and, more pressing, cautions about locating the 
state at the center of this activism. 
Contesting the State: Sexuality, Law, and Reform
Naz Foundation’s recourse to the state shadows histories of sexual reg-
ulation and reform in India. Pointing to this arc, Patricia Uberoi notes 
that questions of sexuality have been at the heart of the social reform 
agenda, its debates and contestations, in the colonial and postcolonial 
periods.6 Others too have emphasized a tight link between sexuality 
and legislative social reform starting in the nineteenth century.7 For the 
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most part, though, such deliberations over the “woman question,” or, 
for that matter, over marriage, pro-natalism, or population control, have 
been pegged to nation and nationalisms, while institutional analyses of 
state and sexuality are harder to find.8 Further, state is frequently col-
lapsed into nation, as seen repeatedly in treatments of sexual violence 
and trauma during the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947.9 In con-
trast, revised readings of this inaugural moment of the Indian state by 
Veena Das and Christine Keating’s retelling of the framing of the Indian 
Constitution emphasize the weaving together of the social and sexual 
contracts, thereby helping reinsert questions of state and sexuality at the 
heart of Indian postcolonial history.10
State institutions are the hub of contestations over sexuality in con-
temporary India more acutely than ever before. Such contestations—
related not just to homosexuality but also to hiv/aids, sex work, sex 
trafficking, sexual violence, population control, and media representa-
tions, among others—play out intensively in the Indian context, making 
it an especially useful lens to apprehend what is relevant in other settings 
as well.11 Anxieties about obscenity in media representations or art, for 
example, have been defined in terms of the need to protect the moral and 
social fabric of the Indian nation but are actually channeled through local 
police stations and the courts.12 Citizens and representatives of political 
and religious groups routinely register complaints; reportedly thousands 
of such complaints are pending, and although few prosecutions occur, 
state institutions remain the focal points of redress.13
More than any other institution, law and the attempts to enforce, 
reform, and redefine it in ways that match the aspirations of ordinary 
people, what Nandini Sundar calls law struggles, has come to define the 
interface between state and sexuality.14 Not surprisingly, then, abva’s 
abortive attempt at repealing Section 377 and Naz Foundation’s sub-
sequent intervention worked squarely within this paradigm. The an-
tisodomy law had been increasingly commanding center stage due to 
the heightened contestations around same-sex sexualities amid the im-
pending hiv/aids crisis. Marked by greater governmental scrutiny of 
same-sex practices and identities, deemed as high risk, this period also 
witnessed increased countermobilizations to protect people from the 
intrusions of governance. Increasingly Section 377 was identified as the 
symbol of institutionalized homophobia and an instrument of legal and 
extralegal persecution. Additionally, insofar as it criminalizes same-sex 
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sexual practices and, by implication, gay, lesbian, and queer subjects, it 
was also seen as the barrier to securing necessary rights and protections 
for them.
Conceived as a legal strategy to be waged procedurally in the Delhi 
High Court, the Naz Foundation intervention was from the beginning 
circumscribed by its pivot to the state. Aimed at persuading the court to 
decriminalize homosexuality, the writ highlighted the antisodomy law’s 
ill effects on same-sex sexualities and, most important, the violation of 
constitutional rights. In so doing it surfaced questions about the poten-
tials but also the limitations of its bent, arguments, and strategies. For 
one thing, the writ sought to expose the inconsistencies and biases of 
state policies, whereby some state institutions acknowledge and serve 
same-sex sexualities even as the law criminalizes them. Yet its principal 
arguments were couched in a grammar of reasonableness: that decrim-
inalization would ensure better public health and effective regulation, 
thus raising the greater concern for me about the extent to which decrim-
inalization might actually lead to strengthening governance.
Curious about this and the complex relationship between state and 
sexuality that was emerging as a result of Naz Foundation’s challenge 
to the antisodomy law, I spoke with a number of activists and lawyers 
who were part of the legal process. More and more intrigued about how 
the state was being imagined through the writ petition and how offi-
cials were representing notions of state, governance, and sexuality, I vis-
ited a number of state institutions and agencies in the first phase of my 
fieldwork. Looking to gain insight into the positions of the respondents 
(Delhi Police, Union Government of India, and others) named in the Naz 
Foundation writ and also the bureaucratic procedures and mechanisms 
through which such positions are crafted brought me up close to the 
state and the intricacies of governing Section 377.
sexualizing the state: conceptual framings
Alongside surfacing the inconsistencies and incongruities of state agen-
cies and institutions, this ethnographic view also confirmed the need to 
dismantle the overarching idea of “the state.” It dovetailed with post-
structuralist understandings of the state as culturally and historically 
produced and reliant on active fashioning through ideas and practices, 
giving it the illusion of being monolithic, coherent, rational, permanent, 
and irrefutably “there.”15 Seeing the visits to police stations, gathering 
10 chapter one
of police crime records, and other occasions through this critical lens in 
fact laid bare the state as fragmented, messy, contingent, and inconsis-
tent. For instance, it raised questions taken up in chapter 3 about how 
to contend with a law that was intended to criminalize same-sex sexual 
behavior regardless of consent but that in fact has been used primarily 
to prosecute sexual assault on children. This approach also emphasized 
the need to interrogate how administering this code (among others) was 
continually breathing life into the state.
It became clear that the discursive illusion of the state could be con-
fronted only through an investigation into the nitty-gritties of gover-
nance, their pedestrian, iterative qualities.16 Following Foucault’s em-
phasis on studying the micro practices of power affirmed the insight 
that engaging the state critically means attending to its constitutive 
elements, that is, the discourses and micro practices of governance, re-
ports, documents, interactions, procedures, and more. Intent on uncov-
ering this banal and therefore influential thick web, I became especially 
interested in the minutiae of Section 377, its case law and enforcement 
as also the ideological production of crime data, meanings ascribed in 
the government’s legal responses, exchanges during the hearings in the 
Delhi High Court, and so on.
More crucially, my fieldwork raised questions about the role of sexual-
ity in ways that could not be satisfied by seeing these discursive practices 
only as biased and inconsistent. For instance, my search for data, which 
is where chapter 2 begins, revealed that the difficulty of accessing sta-
tistics on Section 377 in contrast to the glut of tables on (hetero)sexual 
crime on women is not adequately explained by erratic institutional prac-
tices. Indeed, moments throughout the fieldwork reinforced the insight 
that the domain of sexuality blurs putative distinctions between the pub-
lic and the private, or the political and affective aspects of the state.17
Law, the seemingly dispassionate arm of the state, it turns out is colored, 
for instance, by justices’ affects, passions, and anxieties that became 
evident during the Supreme Court hearings discussed in chapter 6.18
Trailing the broader spectrum of institutional practices and discourses, 
though, suggests going beyond the scope of law to unearthing sexuality’s 
far-reaching significance to governance and, in effect, the state.
Thus, although the Naz Foundation–led efforts to decriminalize ho-
mosexuality were invoking conventional understandings of the state, the 
struggle inadvertently triggered an analytic of the sexual state. First, it 
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brought home the long-standing insight in feminist and sexuality studies 
that states are deeply subjective, preoccupied with regulating sexuality 
especially among vulnerable constituencies. Reaching for the nuanced 
analyses in this body of work paved the way for seeing that in fact sexual-
ity impacts states just as much as states seek to define sexual normality, 
discipline bodies, and control populations.19 Coming to grips with these 
complexities required shifting meanings of sexuality away from notions 
of individual or collective identity toward its structural connotations, 
as a domain at the level of relations, institutions, and more.20 As such, 
the task expanded to tracking how applying the antisodomy law serves 
the state and, more broadly, seeing the state from the angle of sexuality.
Second, the view from the ground exposed sexuality’s role in help-
ing produce state-effect. The government’s first legal response to the 
Naz Foundation writ was telling in this regard. Analyzed in chapter 5, 
this reply showcases how sexuality’s seeming threat to society is used to 
produce and affirm the role of the state. Another pivotal moment at the 
National Crime Records Bureau (see chapter 2), which I visited to get a 
sense of the scope and circumstances in which crime under Section 377 
is recorded, was equally illustrative. An “inside” view of this state agency 
revealed bit by bit not only sexuality’s impact on its various aspects but 
also how these sexualized processes, spaces, functions, and interper-
sonal interactions cumulate into an idea of the state and the mandate 
to govern.
Third, a comprehensive view of the antisodomy law showed that con-
cerns with sexuality implicitly and explicitly propel governance, often 
in incremental ways—as in the pattern of expanding judicial interpre-
tations of the crime that Section 377 ought to cover. Equally important, 
the upshot was that not just juridical but also biopolitical and neoliberal 
rationalities are implicated in applying the antisodomy provision. This, 
contrary to the fact that sexuality is often left out of theories of biopol-
itics, with which I take issue in chapter 2, and that the state is typically 
overlooked in notions of neoliberalism, a point I reconsider in chapter 
6.21 In other words, issuing from this critical appraisal of the sexual state 
is the conceptual challenge of contending with multiple rationalities of 
governance rather than taking a teleological view of it (whereby neolib-
eral forms are seen as supplanting juridical and biopolitical modes).
Coming to grips with the sexual state in these ways highlighted the 
fourth aspect: that ordinary people also participate in animating it. Com-
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monplace criticisms and ridicule of the state abound, yet it is difficult to 
sidestep the state in the search for justice, particularly for marginalized 
groups.22 Vulnerable to the effects of state power, they are also likely to 
become implicated in fetishizing the state.23 Setting into motion the 
legal process lasting for over a decade, the campaign to decriminalize 
homosexuality and the entire constellation of actors, constituents, opin-
ions, and criticisms it prompted spun around projections of the state. 
Thus Naz Foundation’s interpellation of the state as antagonist and pro-
tagonist mattered, as did more far-reaching critiques of the state offered 
by the coalition Voices against Section 377 (considered in chapter 6). Un-
derstanding the inciting of the state in these complex ways brings to light 
that in dispute between the Delhi High Court’s decision decriminalizing 
homosexuality and the Supreme Court’s subsequent overruling of it was 
the role and reach of the state.
Generating an ethnographically grounded appraisal of the sexual state 
yielded additional insights around which this book is constructed, be-
ginning with the point that Section 377 is not, nor could it be, the prin-
cipal law through which same-sex sexualities are governed. Even though 
the antisodomy law was intended to curb same-sex sexual activity (and 
other behavior seen as transgressive), a review of legal history indicates 
that it has for the most part not been used to prosecute adult consensual 
activity. Rather sexuality’s significance to the state links a whole nexus 
of laws, policies, and discourses—among them the anti–sex trafficking 
act and lower order laws, including vagrancy and public nuisance, that 
are easier to enforce and therefore likely to have greater impact than the 
antisodomy law on same-sex sexualities, especially those vulnerable due 
to their gender expression and social class.
Pressed further still, it is debatable that sexuality’s effects are lim-
ited to any one expression, pointing instead to an approach that goes 
beyond troubling states’ heteronormative underpinnings.24 Taking an 
integrated view of sexuality’s disparate iterations has the distinct advan-
tage of providing thoroughgoing critiques of the state, especially in con-
texts where the dualities of heterosexuality and homosexuality have not 
been foundational.25 The examples of the dance bars, agitations against 
(hetero)sexual violence, and attempts to stall immigration from Bangla-
desh, alongside the struggle to decriminalize homosexuality, fruitfully 
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expose contiguities between sexuality’s various iterations and highlight 
its effects on states even when not easily perceptible, as in the case of 
emigrants from Bangladesh.
Gesturing to neither a single law nor a specific aspect of sexuality, the 
analysis also throws into question the premise that Section 377 imper-
ils only, or mainly, homosexual subjects. The campaign against the law 
presumed that Indian legal history tracks closely with Foucauldian gene-
alogies of the homosexual, who is seen as brought into history through 
institutions such as law only to be persecuted. But if, as noted earlier 
and explored fully in chapter 3, such a pattern is not borne out by case 
law, then it throws into doubt the presumed subject of this statute. More 
gravely, the ethnography examined in chapter 4 points toward the ways 
the law’s enforcement is likely to target hijras and, significantly, religious 
minorities, especially Muslims, regardless of their sexual practices. Ac-
counting for how some religious minority groups are racialized and pe-
joratively queered, the discussion provides a broadened understanding 
of the range of subjects impacted by the antisodomy statute. As such, a 
close analysis of this law, coupled with the other cases I consider, illus-
trates the need to bring “least powerful” constituencies—on the basis of 
marginalized social class and caste, sexual orientation, gender expres-
sion, and religion—and the numerous points of regulation into the same 
field of analysis, without of course collapsing relevant differences.
In sum, a critique of the sexual state advances radical appraisals of 
state, sexuality, and governance. This theoretical turn keeps states in the 
analytical foreground and demystifies them by drawing attention to the 
subjective and especially sexualized governance practices, laws, policies, 
and discourses that help realize them. Analyzing how states are consti-
tuted partly by the mandate to contain sexuality’s putative threat to the 
social order, this stance looks at the ways sexuality easily affects every 
aspect of the assemblage abbreviated as “the state.” Highlighting the ba-
nal as well as multiple iterations of governance actually giving substance 
to states, it encourages awareness of how race, gender and expression, 
and social caste and class are implicated in the exertions of power. Not 
least, this approach underscores that it is not only the nitty-gritties of 
governing that help produce state-effect but also the quests for sexual 
reform that (are obligated to) pivot around the state.
To illustrate the relevance of this approach beyond the efforts to de-
criminalize homosexuality, I return to the ban on dance bars for the rest of 
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this introduction. Marking the differences presented by the dance bars—
heterosexuality, sexual labor, and the politics of the regional state—from 
the decriminalization of homosexuality, I show the urgency of grappling 
with states’ reliance on sexuality and striving further toward critical as-
sessments of discourses and practices of rule.
Dance Bars and Remaking the Postliberal Regional State
Dance bars took center stage in public discourse once the regional state’s 
deputy chief minister and home minister, R. R. Patil, suggested a pro-
hibition on women’s performances in these settings. When the state 
governor refused to sign an ordinance initially proposed by Patil to shut 
down dance bars, a bill (Bill No. 60 of 2005) was swiftly introduced into 
the Maharashtra State Legislature on July 8, 2005.26 The bill, entailing an 
amendment to Section 33 of the Bombay Police Act of 1951, which reg-
ulates entertainment such as dance performances in restaurants, bars, 
and so-called permit rooms, was unanimously passed within two weeks:
and whereas it is brought to the notice of the State Government 
that the eating houses, permit rooms or beer bars to whom licenses 
to hold a dance performance, have been granted are permitting the 
performance of dances in an indecent, obscene or vulgar manner;
and whereas it is also brought to the notice of the Government 
that such performances of dances are giving rise to the exploitation 
of women;
and whereas the Government has received several complaints 
regarding the manner of holding such dance performances;
and whereas the Government considers that such performance 
of dances in eating houses, permit rooms or beer bars are derogatory 
to the dignity of women and are likely to deprave, corrupt or injure the 
public morality or morals.27
The inconsistencies of state discourses on dance bars encapsulated in 
the bill were conspicuous right from the start. This, not just because the 
bill exempted establishments with ratings of three stars or more or per-
formances in Hindi- and Marathi-language films but also because of 
how the ills of dance bars were framed. Hinging on questions of wom-
en’s bodies and sexualities, the discursive legitimation for closing down 
dance bars had as much to do with the vulgarity of the performances 
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and the “easy money” women could net by dancing and manipulating 
men’s weaknesses as with women’s sexual exploitation and trafficking of 
women and girls. State logics alternated between the violation of the dig-
nity of women and the threat that the women posed to public morality.
For those who opposed the state’s edict, not least the bar dancers 
and feminist scholars and researchers mobilized by the implications of 
the ban, its rampant contradictions were fodder for contention. Since 
little was widely known about dance bars beyond the handful of popular 
representations and an account based on a sample too small to carry 
heft, two studies conducted by feminist researchers, “Background and 
Working Conditions of Women Working in Dance Bars in Mumbai” and 
“After the Ban: Women Working in Dance Bars of Mumbai,” became cru-
cial in countering the underlying schisms.28 Contrary to state officials’ 
claims, the first study showed that women were not trafficked into the 
profession, were between twenty-one and twenty-five years on average, 
and lived precariously on incomes of less than Rs. 15,000 (approximately 
$330) a month, entirely dependent on a share of the tips from customers.
Noting that bar dancers were largely from culturally and economi-
cally marginalized communities, this study and other emerging accounts 
troubled the uneven and unjust effects of state policy as well as its un-
derlying motivations. From these counterhistories it became clear that 
as many as 42 percent of the women in the study were from caste-based 
and marginalized Muslim communities, where unmarried women sup-
ported families through some form of sexual labor.29 Further, the in-
junction against dance bars stood to exacerbate, as it subsequently did, 
the vulnerabilities of women from migrant communities who had been 
forced to migrate from within the state and elsewhere due to the impact 
of uneven development.30 Identifying the state’s preoccupations with the 
dance bars as trails of earlier colonial histories aimed at reforming nautch 
(singing and dancing) girls as well as elitist attempts to rid Maharashtra 
of its regional sexualized entertainment forms, such as lavani, feminist 
critics rightly indicted the casteist, moralistic, hypocritical tendencies 
of the state.31
After the law was passed and the dance bars were closed on midnight 
of August 14, 2005, challenges to the biases and subjective hues of the 
Maharashtra state had little choice but to seek recourse from another 
state institution, namely law. A number of writs from the bar owners as-
sociation, bar dancers union, feminist coalitions, and a variety of social 
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and activist groups contested the ban in the High Court of Bombay pri-
marily on the grounds that it violated constitutional rights—including 
the right to practice a profession, occupation, or trade; the right to life 
and livelihood; and the right to freedom of expression—while discrim-
inating against this form of labor. In a prompt decision, Indian Hotel & 
Restaurants Association v. The State of Maharashtra and Others, the high court 
declared the state decree to be unconstitutional, while safeguarding the 
bar owners’ and dancers’ fundamental right to practice a profession, 
occupation, or trade and making much of the state’s irrationalities in 
passing the law: that the injunction was arbitrary since it exempted other 
elite establishments and that if the dance bars were morally suspect, how 
could the state allow women to work as wait staff.32 Rejecting the Ma-
harashtra government’s subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court upheld 
the high court’s ruling and arguments and delivered a searing critique of 
the state’s illogic, paving the way for reopening the dance bars in 2013.33
Despite the apex court’s pronouncement, the state government re-
mained defiant under Patil’s leadership, seeking measures that would 
preserve the ban on dance bars.34 Proposing in fact to extend the embargo 
to exempt elite establishments, the state government waded deeper into 
the mires of sexual regulation, reenergizing questions about dance bars’ 
importance to the state.35 Taking on this question, I build on feminist 
appraisals the regional state, while critically reading the state through 
the histories of dance bars and attempts to regulate them.
regional itineraries of the sexual state
The rise and fall of dance bars chronicles the remaking of the Maharash-
tra state over the past two decades. Emerging in the 1980s, dance bars 
flourished outward from Mumbai to its suburbs and satellite cities and 
then on to other cities and towns under a morass of regulations as well 
as extralegal arrangements that were the offshoots of the developmen-
tal state characterizing postindependence India.36 Managed through 
an elaborate system of licensing and a density of state laws governing 
restaurants, serving liquor, and dance and entertainment that were grad-
ually put into place over the years, the dance bars were lucrative sources 
of state revenue from taxes and fees, as well as extralegal payoffs for stay-
ing open past the official closing time, placating police, or contributing 
to various political parties.37
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The apex and turning point of this economy of exchanges occurred 
in the mid-1990s under the right-wing coalition government of the Shiv 
Sena and Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp), just as the regional state was being 
impacted by liberalization. Introduced in 1991, liberalization measures 
ushered in the deregulation of markets and licensing control, foreign 
capital investment, and privatization, as well as increasing political de-
centralization that granted greater autonomy to states and oriented 
them directly toward transnational capital and global governance.38 As 
Sarah Joseph notes, these changes represented the incorporation of mar-
ket rationalities in the structures of the state and mechanisms of gover-
nance.39 Subsequent efforts to revive Mumbai as a global financial and 
service center, for example, attest to how the regional state was and is 
being reconfigured, simultaneously repressing and abetting market ra-
tionalities and further blurring the boundaries with corporate capital 
and the interests of elite consumers.40
The Maharashtra government’s increasingly fraught relationship with 
the dance bars by the late 1990s reveals the regional state’s attempts to 
transition from a regulatory system embedded in licensing and payoffs 
to one that is more liberal and rational. Flavia Agnes explains that the 
strains initially involved a punitive excise tax hike of 300 percent and 
police raids in 1998 under the right-wing coalition government, which 
led to a bar owners’ lobby and unprecedented public attention to a rally 
of some thirty thousand bar dancers.41 Particularly noteworthy is that in 
2001 the subsequent government, led by the Nationalist Congress Party, 
to which Patil belongs, introduced for the first time measures specific to 
dance bars that would have lessened corruption, but for disagreements 
with the bar owners later adjudicated by the courts.42 Then, only a year 
before the dance bars were closed, the government issued a fresh set of 
rules in July 2004, levying restrictions on the kinds of clothes bar dancers 
could wear, establishing a barrier between the dancers and customers, 
and stipulating a maximum of eight dancers on stage at a time, among 
others.
These escalating public conflicts and protracted efforts to manage and 
eventually shut down the dance bars were undoubtedly part of a larger 
project, as critics have noted, to “cleanse” the city of lives and lifestyles 
incompatible with state-sponsored neoliberal visions.43 But they were 
also signs of a state in crisis. In a postliberal era when the state is no lon-
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ger the focal point or, as Joseph argues, is no longer seen as the guardian 
of public interests, dance bars provided an opportunity for the regional 
state to remake itself.44 Rather than a calculus of retraction or expansion, 
the state’s dogged attention to dance bars over the years and across the 
political spectrum reveals a crisis of relevance and legitimacy.45 Speaking 
to these representational aspects, Akhil Gupta and K. Sivaramakrishnan 
observe that liberalization entailed shifts in arrangements between the 
state and economy and a change in “the way relations between state and 
other institutions and social groups are recast and re-imagined,” thus 
raising the question of what was peculiarly significant about dance bars 
for the regional state.46
sexual perils and state- effects
Setting dance bars apart from other forms of sexual labor is the widely 
held view that they do not simply provide sexual entertainment to men 
but drive them to irrational sexual behavior and fiscal excess through the 
seductions of love and romance. Indeed over the years dance bars were 
gradually associated with the false promises of love and romance that 
would lead men to irresponsible and excessive behavior. Reinforced in 
the first extensive journalistic portrayal of dance bars, Suketu Mehta’s 
book Maximum City, this is how dance bars came to be understood and 
reproduced once they were under the harsh light of mainstream media. 
Spelling out these discourses of excess and extraction, Mehta chronicles 
what he sees as a typical scenario:
It goes this way: A gangwar boy might start becoming a regular at a 
bar. He might see a girl whom he fancies. He might imagine him-
self protecting her from villains, or he pictures the girl nursing his 
wounds after a gunfight or an encounter. So he goes up to the girl on 
the way out and asks to see her after the bar closes. She smiles and 
asks him to come back tomorrow. He goes back the next evening and 
sits there and now watches only her among the dancers. She remem-
bers him from the previous day, smiles once or twice at him, and he 
asks the waiter to garland her with thousand or five thousand rupees. 
She dances a little faster for him, in his direction. He stays until the 
bar closes and then asks her again for her number. She asks him to 
come the next night; she will be waiting for him. And so he comes 
again and again to the bar, throwing a little more money over her head 
Governing Sexuality, Constituting States 19
each time, until one night, when he is least expecting it, she quickly 
thrusts a piece of paper into his hand. On it is written the magic tele-
phone number and her name.47
Mehta’s narrative sees emotional intimacies between dancers and pa-
trons at the crux of transactions of cash, gifts, and sex, while showing 
how extraction and excess are inherent to dance bars.
These populist accounts further diverged into bar dancers as sexual 
predators and men as prey. It is for this reason that although portrayals 
of women as hapless victims of the trade entered state and mainstream 
criticisms of dance bars, they were consistently offset by apocryphal ac-
counts of women earning staggering amounts of money from merely (!) 
dancing in bars. Mehta’s chapter on bar dancers singles out one such 
woman with the pseudonym Monalisa, as if to suggest that exceptional 
cases such as hers illustrate the danger inherent in the trade. Similarly, 
soon after the ban went into effect, a Mumbai bar dancer, Tarannum 
Khan, was arrested on charges of illegal betting, gambling, and links to 
the underworld. She captured attention for having amassed vast wealth 
from dancing at the bars and reportedly being literally showered with 
90 lakhs in one night by a male patron later indicted on charges of massive 
corruption. Raids by income tax authorities on the homes of several bar 
dancers and media reports of untold extralegal wealth further fueled the 
discourses of extraction and excessive accumulation. As one commenta-
tor observes, these images effectively displaced media representations of 
despair and desperation that emerged after the ban was enforced.48
In contrast, male patrons of dance bars were seen as gullible, easily 
seduced into fiscal irresponsibility, and needing to be saved from the 
dancers and themselves. A frequent point of concern was that men of-
ten squandered their entire monthly income on the bar dancers, thereby 
harming their “respectable” wives and mothers. If this discourse was 
implicitly about men from the working classes with dependents and lim-
ited income, another point of anxiety derived from the intersections of 
masculinity and surplus wealth, often associated with the underworld. 
The stories about men bestowing lakhs of rupees on the object of their 
desire, as Mehta describes, were stories about the overindulgences of 
money and masculinity. Indeed one of the five amendments proposed 
by the state prior to the embargo on the bars was that clients could not
shower money on the dancers. What tied together the two discourses 
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on masculinity was the fervent belief that dance bars make men behave 
irrationally, both sexually and fiscally. Despite the fact that the discourse 
of male irrational sexual behavior was not widespread, it dominated in 
the context of dance bars.
The notoriety of dance bars was and continues to be especially con-
ducive to reassembling the illusion of a regional state with increasingly 
blurred boundaries and uncertain relevance. Introducing one regulatory 
mechanism after another, especially since the late 1990s, helped reassert 
the state’s indispensability in managing sexuality’s irrational, excessive, 
and ever-present potential to disrupt the social order. The imperative 
to “save” besotted men and the women who posed a danger to men as 
well as themselves aided in reproducing the state as the centerpiece of 
governance despite liberalization, or perhaps more necessary because of 
it. Positioned at the crosshairs of transnational capital and global gov-
ernance, the regional state was produced as both modern and moral by 
dovetailing with U.S. State Department–led antitrafficking rhetorics and 
globalizing discourses of women’s rights to justify the imminent dangers 
of dance bars.49
These sexualized edicts, policies, and discourses, then, are fruit-
fully understood as traces of the sexual state, which is reproduced amid 
changing regional, national, and transnational contexts and reflected in 
the struggle against the antisodomy law. Despite the differences between 
the two sites of contestation, not least issues of (hetero)sexual labor and 
(homo)sexual identity, accounting perhaps for their noticeable lack of 
engagement with each other, and the significantly different outcomes 
in the Supreme Court, a careful exploration of the injunction against 
dance bars illustrates that states continue to remain the hub of sexual 
regulation, governing through a nexus of laws, policies, and discourses 
rather than simply the injunction against dance bars or the antisodomy 
law. Consider therefore the sexualized regulatory mechanisms that both 
preceded and outlasted the closing of the dance bars: state officials’ defi-
ance of the apex court’s ruling to reopen dance bars, the refusal to issue 
fresh licenses, proposals to make licensing fees prohibitively high and 
issue more stringent rules to discourage dance bars. Despite the rulings 
in favor of the dance bars by the Bombay High Court and the Supreme 
Court, the regional government remains committed to obstructing the 
reopening of dance bars and in so doing continually reproducing the 
state and justifying discourses and practices of governance.
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The Roadmap
This book is about the intimacies of state and sexuality that play out 
widely in the Indian context, typically through law, sometimes at the 
behest of the state institutions and at other times through the pursuit of 
redress. Focusing on the struggle to decriminalize homosexuality, the 
book is organized into three sections. Supplementing this introduction, 
chapter 2 begins with a pursuit for statistics related to the antisodomy 
law in order to gain some insight into the extent to which this law is 
enforced. Bringing an up-close view of the National Crime Records Bu-
reau, my fieldwork yields crucial insights about sexuality’s impact on 
such agencies composing the state by holding up to scrutiny its spaces, 
iterative practices, and routinized procedures for crunching and report-
ing data on crime. The discussion revolves around the difficulty that 
heterosexual violence against women is emphasized and rendered into 
a social problem, whereas the numbers for Section 377 are deliberately 
omitted. Rather than heteronormativity, I account for this difference by 
way of the agency’s concern with ensuring the biopolitical welfare of the 
population. Taking issue with the neglect of sexuality in theories of the 
biopolitical while emphasizing the connections between biopolitics and 
sexuality leads to the insight that seemingly objective measures such as 
statistics as well as state definitions of social problems are deeply sub-
jective sexualized practices. It also makes clear that Section 377 is not 
the primary law but one among a thicket of decrees, policies, discourses, 
and iterative practices through which same-sex sexualities are governed 
and states affirmed.
Part II further disassembles the idea of the monolithic, rational state 
by exploring the subjective histories of law and law enforcement. Show-
ing that case law and police crime reports (known as firs, First Informa-
tion Reports) for the antisodomy law are primarily related to child sexual 
assault, chapter 3 reveals the irrationalities of a law used quite differently 
from its original intent. This approach leads to a fuller understanding 
of how law’s practices and discourses regulate sexual crime and subjects 
in ways that reaffirm its indispensability and, by extension, the state in 
preserving sociosexual order. Reading case law from the angle of sexual 
violence on children, the analysis reveals a steady expansion in the range 
of sexual practices and discourses that fall within the ambit of gover-
nance. As such, I argue, case law or police crime reports do not support 
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a Foucauldian understanding of “the homosexual” as the beleaguered 
subject of the antisodomy law, and I note the pitfalls of such readings. 
Arguing for the need to disentangle the homosexual from these records 
of child sexual violence, I also caution that Foucauldian readings of law 
and homosexuality risk strengthening the state—by assuming it as the 
primary site of injustice and then as the arbiter of justice.
Continuing the focus on juridical aspects of the state, chapter 4 turns 
to the antisodomy law’s significance to law enforcement. Fieldwork con-
ducted among the Delhi Police helps highlights the subjective, sexual-
ized aspects of law enforcement in three ways. First, pivoting around 
discussions with police constables and more senior members of the 
force, the chapter shows that the generic homosexual is not the primary 
target of law enforcement. Rather the crucial insight is that policing in 
Delhi is likely to imperil racialized religious minorities, particularly Mus-
lims, whom the police associate with sexual crimes. Making the case that 
Muslims are being racialized within the national context and specifically 
within police discussions, the chapter explains the inconsistencies of 
policing and the endemic forms of prejudice that so quickly rise to the 
forefront in relation to enforcing the antisodomy law. Second, indicat-
ing the ways police also target hijras, the analysis speaks to the flexible 
uses of Section 377 that permit governance well beyond the law’s scope. 
Third, revealing dissent among the Delhi Police, this discussion notes 
that while there may be some leeway in the policing of the generic homo-
sexual, the regulation of racialized religious minorities and gender non-
conforming persons is more intractable.
Following the groundwork laid in the two previous sections, part III 
shifts course to documenting the legal campaign to decriminalize homo-
sexuality that ends abortively with the 2013 Supreme Court decision. 
Framed against the previously established insights that the antisodomy 
code is not the only law governing same-sex sexualities and its potential 
impact is not limited to same-sexualities, chapter 5 begins with a dis-
cussion of how the Naz Foundation writ was constrained by a pivot to 
the state and a necessarily reductive understanding of the antisodomy 
law. Drawing on fieldwork at Naz Foundation as well as interviews with 
sexuality rights activists and visits to organizations across five major 
metropolitans, I account for early criticisms of the writ and its evolution 
into a national-level campaign focused around the antisodomy law and 
the generic gay subject. Also building on fieldwork conducted among 
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state agencies, especially the Ministry of Home Affairs, I underscore 
the subjectivities of the government’s legal response opposing decrim-
inalization, exposing its appeal to the perils and excesses of sexuality 
in order to preserve the integrity of state institutions and justify state 
intervention. Leading to the writ’s initial dismissal by the Delhi High 
Court in 2004 on a mere technicality, the chapter concludes by chroni-
cling Naz Foundation’s plea to the Supreme Court and the subsequent 
directive instructing the High Court to decide the case on its merits, 
thereby rendering Section 377 as the flashpoint for a national legal and 
political campaign for justice.
Delving into the second phase of the struggle against the antisodomy 
law (2006–13), chapter 6 juxtaposes the 2009 Delhi High Court ruling 
decriminalizing homosexuality and the subsequent 2013 Supreme Court 
decision recriminalizing it. The chapter begins with the decisive impact 
of Voices against Section 377, a coalition of Delhi-based groups, on the 
historic Delhi High Court ruling. Reading this decision alongside the 
apex court’s overruling, I make the case that the two judgments repre-
sent diverging views of the relationship between state and sexuality in 
postliberalized India. Thus, the argument goes, the lower court seeks to 
reduce the reach of the state, except that it does so by deploying an indi-
vidualized, assimilationist, and neoliberal rights regime. Turning to the 
Supreme Court 2013 pronouncement, the analysis comes to grips with 
the ways it too is shaped by the imperatives of postliberalization. The 
chapter shows that, in contrast to the lower court’s vision, the apex court 
seeks to reaffirm the state and prolong governance through legislative 
intrusions into the realm of sexuality.
The postscript, “Afterlives,” offers a summary and discussion of the 
implications of the arguments developed in the previous chapters. It 
also extends the implications of the concept of sexual states through an 
analysis of the agitations around sexual violence that swept India after 
December 2012 and its applicability to a site where the imperatives of 
sexuality are not so obviously marked, namely migration from Bangla-
desh into New Delhi, before ending with the concept’s relevance outside 
of India.
C H A P T E R  2
E N G E N D E R I N G  S O C I A L  P R O B L E M S , 
E X P O S I N G  S E X U A L I T Y ’ S  E F F E C T S 
O N  B I O P O L I T I C A L  S TAT E S
States’ preoccupations with sexuality are everywhere in evidence. In 
the United States the military has lifted the ban against lesbian and gay 
soldiers, the Supreme Court has mandated the recognition of gay marriage 
at the federal level, the Food and Drug Administration has approved the 
over-the-counter sale of the “morning after” pill, and numerous regional 
states have introduced legislation against sex trafficking. In the United 
Kingdom, the Office of National Statistics has started to track lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual members of the population. In Russia lawmakers 
have passed legislation against “homosexual propaganda,” and Nigeria 
has expanded and intensified the criminalization of homosexuality. 
Instances of sexualized forms of governance—legislation, policy shifts, 
decriminalization or intensified proscriptions—are numerous. Coming 
to grips with them illuminates how they help produce the state as an 
elemental, normal, if not natural, feature of social life and as ever more 
important to ensuring social stability.
The usefulness of tracing governance’s recourse to sexuality became 
amply evident in what started off as an innocuous quest for statistics 
related to the antisodomy law, Section 377. Seeking insight into the Naz 
Foundation–led struggle, I wondered how numbers would inform the 
efforts to undo Section 377. Would they be low, thereby confirming the 
established wisdom that police routinely harass and extort but do not 
formally charge same-sex sexual subjects under Section 377, or would 
they be high, asking for a different account? While exploring policing 
and criminal prosecutions was important to understanding the context 
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in which Section 377 came to be the lightning rod of state injustice, num-
bers promised rough and ready insight into the law’s landscape.
Helpful police constables recommended that I visit the National 
Crime Records Bureau (ncrb), which serves as a clearinghouse for crime 
statistics. But gathering the data related to Section 377 turned out to be 
no straightforward task, and the process of gaining access to the infor-
mation was also complicated. My first foray into ncrb might well have 
ended abortively, with a frustrating side note in field logs on impossible 
bureaucratic hoops and a footnote in this book explaining the absence 
of numbers. As it happened, the initial lack of available data, a series of 
encounters with state representatives, and paths from cubicles to larger 
and larger offices winding through a series of administrative sections 
gave me insight into the complexities of sexuality and governance prac-
tices at a seemingly dry, bureaucratic, number-crunching state agency.
The visits to ncrb highlighted inconsistencies in the processing 
of data, for while numbers for Section 377 are omitted, (hetero)sexual 
crime against women is processed into statistics and elevated to the sta-
tus of a social problem. Further, these irregularities foregrounded the 
significance of the agency’s iterative practices, such as tracking numbers 
for crime, processing statistics, and generating reports, thereby surfac-
ing the banal and unremarkable and, as such, more impactful aspects 
of governance.1 This dovetailed with the added insight, that consider-
ations of sexuality affect biopolitical forms, measuring and indexing 
crime in order to govern and ensure the well-being of the population 
as a whole—a point that has been routinely neglected by a long line of 
scholars, including Giorgio Agamben, Henry Giroux, Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri, Achille Mbembe, Aihwa Ong, and more recently Akhil 
Gupta.2 And not least, what became repeatedly apparent are the implicit 
and explicit ways sexuality impacts not just the functions of crunching 
numbers and producing reports but also ncrb’s spaces, structures, and 
procedures for handling the interpersonal.
Providing a nitty-gritty glimpse of a typical bureaucracy, the quest 
for numbers lays the groundwork for coming to grips with sexuality’s 
effects on state agencies such as the ncrb. Especially since the agency 
(or “the state”) is not a monolithic thing or a presumptive reality but a 
cultural and material assemblage and effect, delving into the elements, 
functions, and procedures that make it work is a means of unearthing 
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how sexual ideologies help sustain its idea and importance. And insofar 
as ncrb is not a constituent part of “the state” (for that would mean see-
ing the state as overarching and everlasting), ncrb’s discursive practices 
and spaces are windows onto the idea and inevitability of the state itself.3
This chapter begins by dwelling on my first field visit to ncrb, for 
the interactions and observations look beyond the question of numbers 
or reports to the subtleties of sexuality’s effects. As such, it sits squarely 
within a rich tradition of anthropological and sociological ethnographies 
of the state that use the minutiae of fieldwork to critical ends.4 Dwelling 
on the deferrals and obstacles in dealing with this bureaucracy, this ap-
proach teases out their sexual inflections in ways that are relevant not 
only to ncrb but to research trips to government offices, state-run li-
braries, and archives, to name a few. As such, it presses against the ten-
dency to see such field-based encounters as a backdrop to data gathering 
and not the data themselves. At the same time, heeding Gupta’s cautions 
about fieldwork’s unassailable claim—“I was there”—this chapter takes 
the position, following Jacqueline Stevens, that our experience of the 
state is embedded in its discourses.5
The second section revolves around the difficulty that numbers for 
crime under Section 377 are not easily accessible even as crime against 
women is more fully processed and reported. Analyzing the differences 
between numbers and statistics, I explore how, in contrast to crime re-
lated to the antisodomy law, crime against women is constructed as a 
social problem in ways that help reproduce state institutions such as 
ncrb and legitimize their purpose. While such disparities may be con-
signed to heteronormative ideologies, I argue instead for the need to 
look more deeply into the biopolitical practices and techniques of gover-
nance producing the disparities and neglect. Coming more fully to grips 
with them, the last section argues that crime related to Section 377 is be-
ing actively written out of measures aimed at assessing and ensuring the 
welfare of the population. The analysis also leads to the insight that the 
antisodomy law is not the only site through which same-sex sexualities 
are likely to be regulated, thereby clearing the way for a more complex 
understanding of how Section 377 is used and the implications thereof.
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Banal Quests and Emerging Insights
New Delhi, scene one:
I arrive one July afternoon at the ncrb in New Delhi. Stating my 
business at the check-in window as a researcher who is looking for sta-
tistical data, I am sent up to the next floor to Kavita Paul’s cabin [cu-
bicle], joint assistant director in the Systems Development division.6
Partially transparent partitions carve up the large room into individual 
work areas, with several desks in the center. Stacks of files, bound cop-
ies of reports are crammed everywhere in cabins, by the desks outside, 
against the wall.
Kavita Paul greets me graciously from behind her desk in her corner 
cabin. Our meeting is short, lasting but a few minutes. The information 
on Section 377 does not exist since the data are reported by offenses, 
not the penal code, she says. Paul offers me data on crimes against 
women instead; that is no problem, she says. Stacks of files, paper, re-
cords everywhere, but no information related to Section 377?
I persist, and Paul asks to see my authorization letter. Then, some-
what sympathetically, she says, “Come with me,” and takes me to N. 
K. Agarwal, joint additional director in Systems Maintenance. His is 
also a cabin, but partitioned from floor to ceiling. He and his assistant 
confirm that this information can be derived from the system. After 
expressing doubt over my letter of approval since it doesn’t say anything 
specifically about ncrb or Section 377, he waves me on to get permis-
sion from Mr. Nair in the Operations division.
On the ground floor, past the odor of the women’s and men’s bath-
rooms, past the double doors into a common space lined with cabins 
on the left and a couple of work rooms on the right, is Mr. Nair’s cabin. 
Blue plastic lines all of the windows and the glass panels on the doors, 
which, coupled with florescent light, radiates a moon-like glow. Pro-
tecting the computers and the records, not ambiance, is the likely pur-
pose. My first task is again to explain my interest in data on Section 377 
and furnish my letter of approval. He says that I should state my interest 
in a letter so that my request can be approved by Deputy Director of 
Computer and Systems Satish Dubey. It seems wise to use institutional 
letterhead instead of the blank paper he offers, and the letter, Nair’s 
assistant and my escort, Sanjay, and I are sent on to Mr. Dubey.
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Dubey’s is a small but full-fledged office on the second floor. He is 
amenable to my request, indeed affable and interested in my research. 
However, I have to get permission from the director, he says. He cannot 
be serious!
To encounter the ncrb is to encounter the material histories and imagi-
nations of the state.7 In 1986 several state agencies that kept track of crime 
data, including the Central Fingerprint Bureau and the data section of 
the Central Bureau of Investigation, were amalgamated to establish the 
ncrb, based on the 1979 National Police Commission recommendation 
to establish a “nodal agency” to standardize crime records and to create 
sharable databases across police stations.8 Its charge is to provide police 
with information necessary for law enforcement by serving as a clearing-
house for crime statistics and to improve public service through the web, 
for example, by providing information on stolen vehicles and authenti-
cating secondhand vehicles to be purchased. Located in R. K. Puram, a 
suburb of the capital city, ncrb is housed in a low-level, unassuming 
building. What is it about the state that makes one expect resplendent 
structures, especially where national crime statistics are managed? The 
signboard is unimpressive: basic black and white lettering on metal, typ-
ical of Indian postcolonial state institutions. Then again, cultural and 
historical discourses of the state constantly filter every encounter with 
its buildings, spaces, documents, agents, and discourses.
But a culturalist reading of the ncrb needs elaboration in light of C. J. 
Fuller and John Harriss’s strong claim that scholarship on the modern In-
dian state shortchanges it as an idea or does not embrace it in the idiom 
of the state-idea (after Philip Abrams).9 The same is true, they suggest, 
of ordinary people’s understanding; sarkar (Hindi, encompassing state, 
government, and state officials) has etched itself as a material reality 
in the minds of ordinary Indians. To insist on a culturalist approach, 
then, is either to be at odds with scholarship and popular discourses on 
the state in India or to claim a more radical contribution on this point 
than is warranted. Fuller and Harriss are right to suggest that scholarly 
attention remains on analytical narratives of the trajectory, successes, 
and travails of the modern Indian state, but Partha Chatterjee’s history of 
the postcolonial Indian state is as much a political as a cultural narrative 
of the changing idea of the state.10 Similarly Sudipta Kaviraj’s and Ashis 
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Nandy’s analyses are each premised on the subjective imaginations of 
the state, and Gupta’s analysis of the discourses of corruption in rural 
northern India points even more clearly to how people construct the 
state symbolically.11
As a state agency dedicated to processing and managing crime sta-
tistics, ncrb embodies notions of the neutral, rational state, compared 
to, say, impassioned perceptions of political corruption, making it that 
much harder to reconcile it with the subjective understanding of the state 
that I introduced in chapter 1. If anything, the ncrb seems to conform to 
the impersonal and rational characterizations that derive from Weber’s 
combined view of the state as a compulsory organization, with a mo-
nopoly on the use of force and binding authority over a defined territory, 
and a bureaucracy, characterized by division of labor and jurisdictions, 
hierarchy of authority, abstract laws or administrative regulations, and 
general rules of functioning.12 But such foundational assessments of ra-
tionally minded, bureaucratically driven states have been faulted, and by 
none more cogently than Ann Laura Stoler’s concept of affective states: 
“Such a focus opens up another possible premise: that the role of the state 
is not only as Antonio Gramsci defined it, in the business of ‘educating 
consent.’ More basically, such consent is made possible, not through 
some abstract process of ‘internalization,’ but by shaping appropriate 
and reasoned affect, by directing affective judgments, by severing some 
affective bonds and establishing others, by adjudicating what consti-
tuted moral sentiments—in short, by educating the proper distribution 
of sentiments and desires.”13 Still, to rethink ncrb as subjective means 
extending Stoler’s arguments by noting that the challenge lies not only 
in tracing states’ use of affective strategies but also in recognizing that 
rational techniques are not asubjective. Said another way, rationality is 
not opposed to affect but is in fact another form of it, thereby raising the 
stakes to showing that irrationality can be constitutive of something so 
seemingly impersonal as number crunching and report making. Stoler’s 
gesture toward affective states also needs to be extended by accounting 
more directly for sexuality, for despite her careful attention to it in terms 
of colonial governance, sexuality is visibly absent in these reflections on 
the state.
In contrast, Begoña Aretxaga’s analysis provides a more thorough-
going critique of the state as a site of libidinal passions and sexual fanta-
sies. In the accounts of strip searches of Irish Republican Army women 
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prisoners by prison guards in March 1992, Aretxaga sees chilling erup-
tions of state fantasy, a phantasmatic heterosexual mass rape of the 
prisoners conducted by male and female prison guards. In the process, 
Aretxaga notes astutely, “state power lost the neutral, rational mantle 
that legitimizes it to reveal a thoroughly sexualized, symptomatic body 
politic.” But unlike the episodic and violent displays of state sexual fan-
tasies and passions brilliantly analyzed by Aretxaga, my encounter with 
ncrb is humdrum, if not routine. Gathering numbers for police crimes 
recorded under Section 377 may not be a daily occurrence, but its site 
is qualitatively different; there is no event putting the state in a state, as 
Aretxaga describes the torrent of violent sexual fantasies unleashed by 
the state.14
ncrb is saturated with matters of sexuality in ways that are routine, 
unremarkable, and minute, perhaps harder to identify but more power-
ful as a result. Contrary to the notion of the impersonal state, especially 
in a number-crunching agency, gendered and sexual bodies are every-
where. Indeed the metaphorical similarities of states and bodies have 
been noted.15 Bathrooms and bodily odors that are hard to escape in gov-
ernment buildings in India are constant reminders of the inextricability 
of stateliness, embodiment, and sexualities. What greater prompt of the 
sexual state than how sexual respectability must be routinely managed 
on site. As a normatively presenting woman researcher, in no case did I 
meet with a male state agent by myself behind a closed door. Glass par-
titions and open doorways sifted encounters and contained the threat 
of sexuality. In other cases, when office doors were shut to reflect status, 
give privacy, or maintain the efficiency of air-conditioning, at least one 
additional person was always present to maintain decorum—of sexual 
respectability and, of course, status.
the data trail: grids of space and status
To obtain the necessary information, I traverse the ground and first floor 
of ncrb, the hierarchy of cabins and offices, as well as three divisions 
that manage information and the technology used to produce it. Should 
I have cut to the chase and gone directly to the director of ncrb? Per-
haps. But the role of the representative at the receiving window is to di-
rect me to the right official, precipitating appropriate rituals and proce-
dures. Curiously neither N. K. Agarwal nor Mr. Nair anticipates that such 
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a request would need the director’s approval; rather they simply send me 
on to their superior in the chain of command. The state, after all, is an 
exercise in authenticity to be practiced routinely and minutely.
The lateral and vertical grids of ncrb enact the state structurally and 
functionally.16 Henri Lefebvre’s point that the primary role of the mod-
ern state is to prevent the collapse of a political, economic, and social 
edifice through a system of hierarchical places, functions, and institu-
tions explains how tasks are distributed.17 The management of crime 
records is organized into three units: Systems Development, Systems 
Maintenance, Systems Operations. At issue is not so much efficiency (or 
lack thereof ) of work and its distribution (on which I cannot comment 
adequately) but the practices guiding the data trail through the three di-
visions, up and down the building, in and out of the cubicles and offices 
of joint assistant directors, joint additional directors, and eventually the 
director, even though the task finally comes to rest in the hands of a 
couple of relatively junior state employees.
Further, some functions are appropriate to cubicles, some belong in 
offices, and others occur in common workspaces that, as Foucault sug-
gests, are governed by seeing and surveillance. Paul is in a cabin that 
allows mutual looking between her and her neighbor, while remaining 
partially shielded from the common work area immediately outside. 
Agarwal’s cubicle is sturdier, fabricated partly out of glass and protected 
by a door. Nair’s cabin also has a door, with a view of the common work 
area of the ground floor, the network of computers, assistants, and work-
ing bodies. He is partially shielded from and has partial visual access to 
the work area. As I observed from my vantage point in the common area 
on a number of occasions, glass doors to the row of cubicles can be cov-
ered with blinds. Cabins, offices, common work areas, glass, and gazing 
create homogeneous and fractured spaces and states.18
Visitors like me are an oddity at the agency. On the one hand, ncrb
facilitates the work of other state agencies and institutions, for it is not 
intended to interact directly with the public. Any wonder, then, that the 
pursuit of data is confusing, a matter of negotiating opaque and uneven 
lateral and vertical grids? It feels like a game of snakes and ladders; at 
any moment of encounter, one might well hear the dreaded words, “It 
is not possible to give you these data,” which once uttered would be dif-
ficult to take back. On the other hand, as a visitor I am instrumental 
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to the procedures of governance and, in effect, stateliness. Paul asks to 
see my letter of authorization before we can proceed further, before she 
can inquire about the availability of Section 377 data not to be found 
in published reports. It is as much to verify my access to data as it is to 
relegitimize state authority. The letter of authorization does not convince 
Agarwal initially since it does not mention data on Section 377, but then 
he abruptly shrugs off his ambivalence and leads me to the next step.
At a subsequent moment, however, the paradox of governance prac-
tices assumes fuller proportions as I become further implicated in the 
process that sustains state authority at the behest of Nair, who asks me 
to put in writing my request for data on Section 377. A blank piece of 
paper will do, and it is furnished. The purpose? First, it is to freight state 
records with the power of the written word in ways insightfully captured 
by Emma Tarlo’s concept of “paper truths.”19 Second, the authority in-
vested in the position of the deputy director is performed in response to 
the written request, for he has something on which to imprint a seal of 
the state and his signature. Third, the purpose of putting down my re-
quest in writing is to leave a paper trail, especially if my request is granted 
and Nair’s is the unit charged with providing me the data. It is his in-
surance, for, as Tarlo explains, paper truths leave trails of bureaucratic 
workings (that in some instances also make them vulnerable). But I of-
fer letterhead from where I work in place of the blank paper, to counter 
state authority with the power of an institution of higher education in the 
United States and the priorities of research more generally. It works, but 
at the cost of becoming a willing, even enthusiastic instrument for secur-
ing the nexus of stateliness, U.S. imperialism, and Western institutions 
of higher education. One dances to the tune of the state, but hopefully 
while deliberately messing up the steps.
Statistical Technologies and Gendered Social Problems
Had I been willing to settle for data on crimes against women, my en-
counter with ncrb would have been limited to a few minutes with Paul 
and a pile of reports and documents. But my request for Section 377’s 
numbers triggered a series of interactions, foregrounding the partial-
ities of enumerative practices of governance and, in effect, ncrb. To 
begin with, these interactions indicate that the data on crime against 
women are abundant, which, as it turns out, has to do with the subjec-
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tive differences between numbers and statistics. This is to say that while 
state agencies and units might enumerate all kinds of things, only some 
things are endowed with the gravity of statistics (thereby giving the no-
tion of statistical significance different and expanded meanings).
ncrb performs its function as a clearinghouse for crime data by col-
lating numbers from police stations around the country, which are then 
transformed into statistics and statistical representations, such as ta-
bles. Tables provide a snapshot of crime statistics in various categories, 
and, to make it more visual, maps of India demarcated into states and 
overlaid with each set of crime statistics have been added. The visual rep-
resentations are processed into annual hard copy and electronic reports 
on crime statistics for major cognizable crimes and local and special 
laws. The reports are organized into various chapters based on vulner-
able populations, such as “Crime against Women” and “Crime against 
Children,” or types of crime—juvenile crime, violent crime—and so on.
In the chapter “Crime against Women,” only those crimes that target 
women qua women are included and organized into categories related 
to sections of the penal code: rape; kidnapping and abduction for dif-
ferent purposes; homicide for dowry deaths or their attempts; torture, 
both mental and physical; molestation; sexual harassment; importation 
of girls (up to age twenty-one). A second overall classification covers 
crimes committed under (somewhat) gender-specific laws, including 
the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act (1956),20 the Dowry Prohibition 
Act (1961), the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act (1979), the 
Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act (1986), and the 
Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act (1987). Tables, graphs, maps, and 
brief interpretations keep prose to a minimum so that statistics appear 
to speak sufficiently; for example, crimes classified by penal code, that 
is, cruelty by husbands and relatives, molestation, kidnapping and ab-
duction, rape, and the like, account for 95.8 percent of the crimes, and 
those related to special or local law provisions 4.2 percent, according to 
ncrb’s 2011 report.21
Statistics and statistical accounts on crimes against women are based 
on the assumption that aggregates, totals, and trends yield important 
information as a whole, despite the loss of specifics related to each case 
or the relevance of social class, ethnicity, religion, and region to crime.22
Classifications such as crime against women and its various subcatego-
ries that are especially attentive to sexual crime (rape, kidnapping, mo-
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lestation, child marriage, the Immoral Traffic [Prevention] Act, indecent 
representation of women) sustain the need for new rounds of numbers, 
fresh statistical analysis, and, in effect, practices of governance. It is also 
true that governmental statistics—and this is particularly true about 
crimes against women—can be variously interpreted and used to ex-
pand governance. Even though nongovernmental organizations (ngos) 
and semiprivate institutions share the massive burden of counting and 
classifying the population in India, agencies such as ncrb still carry the 
appearance of legitimacy, if not the weight of authority. ncrb’s statis-
tics are regularly used by numerous constituencies—women’s groups, 
ngos, police, newspaper editorials, websites—to demand state ac-
countability and to argue for more resources, better enforcement of law 
and crime prevention, more policewomen, improved systems of redress, 
and a more sensitive judicial process—all of this most visibly related to 
matters of sexual crime.23
The question, then, is when and how did attention to crime against 
women come to occupy such a central place in practices of governance? 
The answer lies generally in the colonial histories of crime and statistics 
and the specifics of defining women as social problems in the Indian 
context.
colonial histories
Describing the explosion of statistics as a technique of governance be-
tween 1820 and 1840 in Western Europe, Ian Hacking suggests that this 
period of the “avalanche of printed numbers” led to an unprecedented 
growth of state bureaucracies and typologies of enumeration: census, 
surveys, maps, among others.24 As Nikolas Rose argues, statistics was a 
means of rendering territories into pulsating objects of knowledge, which 
was nowhere more relevant than in the seemingly impenetrable colo-
nies.25 Placing the rising significance of numbers, statistical techniques, 
genres of officially sanctioned histories, reports, and the like also around 
1840, Richard Saumarez Smith suggests that they were aimed at appre-
hending and administering colonial India, while also centralizing the role 
of the colonial state.26 Thus the use of statistics in the colonies was, ac-
cording to Arjun Appadurai, about the ability to domesticate the clutter 
of narrative prose “into the abstract, precise, complete, and cool idiom of 
number” and a way of constituting rather than reflecting reality.27
But the function of statistical techniques in colonial India was no 
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mirror image of the metropole, as Appadurai and others are quick to 
underscore. Although in Western Europe statistics emerged as a “moral 
science,” as Hacking details, that is, the study of immoral behavior and 
criminal behavior, Appadurai argues that in the colonies a focus on crime 
and deviance encompassed the entire population.28 Numbers were used 
by states before they were used in the colonies, but it was their deploy-
ment as statistical measures, imbued with the appearance of scientific 
rigor and aimed at the governance of the population, that set them apart 
in colonial India. Focusing on the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 that insti-
tutionalized notions of hereditary criminals, for example, Sanjay Nigam 
sees the legislation as a commentary on Indian society as well as on a 
subsection of the population whose deviance was traceable to Indian 
culture.29 Appadurai further argues that statistics served justificatory and 
disciplinary functions in the colonies by marshaling support for argu-
ments, debates, and rhetoric on committees and boards, enabling com-
parisons among groups, and providing narratives for otherwise incom-
mensurable aspects of the social and human landscape. Most important, 
statistics became alibis for colonial interventions into cultural practices 
especially to do with girls and women, such as sati.30
A second point to be underscored is that the conjunctions of statistics 
and the “woman question” were framed by perceptions of social prob-
lems plaguing the colonies. But, as critical sociologists usefully explain, 
social problems are not objective conditions; rather they are subjective 
judgments about what constitutes harm or requires problem solving.31
That is, numbers, statistics, and reports did not represent colonial India 
as much as they helped constitute it as a collation of social problems that 
required scientific modes of apprehension and degrees of intervention—
to which the debates on women’s illiteracy, sati, and child marriage as 
social problems requiring intervention and reform attest. Backed by 
the authority of science, objectivity, and universality, statistical tech-
nologies, methods of sampling, and probabilities were used to define 
and assess sociological priorities.32 Scholars of colonial India, such as 
U. Kalpagam and Gyan Prakash, tend to imply rather than analyze the 
construction of social problems in the colonial context, but their work 
amply illustrates the processes through which administrators selectively 
defined, intervened in, and socially engineered parts of colonial soci-
ety.33 If statistics and the contested terrain of women’s social life was one 
angle of the gendering of social problems in colonial India, then crime 
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against women is its postcolonial avatar. The point, though, is not to of-
fer a presentist reading of history or constrain present-day complexities 
into an increasingly distant past but to call attention to technologies of 
governance with institutional histories.
engendering social problems 
in postcolonial india
I spoke with representatives of the Delhi Police to understand how Sec-
tion 377 is perceived and enforced. Although the police commissioner 
dismissed me after but a few minutes, he sent me on to another senior 
police official, N. N. Khanna, who dealt with legal writs that named the 
Delhi Police as a respondent, including the one filed by Naz Foundation 
challenging the scope of Section 377.34 Unaware of the Naz Foundation 
writ at the time, Khanna nonetheless sought to deflect my interest in 
Section 377, saying, “This is a peripheral aspect. Because of the total vol-
ume of crime, very little attention is paid to Section 377 by the police. . . . 
The social attitudes to women’s issues and gay criminal activity cannot 
be compared. You should be studying Section 375 [rape law], not 377. 
There is more social impact of 375. If you want to make a contribution, 
you should study crime against women.”35 On several other occasions as 
well police and other state officials instructed or encouraged me to focus 
on crimes against women, especially sexual crimes. Some, including a 
senior-ranking policewoman, a joint commissioner of police who was in 
charge of the crime against women police cell, were puzzled: Why would 
I want to focus on Section 377?
Framing the apposition between sexual assault on women and the 
antisodomy law are the perceptions that sexual crime against women 
is an egregious social problem because of its scale and seriousness, and 
Section 377, covering crimes related to unnatural sex, does not warrant 
attention. As a result Khanna suggested that Section 376 ought to be of 
greater interest to me as a (woman) researcher, echoing Paul’s offer of 
statistics related to crimes against women in place of Section 377 and 
the puzzlement of the policewoman heading the crime against women 
cell. Their apprehension about heterosexual violence against women is 
not unimportant; however, it is used to diminish attention to Section 377 
and imply that rape may be a social problem but not an unnatural one. 
Pressed on this issue by Khanna, I could not help but respond, “Yes, you 
are right about violence against women. We do not even protect women 
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from their husbands when there is marital rape.” He, who was to become 
the next police commissioner of Delhi, simply ignored my interjection.
Rendering crime, especially sexual crime, against women as a social 
problem of national prominence derives from the collusions of modern 
forms of governance, which, as James Scott notes, are characteristically 
focused on making the social easily legible through statistical and other 
techniques and national and transnational women’s activism.36 Feminist 
agitation has been crucial to rendering violence against women a press-
ing social problem in India through what Malcolm Spector and John I. 
Kitsuse would describe as an interactional and interpretative process 
that involves claims making and responding activities.37 The result is that 
dowry-related deaths, custodial rape, battering, homicide, and torture 
became issues of social concern and sites for state intervention and at-
tention, as reflected in the ncrb reports, the creation of special police 
cells in cities like Delhi, and more recently the expanded definitions of 
and punishments for sexual assault.
Trailing colonial histories of the “woman question,” transnational 
gendered discourses of human rights have placed the burden on post-
colonial states like India for defining and addressing the problems of vi-
olence against women. As Inderpal Grewal writes, the formula “women’s 
rights as human rights” re-creates “new forms of governmentality that 
reshape the relations between the West and non-West, and between pop-
ulations and states.”38 The need to protect women and endow them with 
rights, Grewal suggests, was supported by international and national de-
velopment agencies speaking the language of women in development.39
Even as a large number of developmental organizations and state insti-
tutions started to keep statistical information on women, police in cities 
such as Delhi and the judiciary began receiving training in human rights 
and the problems of violence against women, lending added significance 
to tracking crime data.
But critical feminists have also distanced themselves from such insti-
tutional attention to sexual violence, for it has served above all to expand 
the scope of governance rather than bring relief to women. Focusing 
on the sexual violence agenda and the inescapability of feminist orga-
nizations having to comply with state regulations to become eligible for 
resources in the United States, Kristin Bumiller notes that even as the 
resources available for women decreased, the state’s reach was expanded 
as sexual violence was defined as a social, medical, and legal problem.40
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In India the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (pwdva)
of 2006 was a hard-won victory after protracted negotiations with state 
institutions, but it was also a source of more intimate governance, for it 
extends the reach of governance through protection officers and a series 
of protective legal measures to stop violence, including offering mone-
tary relief, restoration to the household, and custody of children.41 Look-
ing to state intervention to solve the problem of sexual violence ignores 
the ways the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Act, and other laws that are ostensibly aimed at securing 
parts of India in fact exhort state violence, especially toward women, as 
Navsharan Singh and Urvashi Butalia assert.42
The imperatives of historically, nationally, and transnationally en-
gendered social problems address why crime against women is discur-
sively produced, but the question of why the numbers for Section 377 are 
unavailable is still unclear. Crime against women is reported through a 
combination of offense and sections of the penal code, which only con-
fuses why crime under Section 377 is not enumerated and interpreted. 
That the numbers are too few, have not been tabulated, or are not sta-
tistically significant may all be true, but wouldn’t statistical analyses be 
the only way to determine that for sure? If their statistical insignificance 
had indeed been determined, why was it not registered with asterisks 
or other signs, which is standard procedure? The imperative, then, is 
to delve further into what the omission of Section 377 tells us about the 
complexities of unnatural sex and the exigencies of governance. Put dif-
ferently, the point is to consider Simone Abram, Jonathan Murdoch, and 
Terry Marsden’s caution: a fate worse than being captured by numbers is 
being neglected by them.43
Sexualizing Biopolitical Governance
An obvious difference between being registered and being erased by sta-
tistical measures has to do with their heteronormative underpinnings. 
Heteronormativity has been useful in coming to grips with statistical 
technologies of governance, exemplified by Michael P. Brown and Paul 
Boyle’s study of how census surveys and reports in Britain and the United 
States continue to closet gays and lesbians.44 Using the metaphor of the 
national closet, the authors call attention to the quotidian and complex 
interweavings of governance, sexuality, and the census that result in 
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such erasures of sexual identities. The explanation, they suggest, lies 
not only in the issues of privacy, tyrannies of categories, and statistical 
rigor but also in societal and governmental heteronormativity.
But the degree to which heteronormativity explains the biases in 
ncrb’s reports is debatable, for its history does not travel well to the 
Indian context. The idiom of the closet does not adequately resonate in 
a setting characterized as much by partially obscured histories of same-
sex eroticism as by the hypervisibility of queer subjects (not least hijras, 
Kinnars, Aravanis) and practices that, as scholars of colonialism and sex-
uality have repeatedly found, were only partially erased in attempts to 
make the colonies comply with bourgeois ideals of sexual normalcy and 
propriety.45 Heteronormativity is also incongruous with the language of 
Section 377, which emphasizes “unnatural carnal intercourse,” or same-
sex as well as cross-sex sexual practices outside the putative realm of na-
ture and normality. This explains why a subset of the case law under Sec-
tion 377 has to do with women petitioning for divorce on the grounds of 
unnatural sex imposed on them by their husbands.46 Finally, by mapping 
the differences between crime against women and Section 377 in terms 
of presence and erasure, heteronormativity does not facilitate grappling 
with sexuality’s effects on governance practices when they do not align 
neatly along axes of heterosexuality and homosexuality.
The gap between what is available and what is untabulated in the data 
trail at ncrb cuts to the crux of biopolitical governance and its imbri-
cations with sexuality. Crime records are an essential part of biopolit-
ical modalities that seek to interpret, predict, and intervene in social 
relationships and events. ncrb’s defining purpose, assessing crime 
statistics, producing reports year after year, serves to regularize life and 
mortality, to manage violence with statistical techniques, analyses, and 
policies. Perhaps crime and violence cannot be completely erased, but 
they must be managed to ensure a relative equilibrium between crime 
and the economy (especially given their complex interconnections) for 
the collective well-being. Corporations, ngos, and the media are among 
other constituencies that gather statistics and data about populations 
and groups, but what is distinctive about ncrb and other state institu-
tions, following Foucault, is that biopolitical techniques are aimed at 
improving the life and quality of the population, controlling the random 
and the accidental through calculation and forecast, while justifying reg-
ulation in the interests of the population or its regularization.47
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Foucault’s thinking on biopolitics has spurred scholarship along two 
dimensions: the terrain of biology, medicine, and science through which 
matters of life, health, genetics, and disease are addressed, and the for-
mation and fault lines of political community, wrought by defining states 
of exceptions.48 The concept of the biopolitical can be extended in these 
disparate ways precisely because it engages the deeper questions of what 
counts as life, death, and the collective, and it opens up connections 
between the use of surveys and statistics and discourses of nation and 
territory, between genocide and census data, between the individual and 
the planet. Indeed the thread common in Foucault’s discussions on the 
biopolitical and subsequent engagements by Agamben, Mbembe, and, 
more recently, Gupta, is the production and regulation of the collective, 
alternatively known as population and political community.
Missing from most engagements with biopolitics, of which Agamben’s 
is the most often cited, are the domain of sexuality and the structures of 
racism. Few engage race at the intersection of life and politics, despite 
Foucault’s attention to the ways race differentiates between “what must 
live and what must die.”49 Sexuality, Foucault argues, takes effect not just 
in terms of constituting subjects; it “exists at the point where body and 
population meet,” a point that ironically is missed by Agamben, who 
questions Foucault’s inability to connect the exercise of power at the level 
of the subject and the collective or the body politic.50 Mbembe offers 
a thought-provoking revision of Foucault’s reflections on the biopoliti-
cal with the concept of necropolitics, to argue that contemporary life is 
subjugated to the power of death.51 Using historical and contemporary 
examples drawn from Nazi death camps, slave plantations, the occu-
pation of Palestine, and the sustained violence and genocide in Africa, 
Mbembe, like Agamben, neglects a reading of power and sovereignty 
deepened by attention to the ways the domain of sexuality serves as a 
pathway of power; for example, hiv/aids is significantly absent as a 
crucible of the biopolitical and the necropolitical in Mbembe’s analysis.
Sexuality is foundational as much at the level of the subject as it is to 
the forging and governance of political and social collectives, whether as 
population, national body, or community. Calibrating fertility rates or 
the ratio of births to deaths, tracking sexed and gendered bodies across 
the life span, estimating rates of sexual activity or the composition of 
households, in fact what might be summarized as reproductive and non-
reproductive sexuality, is central to regulating the population and the 
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rhetoric of collective interest. What possible interest does the state have 
in restricting and recording marriages—not just the lineages of prop-
erty and prohibiting miscegenation but also regulating reproductive 
and nonreproductive sexuality? At the level of the social body, sexuality 
stages our anxieties about morality and beliefs about the natural dimor-
phism of humans, and the gendered essence of humans. Notwithstand-
ing medical reproductive technologies and beliefs in divine intervention, 
sexuality is seen as the ontology of human existence. In this framework 
the appropriate and adequate management of sexuality ensures a healthy 
population and a state of equilibrium to prevent sexual repression, sex-
ual chaos, too many children or too few, population explosion, hunger, 
disease, hiv/aids, and the list goes on.
Remaining attentive to sexuality’s foundational relevance to biopo-
litical governance helps reframe the subjective differences produced 
by statistical discourses. While violence against women is elevated to a 
social problem and a matter of biopolitical governance, the omissions 
from Section 377 point toward the fault lines of biopolitical practices 
through which populations, or the collective that matters, are forged. 
In his reflections on statistical enumeration and biopolitical regulation, 
Gupta notes that even those who must be ignored (or sacrificed) must 
be known, codified, enumerated, and (this is the point that he stresses) 
separated from the rest of the population.52 In contrast, tracking num-
bers for Section 377 and governance practices at ncrb indicates that 
biopolitical practices are riddled with sexual anxieties that affect who 
gets counted and who counts.
As a criminal code, Section 377 is typically deployed when there is a 
complaint about nonconsensual sex involving adults of the same sex, dif-
ferently sexed adults, or assaults on children. While I develop this point 
at greater length in chapter 3, it is worth underscoring here that the vast 
majority of charges related to Section 377 have to do with sexual assaults 
on children. Until the 2012 Protection of Children from Sexual Offences 
Act introduced legislation for children, the antisodomy law was used to 
charge and prosecute sexual assault against boys and aggravated rape or 
sexual assault against girls. Much of the crime reported under Section 
377 is not organized along heterosexual or homosexual axes, and until 
recently, because of narrowly defined rape laws, egregious male sexual 
assault against women was arraigned under it. Despite the substantial 
numbers of child sexual assault cases being charged under Section 377 
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and a section devoted to crime against children in ncrb reports, the 
data are not reported. The letter k under the heading “Crimes Com-
mitted against Children Which Are Punishable under the Penal Code” 
mentions “Unnatural Offenses, Section 377,” but no other description or 
numbers are presented, suggestive of the kinds of sexual anxieties that 
are driving omissions in statistical reports and discourses.
The numbers for Section 377 are also going unreported under crimes 
by penal code, perhaps because sexual activity is mostly consensual and 
therefore not registering statistically or because police stations around 
the country are not funneling numbers related to Section 377 to ncrb
due to lack of enforcement. But anecdotal and research reports indicate 
that legal and extralegal policing of same-sex sexual practices is wide-
spread and socioeconomically marginal same-sex sexualities are espe-
cially at risk, thereby raising two possibilities. The first is that policing 
does not result primarily in formal charges filed under Section 377, which 
is quite likely, for that is no easy task. A medical examination to prove 
offense is the bar that must be met before charges against offending par-
ties can be filed by police, which frequently opens the door to extralegal 
abuse. Thus, instead of charging homosexual men under the antisodomy 
law, police usually solicit either sexual favors or money.53
This foregrounds the second likelihood, that while same-sex sexual 
and gender minorities, especially those without the protection of social 
class, may be vulnerable to Section 377, it is not the only law through 
which police harassment and violence can occur. Indeed an ensemble of 
vagrancy laws, allegations of theft and disturbing the peace, and the Im-
moral Traffic Prevention Act (amended most recently in 2006) variously 
place same-sex sexualities at risk.54 For example, Section 268 is the law 
against public nuisance that capaciously includes any act of commission 
and omission “which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance 
to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property 
in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, dan-
ger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public 
right,” making it a more likely candidate to harass and charge same-sex 
sexualities or gender minorities. Priyadarshini Thangarajah and Ponni 
Arasu point out that despite the perils of Section 377, queer women are 
at greater risk from the laws on kidnapping, abduction, compelling a 
woman to marry, and wrongful concealment or confinement of an al-
ready kidnapped person.55 Paradoxically, honing in on crime data for 
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Section 377 points away from Section 377 and toward a complex network 
of laws, policies, practices, and modalities of governance that regulate 
same-sex sexualities.
One way to develop a critique of the sexual state is to unravel the histo-
ries and practices of a regional state that seeks to regulate dance bars 
through a variety of mechanisms that have outlasted the judicial rul-
ing to reopen them. Another way is to look at state agencies up close, 
through fieldwork, to reveal sexuality’s effects on routine practices and 
mandates of these agencies and, by extension, the state. My search for 
statistics related to the antisodomy law paved the way for a series of 
interactions with and deferrals by state officials at ncrb that, in turn, 
exposed how bodies and sexual propriety are monitored through the or-
dering of workspaces. Across numerous field visits to many state build-
ings throughout the research process, it is difficult to identify a unit that 
is not attentive to the management of gendered bodies and the possibil-
ity of desire, and ncrb is no different in this respect. Indeed the lived, 
embodied aspects of state institutions and agencies are a crucial part of 
what defines and sustains them, even though as researchers we have not 
given them their analytical due.
Being attentive to sexuality also sheds light on why some issues de-
fined as social problems, such as crimes against women, are measured, 
quantified, processed, and reported in ways that justify the rationale for 
ncrb and even the expansion of governance practices—harsher laws 
and punishments, for example. The reason same-sex issues are not sim-
ilarly represented, however, is not predicated on heteronormativity, for 
that would be to deny the point that Section 377 is used to prosecute 
heterosexual violence against girls and women. Accounting for the dis-
cursive differences between violence against women and the antisod-
omy law through a focus on biopolitical governance draws attention to a 
broader view of sexual anxieties that do not align along the heterosexual 
and homosexual divide. Such a focus on biopolitical practices aimed at 
the welfare of the population suggests that the neglect of numbers for 
Section 377 in ncrb’s tabulations and reports is deliberate and that the 
omissions gesture toward a complex web of juridical measures and pro-
visions, of which Section 377 is only a part, governing same-sex sexual 
subjects.
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Sexuality’s significance to biopolitics extends beyond statistical dis-
courses and deliberate silences on sexual crime, for it has everything to 
do with the biased ways populations are understood, measured, and cali-
brated and is implicit in matters of demography, assessments of health 
and disease, marriage and inheritance. The inconsistent attention to 
crime featured in this chapter is an entry point into the broader conjunc-
tions of sexuality and biopolitics and an invitation to rethink theories 
of biopolitics (and necropolitics) that systematically neglect sexuality. 
Gupta’s book Red Tape addresses the puzzle of why poverty is still widely 
persistent in India, despite numerous state-based initiatives. Using de-
tailed ethnographic insights, Gupta juxtaposes the embodied aspects 
of governance and their biopolitical dimensions to explain how well-
intentioned programs can nonetheless reproduce violence structurally, 
but without attending to the relevance of sexuality to the inconsistent, 
messy, and fragmented state. For a program such as the Integrated Child 
Development Services considered by Gupta, which is energized by popu-
lation control and enlivened by state officials, staff workers, villagers, 
and the ethnographic researcher, sexuality remains an unresolved piece 
of the puzzle.
Coda
New Delhi, July 2005, final scene:
A little later I find myself in the spacious, second-floor office of Mr. 
Vishnu Dev, the ninth director of ncrb. Dressed in a beige safari suit, 
Dev, a man in his sixties, listens without much reaction, befitting a di-
rector with a background in the Indian Police Service.56 The informa-
tion is already available, he says, and calls in a Mr. Nath to confirm. 
Nath seems nervous, ill at ease at being called into the office unexpect-
edly and having to confirm the bad news, what Kavita Paul and Satish 
Dubey have already established, that information on Section 377 is not 
already in the records and tables.
The subsequent deliberations are nerve-wracking, hard to read 
across the massive desk that separates the director from the rest of us. 
Would he say yes? Would he approve the conversion of numbers into 
data, of figures into statistics? Dev wonders aloud whether the infor-
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mation even exists, for he believes that there are hardly any cases and 
Section 377 is hardly used. Even that is information that needs to be 
confirmed, I insist valiantly. Dev confirms that the information can be 
culled, and, then, in the tone of those used to granting or denying re-
quests, in the tone of those who occupy large offices and sit behind 
enormous desks, says succinctly, “It’s approved.” I thank him and re-
turn approximately six times to gather the numbers.
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Antisodomy Law and the Annals  
of Law and Law Enforcement
According to the National Crime Records Bureau, 2,243 First Informa-
tion Reports (firs), or police crime logs, were registered under the 
antisodomy law statute over a ten-year period, 1996–2005, for twenty-
five states.1 The state of Madhya Pradesh had the most crime reports 
for Section 377 (401), followed by Rajasthan (337) and Haryana (312), 
while, at the other end of the spectrum, the states of Sikkim and Tri-
pura reported only two such cases. The accuracy and consistency with 
which firs are channeled to the ncrb is unclear; for example, Madhya 
Pradesh reported eighty-four cases for Section 377 in 2003—the highest 
for any state in any year—but as few as four cases in the previous year.
These numbers are often compared with figures for Section 375, the 
law that criminalizes rape. Against the 2,243 cases for Section 377 over 
ten years, 18,359 cases of rape against girls and women were registered 
nationally in one year alone.2 For metropolitan Delhi, which is home 
to some fourteen million, the reported figures for Section 375 are more 
than seven times higher than those for Section 377. As one senior police 
official noted, social taboos and fear of the police and criminal proce-
dures mean that some number of rapes are never reported.3 Even though 
crime committed under Section 377 is also likely to be underreported for 
similar reasons, the volume appears to be considerably less, confirming 
the view that rape represents a social problem but numbers for Section 
377 do not warrant attention (see chapter 2).
Case law for Section 377 parallels the pattern from law enforcement; 
since 1860 only an estimated twenty-six to forty-six cases, depending on 
the cutoff date, went through the higher courts. Even when the tally in-
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creases to the ninety-nine cases that I was able to collate for this chapter, 
or in the case of the final Supreme Court verdict on the Naz Foundation 
writ, which covers 140 cases, it still does not compare to the voluminous 
case law for rape.4 But statistics tell incomplete stories, and numbers 
gesture toward only the most preliminary comparisons. While charges 
under rape law require evidence of the lack of or inability to consent, 
consent is irrelevant to Section 377, and although rape is not seen as 
normal, neither is it seen as unnatural.5 If rape laws are meant to protect, 
the antisodomy law is meant to punish. Whereas the rape law refers to 
violations involving “sexual intercourse,” the antisodomy law uses the 
language of “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” to create a 
tautology between unnatural sexual practices and criminality.
In contrast to its pattern of sporadic (formal) enforcement, the anti-
sodomy statute became the centerpiece of gay, lesbian, and queer ac-
tivism in India in the years preceding the Delhi High Court verdict; 
originally known only in limited circles, it rapidly became the icon of 
homophobia in national liberal discourse. Marking the law’s ascent into 
the public limelight, an open letter signed by the highly regarded novel-
ist Vikram Seth and many other Indian luminaries argued that Section 
377 jeopardizes human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the 
spirit of a democratic and plural nation and should be revoked. In what 
he described as an exceptional gesture, the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen 
supported this appeal, arguing that the criminalization of gay behav-
ior contradicts human civilizational progress; however, he begged the 
question of why a relatively little-used law warranted an extraordinary 
response on his part.6
Plaguing Section 377 are not the number of crimes recorded or the 
cases adjudicated, for numbers, after all, are unreliable and inadequate 
as measures of violence and injustice. Rather driving the struggle against 
Section 377 is its discursive history—that it inaugurates and institu-
tionalizes the sodomite in Indian legal history, and by extension social 
history, and that it facilitates the persecution of homosexuals not least 
through law and law enforcement. As such, the 2001 Naz Foundation writ 
challenging Section 377 makes the case that the law’s letter and spirit 
discriminate against homosexuals and serve as a barrier to equal and full 
citizenship for sexual and gender minorities.
These tensions between a sporadically used but abused law that is 
also an icon of injustice raise questions about juridical governance and 
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histories: Does the law indeed import the sodomite as personage, in the 
Foucauldian sense, into the Indian context? If the law is not being en-
forced, why does it linger? What are the patterns of juridical governance 
across the law’s more than 150-year history? Is it used at all, and, if so, 
does case law indicate the continued persecution of same-sex sexual-
ities? Or does it yield a different picture, and would it hold across the 
annals of law enforcement, such as police crime logs?
In this chapter these questions segue into an analysis of case law and 
firs that articulates with the critique of the sexual state in the follow-
ing ways. First, I expose the subjectivities of law, the institution that, in 
South Asian history, is seen as the emissary of the state or, more broadly 
by theorists such as Weber, as the source of its legitimacy and mean-
ing with particular attention to sexuality.7 Building on previously estab-
lished insights, I trace the disjunctures and inconsistencies between 
the statute’s history and its use to primarily prosecute sexual violence 
against children. Instead of treating it as a ready archive, I disarticulate 
and disaggregate the body of case law, marked as it is by the instabilities 
of meaning—stretching tautly across 150-year colonial and postcolonial 
histories—and the uncertainties of numbers: which cases have been left 
out and which ones qualify. Taking the caveat that legal materials are not 
merely descriptive but normative, and the caution that legal archives are 
often used to produce the very histories and subjects that they ostensibly 
corroborate, I read legal archives from the perspective of child sexual 
assault to highlight law’s irrationalities and affects.8
Second, I track the increasing range of sexual practices and discourses 
that have fallen within Section 377’s ambit over the years, thereby pow-
ering the reach of law and law enforcement and implicitly securing the 
state. Section 377 may not be frequently deployed to register or prose-
cute crime, but its documented history tracks closely with expanding 
judicial definitions and understandings of what constitutes unnatural 
sexual practices, which, without exception, are articulated in the con-
text of sexual assault on children. Third, taking issue with Foucauldian 
genealogies of homosexual persecution institutionalized into law, I in-
vite more complex renderings of colonial and postcolonial histories of 
homosexuality. Coming to grips with these histories in ways that do not 
presume a beleaguered homosexual subject at the outset draws attention 
to a broader and multiphonal set of discourses—unnatural, wrongful, 
perverse, depraved, and habitual—that animate how Section 377 is gov-
52 chapter three
erned. Not least, I also bring to the forefront the nuances of gender, age, 
and social class that mediate sexualized practices of governance helping 
produce state-effect.
Taking the ambiguities of the legal-juridical framework (after Janaki 
Nair) as my point of departure, I begin by analyzing the discursive in-
tent of Section 377 and locating it within a history of colonialism, pe-
nal codification, and criminality.9 The chapter’s emphasis then shifts 
to inconsistencies between the intent of the law and its archival life and 
the passions of its gradually expanding scope. I end by reflecting on the 
pitfalls of reading an ongoing history of homosexual persecution, or a 
Eurocentric Foucauldian genealogy, to drive the struggle against Section 
377.
Formatting Discourse
Section 377 was part of the 511 criminal codes that composed the In-
dian Penal Code, introduced by the colonial state in 1860, and has been 
amended only a few times since then. It reads, “Whoever voluntarily has 
carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or 
animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprison-
ment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, 
and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to 
constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described in 
this section.” Section 377 was the revised version of Clause 361 that was 
part of the draft first submitted in 1837. Although Section 377 aimed for 
greater precision, Clause 361 makes clear that the intent is to penalize 
what is defined as unnatural lust regardless of consent: “Whoever, in-
tending to gratify unnatural lust, touches, for that purpose, any person, 
or any animal, or is by his own consent touched by any person, for the 
purpose of gratifying unnatural lust, shall be punished with imprison-
ment of either description for a term which may extend to fourteen 
years, and must not be less than two years.”10 Section 377 replaces “un-
natural lust” and the vagueness of “touching” with “carnal intercourse 
against the order of nature,” which requires penetration, as Arvind Nar-
rain points out. But it also retains an expansive scope compared to, say, 
the specificity of rape law, requiring continual judicial interpretation.11
Some versions of the Indian Penal Code provide further clarifica-
tions on the intent of Section 377: “General Comments: This section is 
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intended to punish the offence of sodomy, buggery and bestiality. The 
offence consists in a carnal knowledge committed against the order of 
nature by a person with a man, or in the same unnatural manner with 
a woman, or by a man or woman in any manner with an animal.” The 
general commentary serves to further emphasize the intent of Section 
377 in ways that were earlier achieved by providing what were called “il-
lustrations,” aimed at facilitating legal interpretations of some of the 
codes due to the absence of an established body of case law to serve as 
precedent.12 Also notable about the general comments is that they am-
plify what is implicit in Section 377: that the law applies equally to men 
and women.
Despite the relevance of consent, Section 377 was placed in chapter 16 
of the penal code with other violent offenses relating to the body, such 
as rape, kidnapping, and assault. In terms of punishment, life imprison-
ment or ten years rigorous imprisonment (hard labor) and a fine are se-
vere for consensual sex but represented an improvement over the death 
penalty for sodomy in England.13 It is important to note, however, that 
in England sodomy was sporadically prosecuted through its common 
law tradition, and there existed no direct parallel to Section 377 in law 
or in the acts that subsequently legislated same-sexual sexual activity 
in nineteenth-century England, namely Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England (1769), the Offences against the Person Act of 1828, the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885, and the Offences against the Per-
son Act of 1861.14 Section 377, then, was a specifically colonial invention 
that was shaped by extant meanings of sodomy in England and the ex-
igencies of colonialism, crime, and social relations in a context at once 
far removed and linked by rule.15
colonialism, codification,  
and criminalized subjectivity
Attempts to standardize law by codifying the Indian Penal Code of 1860 
were fundamentally about discourses of desire and sexuality that encom-
passed the breadth of colonial rule in ways noted by critical scholars such 
as Anne McClintock, Ann Laura Stoler, and Robert Young. Law was a 
particularly charged site through which the excesses associated with the 
colonies could be produced only to be harnessed by impositions of Eu-
ropean law, synonymous with reason and universality, for, as Piyel Hal-
dar notes, the East was fabricated, fantasized, and even envied as the 
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other side of law in colonial representations, while helping constitute 
Occidental legality.16 These oscillations between the East and Europe, 
between lawlessness and the rule of law, between multiple confusing 
legal systems and a universal system helped rationalize the drive toward 
codification in the Indian colonial context.
Nair suggests that although the process of codifying law started after 
1772, it became an urgent matter in the 1830s, leading to the formation 
of the First Law Commission in 1835, under the stewardship of T. B. Ma-
caulay.17 The draft, prepared mostly by Macaulay, was submitted to the 
government of India in 1837 but adopted only twenty-three years later. 
Influenced by Jeremy Bentham and the Utilitarians, Macaulay strongly 
espoused the need to standardize criminal law to ensure universal juris-
prudence even though the definition of universality was severely medi-
ated by race, gender, and nation in the colonial context. While the cod-
ification of law was highly contested and divisive, its legacy has been 
predominantly understood through the discourses of modernization 
and reform.
Through the decades support for codification oscillated between the 
need for law and the need to reform a legal morass; less disputed were 
the underlying premises of ushering Indian law into history and codi-
fication as progress. That the penal code stabilized the rule of law by 
systematizing, standardizing, and simplifying amid multiple, confusing, 
and complex legal structures is a position shared by Macaulay and his 
supporters well beyond the colonial period. Writing across the distant 
shores of historical space, Macaulay and the present-day legal historian 
M. P. Jain paint similar modernist narratives of rupture with the past. 
The state of law prior to the Indian Penal Code is repeatedly described as 
chaotic, confusing, and uncertain as a result of multiple colonial and pre-
colonial structures of law that varied by region, religion, and jurisdiction. 
Thus in his “Introductory Report upon the Indian Penal Code” Macaulay 
describes an uncertain legal system in India that must be superseded by 
a uniform penal code:
It appears to us that none of the systems of penal law established in 
British India has any claim to our attention, except what it may derive 
from its own intrinsic excellence. All those systems are foreign. All 
were introduced by conquerors differing in race, manners, language, 
and religion from the great mass of the people. The criminal law of 
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the Hindoos was long ago superseded, through the greater part of the 
territories now subject to the [East India] Company, by that of Ma-
homedans, and is certainly the last system of criminal law which an 
enlightened and humane Government would be disposed to revive. 
The Mahomedan criminal law has in its turn been superseded, to a 
great extent, by the British Regulations. Indeed, in the territories sub-
ject to the Presidency of Bombay, the criminal law of the Mahomed-
ans, as well as that of the Hindoos, has been altogether discarded, 
except in one particular class of cases; and even in such cases, it is not 
imperative on the judge to pay attention to it. The British Regulations, 
having been made by three different legislatures, contain, as might be 
expected, very different provisions.18
If Macaulay fails to note the ironies of a legal morass, which was an ad-
ministrative effect of colonial rule and the imposition of conquest, then 
it is also lost on Jain in his narrative on codification:
The chaos with which the legal system was afflicted in India could 
be effectively dealt with only through the process of codification, i.e.
reduction to a definite written form of law which had previously been 
unwritten or written only in such form as reported cases. Codifica-
tion envisages reduction of different branches of law to a clear, com-
pact and scientific form. Only through codification it was possible 
to achieve certainty for uncertainty, a written and stable law instead 
of a wilderness of judicial precedents which were bewildering to the 
litigant and confusing to the court. It was only through codification 
that homogeneity of law in the country could be achieved, and the 
law could be systematized, simplified and made somewhat clear and 
precise.19
The grammar of the excesses of law mixes with metaphors of wilderness 
to affirm codification as inevitable and an improvement.
Codification of law was also a reach for secularization, away from 
what Bernard S. Cohn has described as the theocratic understanding 
of the Indian state, whereby Hindu and Muslim became administrative 
categories of convenience to stabilize complex and hybrid legal and cul-
tural practices.20 Macaulay and Jain each note that although English law 
applied in some parts (presidency towns), other parts (mofussil) were 
governed by Hindu and Muslim law depending on the religious-cultural 
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affiliations of the subjects.21 This nominalization of Hindu and Muslim 
law was first undertaken by colonial agents and later partially undone 
by administrators such as Macaulay for whom secularization became 
the pretext for excluding local law. It was argued that even among pres-
idency towns and the mofussil there was lack of uniformity due to judi-
cial decisions and interpretations; non-Hindus and non-Muslims were 
governed by a different set of laws depending on where they resided; and 
the highest court often had to weigh in on which particular aspects of law 
applied in which areas. All of these elements were cited as arguments for 
a universal, secular, modern penal code.
But the colonial discourses of reform, modernization, and secularism 
were also feints for making systems of governance intelligible and sub-
ject to European orientations. David Skuy, who argues that the Indian 
Penal Code was not about the reform of the Indian primitive criminal 
justice system but was a British attempt to modernize its own criminal 
justice system, suggests one angle of critique. Characterizing the British 
criminal justice system as primitive, Skuy notes that by the time Macau-
lay started his work on the Draft Code of 1837, Britain’s messy, bloody, 
and inchoate legal system had been under reform for half a century and 
that India received a penal code that reflected the needs of England.22 Al-
though Skuy’s analysis ignores the particularities of the colonial context, 
it is useful in unsettling the persistent narratives of modernity and re-
form that shape not only colonial but also postcolonial discourses of law. 
Elizabeth Kolsky takes a different approach; she argues that codification 
was driven by the exigencies of the local, particularly the need for colo-
nial authorities to harness lawlessness among European communities.23
Both Skuy and Kolsky start by relating histories (after Kumkum Sangari) 
of the metropole and colony but point to different sites of significance. 
My point is not to reconcile these different analyses but to note their cri-
tiques of modernity while underscoring law as the means through which 
the East and excess are produced and (unevenly) harnessed.
Rather than a progression of history and modernity, Section 377 rep-
resents what Radhika Singha has called the despotism of law possible 
within an authoritarian context.24 Lost in the colonial and postcolonial 
liberal narratives on codification as inescapable and inevitable is the un-
derside of introducing criminal laws like Section 377 where they did not 
previously exist. Seen from the perspective of Section 377, the rupture 
between past and present, modernity and its predecessor is not celebra-
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tory but suspect. In his introductory notes on the Draft Code, Macaulay 
emphasizes the need to meld simplicity and precision in any law and 
declares law a travesty, an “evil,” if it does not adequately convey meaning 
to the people who must abide by it. He seems to have missed entirely 
the irony of his own beliefs; one wonders what greater evil or travesty 
there is than the introduction of a law against unnatural lust where it 
did not previously exist. Indeed there is scant explanation in the written 
record about the introduction of Clause 361. Macaulay’s “Introductory 
Report upon the Indian Penal Code,” for example, makes references to 
this clause only to forestall public discussion on it: “Clauses 361 and 362 
relate to an odious class of offences respecting which it is desirable that 
as little as possible should be said. . . . We are unwilling to insert, ei-
ther in the text or in the notes, anything which could give rise to public 
discussion on this revolting subject; as we are decidedly of the opinion 
that the injury which could be done to the morals of the community by 
such discussion would more than compensate for any benefits which 
might be derived from legislative measures framed with the greatest pre-
cision.”25 Macaulay drew heavily on Bentham, but regrettably he appears 
to have been unaware of Bentham’s polemic that homosexuality should 
not be treated as a crime.26
Section 377 introduced the criminalization of nonprocreative sexual 
practices in a way that did not have a precedent in precolonial India, 
and although the code does not overtly interpellate any specific persons 
or what have come to be identified as sexual orientations, the consen-
sus is that it inaugurated the homosexual into legal history. Taking a 
Foucauldian stance, Narrain notes that while homosexual intercourse, 
contingent on subjects’ caste and gender, could be punished for violat-
ing religious-legal texts, the “deviant” or “criminal” homosexual did not 
exist in precolonial India.27 Similarly Alok Gupta argues that Section 377 
is a law not merely about sexual practices but about homosexuality, for 
its target is not transgressive sexual acts but the transgressive person: the 
consenting homosexual.28 Aniruddha Dutta crystallizes the analytics of 
the modern homosexual and the attendant homophobia: “Section 377, 
though externally imposed without consultation, becomes part of the 
process of re-mapping and re-figuration of extant categories of gender/
sexual difference vis-à-vis a modern taxonomy of sexual acts and sub-
jects and allows for the retroactive consolidation of tendencies phobic 
or resistant to such difference into a loose yet powerful assemblage of 
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something like modern homophobia.”29 Thus Section 377 can be seen 
as intended for persons who have the appearance of being homosexual 
and therefore likely to commit aberrant sexual acts. Not surprisingly, as 
Anjali Arondekar elaborates in her critique on retrieving sexual subjec-
tivities from the colonial legal archive, one of the very first cases under 
Section 377 had to do with the prosecution of a hijra for a crime without 
an eyewitness, a victim, or a chronology of events, but merely the ap-
pearance of homosexuality.30 Thus Narrain speculates that Section 377 
“contributed to the very emergence of the homosexual as a rights bearing 
subject who would one day question his/her very criminalization.”31 Sec-
tion 377 may have served the imperatives of colonialism and governance 
of sexual subjectivities, but, as Upendra Baxi asserts, it is not enough to 
register the emergence of law as discourse, for it must be analyzed more 
thoroughly.
Law’s Subjectivities and Expansions
As an imprecise collation of judgments, sentencing, and appeals mostly 
from the high courts and the Supreme Court, case law for Section 377 is 
a rough rather than ready archive. Some records are lengthy, others are 
brief, and the handful of studies on Section 377 identifies varying num-
bers of legal cases. For example, Suparna Bhaskaran bases her analysis 
on some twenty-seven cases, while Shamona Khanna identifies thirty 
cases and Gupta forty-six.32 I was able to locate ninety-nine cases due to 
a combination of search methods, improved online search engines, and 
additional cases in the past few years, but even this is not an exhaustive 
list. The law reports are not always thorough, the search engine is not 
comprehensive, and there are human errors, for example where Section 
377 is mistakenly recorded for Section 337. The list is also partial because 
it is drawn from the higher courts, as records from the lower courts are 
difficult to access. If only those high court cases that mention Section 
377 are considered, even when the charges are not filed under this code, 
the cases multiply. Still, if one were to hold more closely to cases that 
are primarily charged under Section 377, the problem extends beyond 
identifying a numerically stable archive to reading an archive spanning 
150 years and shifting conditions.
In her work on U.S. colonialism and law in Hawai’i, Sally Merry ex-
plains that case law always emerges through an “interpretive screen,”33
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which in the context of Section 377 has to do with the decriminalization 
of homosexuality. Notwithstanding the significance of legal precedence, 
case law on Section 377 has been collated and analyzed due to scholarly 
or activist interest, including this study, not least because law dictates the 
terms of its contestation. Inasmuch as Section 377 might be understood 
to criminalize homosexuality, any criticism or challenge thereof must 
show how the law constitutes the sodomite and unfairly and unreason-
ably discriminates against homosexuals.
Critiques of Section 377 range from the discriminatory spirit of the 
law to the records as proof of that discrimination. Bhaskaran’s analy-
sis of case law is undergirded by the aids Bhedbhav Virodhi Andolan 
writ, submitted in the Delhi High Court in 1994 to decriminalize homo-
sexuality by repealing Section 377 (see chapter 5 for more on this writ), 
and Gupta’s and Khanna’s discussions of the legal archive occur in the 
context of the 2001 Naz Foundation writ, also aimed at decriminalizing 
sodomy. These analyses of case law are driven by the need to show inher-
ent legal biases against the sodomite as a precursor of the homosexual. 
My point is not to take issue with these insights, for I build upon them. 
Rather I wish to underscore the point that the engagement with case law 
thus far has been primarily deployed as evidence of the legal bias against 
homosexual subjects and to hold it up as emblematic of contemporary 
homophobia, the origins of which lie within the colonial state.
unyielding bodies
But case law on Section 377 does not so easily yield. Rather than figuring 
the sodomite, it turns out to be a collection of sexual offenses that lie 
beyond the pale of the natural and normal, including consensual and 
nonconsensual sex between adult men, sexual assault on children and 
women by adult men, anal and oral sex coerced by men from their wives, 
and bestiality.34 In fact the vast majority of Section 377 case law involves 
the sexual assault of boys and girls, typically young children, by adult 
men. This is not an innovative insight into case law by any means, for 
Bhaskaran skims this point in her analysis while Gupta notes that more 
than 60 percent of the forty-six cases in his study are about child sexual 
abuse, with a trend toward increased use of Section 377 in the 1990s to 
prosecute sexual assault on girls.35
Since the Indian Penal Code offers only narrow definitions of rape in 
Section 375 and makes no provision there for sexual assault on children, 
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Section 377 has until recently been the only way to prosecute sexual vi-
olence against male children and male adults, as well as aggravated sex-
ual assault against girls and women.36 The format of Section 375 offers 
a narrow understanding of sexual assault so that women and girls are 
consistently reproduced as heterosexual subjects whose bodies are vio-
lable, and men are produced as violators. “Forcible penis penetration of 
the vagina by a man who is not her husband” remains the operational un-
derstanding of rape, as a result of which a judge of the Delhi High Court 
did not hold responsible the father who repeatedly sexually assaulted his 
young daughter in the infamous Jhaku case on the grounds that the harm 
caused her did not fall under the criteria of Section 375.37 In contrast, Sec-
tion 377’s imprecise but adaptable grammar of carnal intercourse against 
the order of nature allows for the prosecution of sexual violence on boys, 
otherwise excluded from Section 375, and also aggravated sexual assault 
that exceeds the scope of forcible penis penetration of the vagina. The 
irrelevance of consent under Section 377, or what is the crux of the prob-
lem for same-sex consenting adults, ends up facilitating prosecutions in 
cases of child sexual assault, as is amply evident in the legal case record.
Despite this the legal record for Section 377 has been analyzed from 
the angle of adult homosexuality. Gupta observes that, ironically, of the 
forty-six cases in his study only six are related to adult male-male anal in-
tercourse, of which one case alone involves consensual sex.38 Similarly, of 
the ninety-nine cases collated for this chapter, seventy-one of the victims 
are children: forty-four boys and twenty-seven girls.39 These cases do 
not lend themselves to facile characterizations, even though the record 
starts dismally in 1884 with the higher court setting aside the conviction 
of Bapoji Bhatt by a sessions judge in the state of Mysore partly by ex-
pressing doubt about the nine-year-old boy’s testimony in Government v. 
Bapoji Bhatt. Another case from the same year, Queen-Empress v. Khairati,
has to do with a hijra whose appeal is granted since she was convicted of 
a “crime” without any substance or witness or harm to anyone, but not 
without the judge railing against her as a habitual sodomite.40 Although 
not all appeals are upheld in the higher courts, most of the archive con-
tains pleas to the rulings or sentences of lower courts in cases of child 
sexual assault.
When considered from the vantage point of child sexual assault, the 
most conspicuous pattern in the legal record has to do with the plausi-
bility of the case, which is primarily based on whether a child can give 
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testimony or the testimony of a young child can be credible, much like 
in Bapoji Bhatt. Years later, in the relatively brief record of Sardar Ahmad 
v. Emperor from 1914, the judge rejected the appeal that the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of the thirteen-year-old boy should not be the basis for 
conviction.41 Even though there appear to be no other cases in the years 
between Bapoji Bhatt and Sardar Ahmad, the judge upheld the district mag-
istrate’s reliance on the child’s “practically uncorroborated” testimony 
without much discussion and let the conviction stand. The very next 
case in the archive, Ganpat v. Emperor, decided in Lahore four years later, 
presents a stark contrast despite similarities in the basis of the appeals.42
The petitioner appealed his conviction under Section 377 for assault on 
a fourteen-year-old boy, and this time the presiding judge set aside the 
conviction and acquit him on grounds of uncorroborated evidence by a 
young child. These contrary judicial conclusions are not without conse-
quence, for Ganpat was cited as recently as 2010 to deny conviction for 
sexual assault on a young boy in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Yash Paul.43 A 
more recent case, Raju v. State of Haryana, related to sexual assault on a 
nine-year-old girl, reveals the persistent ambivalence toward children’s 
testimony in Indian law. The judge wrote:
In a long chain of decisions, it has been observed that children are a 
most untrustworthy class of witnesses, for when of tender age, they 
live in a realm of make believe, they are prone to mistake dreams 
for reality. They are pliable as clay and repeat glibly as of their own 
knowledge what they had heard from others. However, there is no 
rule of law in India that evidence of child witness cannot under any 
circumstances be acted upon. . . . When the oral testimony of the 
child witness is found to be thoroughly honest and straight forward 
and implicitly reliable, even the solitary testimony of the child witness 
is sufficient to sustain the conviction of the accused.44
Of particular importance in cases involving children are judges’ con-
cerns about questionable motives and spurious allegations by victims. 
In the 1947 case Mirro v. Emperor, the judge set aside the conviction es-
tablished by the assistant sessions judge, reasoning that the accounts of 
the boy, the blacksmith who tried to intervene, and other witnesses who 
gathered at the behest of the blacksmith did not add up plausibly.45 In 
particular the judge referred to the petitioner’s concern that the accusa-
tion was the result of “bad blood” between him and the community of 
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Chamars, to which the boy belonged. Dismissing any question of “com-
munal feelings,” the judge set aside the conviction on the “impression” 
(his word) that the accused was seen as an undesirable person and the 
accusation was the result of enmity.
Mirro is also important as a case in which plausibility was at least 
partly based on medical evidence. Continuing a line of reasoning pres-
ent in the earliest case, Khairati, Mirro extends the role of medical evi-
dence as the gap in the prosecution’s story. In her discussion of Khairati,
Arondekar writes that in a case tried under the antisodomy law, without 
a complainant or a specific crime, no location of the alleged crime, and 
no witness, medical evidence of a subtended anus and signs of syphilis 
was damning.46 Arondekar emphasizes the heightened role of medical 
jurisprudence in colonial history involving offenses against the body, 
including under Section 377. What Mirro extends after Khairati is further 
amplified in Ghanashyam Misra v. The State of Orissa in 1957, where the peti-
tioner, a schoolteacher, appealed his conviction for raping a ten-year-old 
girl student under Sections 376 (rape laws) and 377 in the Orissa High 
Court.47 In considering the appeal, the presiding judge carefully weighed 
the various facts but also repeatedly emphasized the role of the medical 
examination. The petitioner’s appeal was rejected and the sentence was 
actually increased based on the medical evidence of a tear in the girl’s 
hymen, her blood-stained sari, the abrasion on the prepuce of the peti-
tioner, the standards of medical jurisprudence that required a satisfac-
tory explanation for the injury on the penis, and the medical opinion that 
penetration, though incomplete, likely occurred.
Across this archive medical jurisprudence is consistently refracted 
through the lens of legal guidelines and what is considered common-
sensical reasoning. Thus the question of plausibility in these cases ex-
tends beyond the matter of child victims and witnesses to the integrity 
of the overall case, and judicial reasoning requires putting together the 
jigsaw puzzle of facts, legal arguments, and medical jurisprudence. Cor-
roborating children’s testimony with other children and adults to whom 
they report sexual assaults, the sequence of events in which the assault 
occurred and was reported to the police, and the circumstances under 
which the assault occurred are among the points of consideration in the 
archive. Put together with legal precedence and judicial interpretations 
of the letter and spirit of the law, the legal archive of Section 377 becomes 
subject to its own discourses and performance. On the one hand, judicial 
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decisions in upholding or modifying convictions and sentences have all 
the appearance of legal and commonsensical reasoning. Their authority 
is derived from such appearances, affirmations about plausibility, re-
course to legal precedence, and reiterations of the spirit and logic of the 
law. On the other hand, the archive and sometimes the individual cases 
are quite arbitrary. For example, close reading of the letter of the law in 
relation to legal precedence sometimes means upholding convictions, at 
other times overturning them. And, as noted earlier, reasoning used for 
similar circumstances sometimes leads to entirely different conclusions, 
for neither legal guidelines nor common sense are free from subjective 
and contrary sociolegal discourses.
law’s expanding scope
Also evident across the unwieldy archive is Section 377’s expanding scope, 
not in reference to the homosexual as sodomite but consistently in cases 
to do with child sexual assault. In Bapoji Bhatt (1884), the judge accepted 
the appeal to conviction from a lower court because he considered the 
testimony of the nine-year-old to be doubtful but also because, in his 
reasoning, oral sex with a nine-year-old boy did not fall under the scope 
of Section 377. Arguing that “Section 377 is almost word for word the 
same as the form of indictment prescribed by English law for cases of 
Sodomy,” he concluded that judges in England did not see a man’s forc-
ing his penis into the mouth of a child as constituting sodomy.48 A simi-
lar appeal some decades later in Khanu v. Emperor (1925) that oral sex with 
a child does not constitute an offense under Section 377 was rejected. 
Khanu serves as a point of rupture in case law by arguing that oral sex 
involves sexual euphoria but is nonprocreative and therefore is against 
the order of nature. Further spinning out sociolegal discourses on sod-
omy, the court also weighed in on the question of why “modern states, 
now freed from the influence of superstition, still make the sin of Sodom 
punishable,” only to conclude that it is to encourage legitimate marriage, 
to discount unmanly and less useful members of society, and to prevent 
the premature sexual indoctrination of the young.49
Khanu is cited frequently and used to expand the scope of sodomy 
to crimes of nature involving bestiality, buggery, and oral sex, leading 
to a conviction of three men for sexually assaulting a boy by forcible, 
if incomplete, penetration of the mouth with a penis in Lohana Vasant-
lal Devchand and Others v. The State.50 As Narrain notes, Lohana Vasantlal 
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Devchand settles the matter of sodomy by including in its purview any 
unnatural sexual activity involving the sexual organs of either of the par-
ticipants.51 The judge wrote, “It could be said without hesitation that the 
orifice of mouth is not, according to nature, meant for sexual or carnal 
intercourse. Viewing [sic] from that aspect, it could be said that this act 
of putting a male-organ in the mouth of a victim for the purposes of 
satisfying sexual appetite, would be an act of carnal intercourse against 
the order of nature.” The following year, in State of Kerala v. Kundumkara 
Govindam and Another, the Kerala High Court justice cited Khanu at length 
and ruled that forcible sex between the thighs of a fourteen-year-old girl 
was within the ambit of carnal intercourse against the order of nature and 
was therefore punishable under Section 377.52
Alongside the expanding statute’s scope, case law was also proliferat-
ing discourses of sexual perversity, mostly through cases of sexual assault 
on boys. In Fazal Rab Choudhary v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court inter-
preted Section 377 as synonymous with sexual perversity while weighing 
an appeal from Fazal Rab Choudhary, who had been sentenced to three 
years of rigorous imprisonment for what was described as an unnatural 
offense on a young boy.53 In deliberating the merits of the appeal, the 
justices wrote, “The offence is one under Section 377, . . . which implies 
sexual perversity.” The justices who furnished the historic judgment Naz 
Foundation v. Government of nct of Delhi and Others in 2009 summarized the 
legal record of Section 377 as spanning “from the non-procreative to im-
itative to sexual perversity.”54
Discourses of morality, excess, and the unnatural flourished through-
out the legal record as judges considered cases and appeals related to 
sexual assault on children. Persisting in the discourse is the language 
of depravity, heinousness, and sexual perversity associated with unnat-
ural behavior that cannot be directly traced to Macaulay’s notion of the 
“heinous crime”; whereas Macaulay seems to refer to the heinousness 
of consensual sex among men, the heinousness in the legal record is 
primarily about the monstrosities of sexual assaults on children by adult 
men. In Mirro, involving sexual assault on a young boy, the judge char-
acterized the accused as a terror and a morally depraved man. More re-
cently, in the State of Maharashtra v. Rahul alias Raosaheb Dashrath Bhongale,
the presiding judges repeatedly used the language of depravity to deny 
the appeal of the petitioner.55 Characterizing the ferocity with which the 
accused sexually assaulted and murdered the young girl, this legal record 
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is replete with phrases such as “depravity of the accused,” “depravity of 
the mind,” and “depravity of nature” to register shock and dismay at the 
vicious crime. Crime under Section 377 is often described as beastly and 
heinous, but perhaps no word is more frequently used in child sexual 
assault cases than unnatural, where it is both a synonym for sodomy and 
a means to characterize excess that cannot be contained within the realm 
of nature (or, really, culture). Thus unnatural sex is frequently used to sig-
nal coerced anal or oral sex but mostly for cases of excessively violent or 
brutal crimes committed on young children.
Case law spanning some 150 years can be broadly read as shifting from 
initial preoccupations with nonprocreative sex to interpreting and ex-
panding the scope of unnatural sex by the early decades of the twentieth 
century. The homosexual as sodomite may well have been the reference 
point in early case law, which is why oral sex forced on a nine-year-old in 
Bapoji Bhatt would be seen as outside the scope of Section 377. But the re-
lentlessness of cases of sexual assault on children forced judges to grad-
ually enlarge the scope of Section 377 and include an increasing range of 
practices—oral sex, forcible sex between the thighs, and so on—within 
its ambit. Across the archive the reference point shifts away from the 
putative perversity of the homosexual as sodomite to the persistence of 
perversity, sexual depravity, and heinousness in relation to adult male 
sexual violence on children. Seen from the angle of child sexual assault, 
the legal archive of Section 377 is inconsistent with the ideological under-
pinnings of the code and is suggestive of law’s irrationalities.
Before proceeding, I would like to juxtapose the legal record with po-
lice crime records, for they are the foundations upon which convictions 
are won and lost in the courts. The handful of analyses on the legal record 
of Section 377 does not take into account police crime records, perhaps 
because they are difficult to access. Providing more immediate insight 
into what sometimes ends up in the higher courts, police crime records 
serve a twofold purpose in this discussion: they provide a useful point of 
comparison with the trends of case law for Section 377, and they speak to 
another facet of Section 377’s illogics. Therefore I turn to a sampling of 
sixty-six firs related to Section 377 for the period 1999–2005 obtained 
from three police districts of New Delhi, covering tens of police stations, 
to explore the uneven ways in which state institutions and procedures 
format sexuality, governance, and criminality.
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Wrongful versus Unnatural Acts: Police Crime Records
First Information Reports are mandated under Section 154 of the Crimi-
nal Procedure Code, related to what are classified as cognizable offenses. 
Section 377 is a cognizable offense, which means that a case may be in-
vestigated and an arrest made without a warrant. Section 154 reads:
Information in cognizable cases. (1) Every information relating to the 
commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in 
charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under 
his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such infor-
mation, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, 
shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall 
be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the 
State Government may prescribe in this behalf. (2) A copy of the in-
formation as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, 
free of cost, to the informant.56
firs are the written reports related to the commission of an offense 
that is supposed to be recorded in writing by the police, based on the 
testimony and attestation of the informant. As affidavits, they serve as 
another iteration of “paper truths” of the state.57 Like many other state 
records, firs are standardized, aimed at registering the same informa-
tion in each case while leaving room for each case’s peculiarities. They 
format otherwise unmanageable details of crime reports into the follow-
ing categories: police district and date of record; relevant sections of the 
penal code; the day, date, and time of the crime and the place, date, and 
time where the complaint was filed; details of the complainant or infor-
mation, including name, father’s or husband’s name, date of birth, na-
tionality, passport details, occupation, address, and telephone number; 
details of the accused; reasons for delay in filing a police report, if any; 
details of any stolen property; details in a case of murder; and the details 
of the crime, as well as the name of the person creating the record.
The sixty-six firs from New Delhi corroborate what is evident from 
the legal archive; the vast majority (fifty-nine) are crimes committed on 
children; forty-nine are about sexual assault on boys, while ten chron-
icle crimes against girls. The ages of the victims were not recorded in 
three of the cases, although the narratives suggest that two were boys 
and one was a girl. The firs also include four adult men as victims or 
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complainants; their ages were eighteen, nineteen, twenty-five, and forty. 
The nineteen-year-old reported that a classmate committed the crime; 
the eighteen- and twenty-five-year-old were assaulted while trying to 
find employment. In what appears to be an unusual case, the forty-year-
old reported being abducted by two men in a van, robbed, and sexually 
assaulted while he was walking to work one early morning. None of the 
four cases involving the adult men, nor any of the other sixty-six cases, 
bears obvious traces of consensual rather than coerced sex, even though 
the circumstances could be more complex than what is recorded.
These firs also provide additional insight into what becomes the legal 
record of Section 377 through the higher courts. The informants or com-
plainants logged in the firs are either the victims of crimes or, typically, 
family members who intervene on behalf of their children. A twelve-
year-old boy may be identified as the complainant, but at other times a 
father or mother may be recorded as such. Typically a mother or father 
is listed as the informant or complainant when the child is younger than 
ten. Women are more likely to register the fir for their young daugh-
ters. Children are typically listed as students, and the adults are generally 
from the working classes, listed as laborers, owners of a small business 
such as a juice stand, or engaged in other low-skill occupations. Almost 
all the women are described as housewives. At least based on these sixty-
six firs, it appears that the working poor and the lower middle classes 
are the ones reporting crime related to Section 377. Most of the accused 
are neighbors; in only one of the cases the identity of the accused was 
not known. The age of the accused is rarely noted, but there are ample 
references in Hindi to ladka/ladke (boy/boys) or aadmi (man). Since ladka
might be used to describe a boy or a young man, it is hard to ascertain the 
age of an accused, whether he is also a minor possibly assaulting another 
minor or legally an adult committing a crime on a minor.
state scripts and wrongful acts
firs are not simply “factual” records of crimes or “paper truths” that are 
freighted with the power of the word in the modern state; rather they 
are better understood as state scripts that produce and mediate narratives 
on crime in three ways. First, they are forms, having a number of differ-
ent fields where information is condensed and easy to read. In fact the 
firs gathered for this study include two versions, the earlier of which 
was phased out. The later version uses twelve fields of information re-
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lated to the details of the informant or complainant and the crime, a 
narrative section, and another three fields at the end related to the po-
lice officer recording the fir. The many more fields of data in the later 
version create a more detailed record, including age, occupation, and 
passport number of the informant or complainant, and is easier to read 
at a glance. The logic of governance appears to be dictated by the stan-
dardization of detail, which allows for more efficient gathering and tab-
ulating of information. This is precisely the kind of information that is 
used by centers such as the National Crime Records Bureau to generate 
reports in increasing detail.
Second, firs are literally scripted. Since the firs are from Delhi po-
lice stations, all the fields are handwritten primarily in Hindi and partly 
in English, especially numbers, dates, and occasionally names. They are 
stored as paper copies and listed in hardbound ledgers, kept in the Re-
cords Room of local police stations. Third, there is relative consistency 
in the narratives, despite the particularities of cases, the different police 
districts from which they were obtained, and the five-year period from 
which they are drawn. It’s not that the details of age, gender, and occu-
pation of the informants or complainants do not matter, but that the 
formatting of the narratives gives the firs a kind of uniformity. While 
no case is the same as another, the representation of the crime and its 
circumstances repeat across the firs into what emerge as a few familiar 
scenarios. A fir from the North West police district recorded in 2001 
lists a twelve-year-old boy as the complainant and a male of unknown 
age as the accused. In the first-person account of the boy, he says that 
he was promised a new and bigger kite by the accused, who took him 
inside the house, locked the door of the room, clamped the boy’s mouth 
with his hand, took off the boy’s pants, and performed a wrongful act on 
him. The boy’s mother knocked on the door, causing the accused to flee. 
Several other firs read similarly, as boys and girls are lured by a neigh-
bor or an older boy or man from the neighborhood and then assaulted 
behind closed doors. In this case the accused was charged under Section 
377 as well as Section 342 for wrongful confinement. Cases involving 
young girls are sometimes charged under Section 377 and Section 376 
(for rape), but only under Section 377 when the girls are young. For ex-
ample, a mother registered a fir for sexual assault on her three-year-old 
daughter, reporting that she left her daughter in the care of a neighbor, 
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the mother of the accused; when she returned she found her daughter 
crying and later learned from her that the accused had put his “ungli (fin-
ger, but possibly a child’s word for penis)” in her “private parts” (written 
in Hindi) and caused her pain. Another scenario repeated in the firs is 
captured in the case of a thirteen-year-old boy who accused three per-
haps older boys of taking him by a small temple in a park and sexually 
assaulting him; when he cried out, they ran away. He returned home and 
told his father, who took him for a medical examination after calling the 
police station and then to the police station to register the fir.
The firs format discourses of sexuality and criminality, but in ways 
that are not consonant with the code. In contrast to the ideologies of 
unnatural sex, the sampling of police crime records is dominated by the 
discourse of galat kaam (Hindi), which roughly translates as wrongful act.
The recorded accounts of the children, the adults reporting on their be-
half, and the adult men who file complaints are thick with references 
to wrongful act; it is used to describe mostly coerced anal sex but also 
coerced oral sex and rape. One way to understand this discourse is as a 
euphemism for sexual assault in the case of children. But if euphemisms 
are necessary, especially in sexual crimes involving young children, un-
natural serves just as well; indeed more linguistically formal references 
to apprakrit maithun (unnatural sexual intercourse) are found in the crime 
records, but only sparingly.
What seems to be at play here is a disjunction between the law and 
narratives of crimes under it. Unlike the discourse of unnatural sex and its 
association with that which violates or transgresses what is natural and 
therefore legitimate, a wrongful act is replete with injustice and injury. 
Rather than being generated at the threshold of nature or culture, the 
discourse of the wrongful act is specifically about the cultural universe 
of harm and the act of wronging another, especially compelling in terms 
of children. Whether it is generated by the person giving testimony—
the children who report crime and testify to the police or the adults who 
file complaints on behalf of children—or the police constable who re-
cords it, the discourse clearly prevails in the context of child sexual vio-
lence and is incongruent with Section 377’s origins and intents.
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Contemplations on the Code, Case Law, and Criminal Records
The egregiousness of a law criminalizing sexual practices among adults 
regardless of consent is inarguable, but the antisodomy law’s records 
point toward more complex histories of juridical governance. Under-
scoring Section 377’s subjective and contradictory aspects yields a 
thicker understanding of how such juridical mechanisms bring within 
its fold a web of crime, sexual practices, and subjects—child sexual as-
sault, sexual assault on women and men, adult male perpetrators, but 
also occasionally women seeking divorce and adult sexual and gender 
minorities—thus reaffirming the indispensability of law and, by exten-
sion, the state in preserving sociosexual order. Though Section 377’s 
unwieldy archive has been read primarily from a Foucauldian viewpoint 
to show how law introduced and wrongly criminalized the homosexual, 
underscoring law’s sexual ideologies offers a more thoroughgoing ap-
praisal of governance and better serves efforts at undoing it.
Highlighting the dissonance between the provision and functions of 
the antisodomy law helps cast doubt on its usefulness. The intent of Sec-
tion 377 may well have been to repress and prohibit sex between males 
and females, but in fact case law from the higher courts—and this is 
supported by the sample of police crime records—has been primarily 
used to prosecute sexual assault against children, especially boys but also 
girls. Complaints, supported by the medical examination required under 
the statute, are likely to be filed in cases of crimes against children, not 
in relation to the adult consensual sexual practices that may fall within 
the ambit of Section 377, throwing its effectiveness into further doubt. If 
the antisodomy law is not targeting same-sex sexual practices (or other 
practices that were originally implied) and is an inadequate substitute 
for prosecuting sexual offenses against children, then it is hard to justify.
Second, discourses of sexual perversity, depravity, and the scope of 
sex against the order of nature have been consistently articulated and 
elaborated through cases involving sexual assault on children, not in re-
lation to the so-called sodomite or the homosexual. Gupta observes that 
the foremost contribution of cases such as Lohana Vasantlal Devchand has 
been to mark sexual perversity in Indian law and trigger a growing link-
age between sodomy, perversity, and homosexuality without distilling a 
space for consensual same-sex sexual practices.58 But to make this case 
is not only to homogenize a complex and unwieldy set of records but also 
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to fill a lacuna in the case records that is worth utilizing differently. By 
underscoring that institutional discourses and expansions of the scope 
of sodomy law are generated through cases of sexual assault against 
children, it is possible to suggest that social concerns about unnatural 
sex, sexual perversity, and the like are consistently being expressed on 
account of adult male violence on girls and boys rather than targeting 
homosexuality.
Third, taking a subjective view of law encourages more nuanced rep-
resentations of the homosexual, not least by sifting him from the child 
sexual predator. In fact even though the Section 377 archive has consis-
tently been criticized for encoding biases against homosexuals, it would 
be more politically efficacious to argue that the archive is not about 
the persecution of adult consenting homosexuals. It is not that biases 
against the sodomite or the homosexual do not color legal archives, but 
reading them systematically into the case law unwittingly reaffirms the 
homosexual as child predator. That law and law enforcement do not sus-
tain homosexual persecution, despite the law’s intents, becomes a way of 
highlighting law’s irrationalities, as well as extricating the homosexual 
from the child predator.
I am also suggesting that by presenting the legal archive of Section 
377 as primarily about child sexual assault and not about the homosexual 
it is possible to rewrite precolonial as well as colonial and postcolonial 
histories as ambiguous ones. Most significant, the archive does not evi-
dence a clear-cut sociolegal history of persecution against homosexuals 
in India. (To suggest otherwise is to produce a Foucauldian genealogy of 
the homosexual as sodomite where it does not unequivocally exist.) Such 
a position also risks giving greater strength to the state, by assuming 
it is the site of injustice toward same-sex sexualities and also the well-
spring of justice, accounting for Naz Foundation’s emphasis on seeking 
recourse from the judiciary. One would go a lot further in demonstrat-
ing the irrelevance of the antisodomy law by rewriting legal histories of 
homosexuality wherein the colonial context has limited impact and the 
postcolonial setting shows little indication of systematic persecution of 
same-sex sexualities as well as by raising questions about a penal code 
and legislative system that, until the passing of the Protection of Chil-
dren from Sexual Offences Act (2012), did not have laws and provisions to 
deter and prosecute sexual assault on children. And, not least, building 
a more capacious case challenging discrimination and injustice against 
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same-sex sexual subjects would necessarily implicate a whole nexus of 
laws, policies, and discourses in lieu of a narrow focus on Section 377.
A fourth and concluding point: the archive is hardly free from homopho-
bic discourses. To say that there are few cases of adult homosexual consen-
sual sex in the higher courts is not to say that troubling discourses are ab-
sent, for the issue is never just about numbers. In a recent analysis, Gupta 
discusses how specific cases—Queen Empress v. Khairati (1884), Noshirwan 
Irani v. Emperor (1934), and D. P. Minwalla v. Emperor (1935)—constitute 
(homosexual) personhood pejoratively.59 Khairati was initially appre-
hended for being male bodied while dressing and singing in women’s 
clothes, and then convicted by a lower court for having the characteris-
tic signs of a “habitual catamite.” In Noshirwan Irani v. Emperor, the judge 
railed against the “vice of a catamite” in the case of the eighteen-year-old 
Ratansi, with whom the appellant was trying to have sex; they were ob-
served by a policeman and neighbor, who subsequently marched the two 
of them to the police station.60 Even though the conviction was set aside—
because of discrepancies in earlier and later testimonies, the likelihood 
that the neighbor and policeman had a grudge against the young Ratansi 
and did nothing to intervene on his behalf, and because no penetration 
could be proved—the language described the catamite as despicable and 
anal sex as a vice. In D. P. Minwalla v. Emperor one of the two accused of 
sodomy appealed his conviction under Section 377 for what appears to 
be consensual sex with a young man described as a lad.61 The judge of the 
High Court of Sind pored over the evidence, arguments, and plausibility 
of the crime to uphold the conviction under Section 377, but revealingly 
chastised the accused for inviting “a lad to perform upon him an odi-
ous and unnatural abomination.” These and similar cases proliferate 
the recursive and pejorative logic between sexual acts and (homosexual) 
personhood.
What stands out troublingly from the language of the cases involving 
consensual sex between men is the discourse of the “habitual sodomite.” 
The language varies superficially as the “habitual sodomist,” “the vice 
of a catamite,” and “the vice” (of sex against the order of nature), but 
its underpinnings are about criminality and habitualness. Starting with 
the legal record of Khairati, the notion of the habitual sodomite finds 
sporadic though consistent expression in the archive of Section 377. The 
habitual sodomite is part of a larger matrix of discourses of habitual and 
hereditary offenders who are codified into the policies and practices of 
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criminality by the late nineteenth century in colonial India. The ideology 
that some groups are predisposed to crime through habit or heritage was 
enacted into law first in the Habitual Criminals Act of 1869 and then the 
Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 and its subsequent iterations, casting entire 
communities as imminent criminals, subject to surveillance and control 
of mobility and coercive resettlement.62
Although Satadru Sen does not address crime related to Section 377, 
his reflections on the distinctions between habitual and hereditary of-
fenders shed light on how to interpret the traces of the habitual sodomite. 
Sen argues that while the hereditary criminal was typically associated with 
the countryside and intergenerational transmission of crime, the habitual 
criminal was seen as his urban counterpart, hardened to crime but not 
predisposed to it. Additionally important, according to Sen, is that “the 
colonial discourse on hereditary criminals was based on a cultural, rather 
than the biological, model of hereditary. The biological model was al-
ways present, but was distinctly secondary.”63 If notions of the hereditary 
criminal are based on social heritage, then the habitual criminal is seen 
as someone who is accustomed to crime and likely to continually repeat 
it; for him, committing crime becomes a settled practice or condition, 
perhaps even an inward disposition.64
When judges use the grammar of the habitual sodomite or the vice of 
sodomy (the habit or defect of an immoral or depraved nature) in the case 
law of Section 377, they rehearse it as a crime that is continually repeated 
or becomes part of the inward or mental disposition, and therefore an 
inevitable practice. It seems to me that the most persistent and injurious 
discourse on homosexuality decried in the legal record is that it is a set-
tled, habitual practice that will inevitably be repeated, the implications 
of which become especially palpable from the angle of a rights-bearing 
homosexual. Even though for the Delhi Police the arc from the habitual 
to the criminal is to some extent negotiable in the case of homosexuals, it 
is intractable in the case of other groups who are seen to be accustomed 
to unnatural sex and criminality.
C H A P T E R  4
“ H A L F T R U T H S ”
Racializations, Habitual  
Criminals, and the Police
Little is of greater concern in state regulation of sexuality than the polic-
ing of sexual and gender minorities.1 In their report on lesbian women 
in India, Bina Fernandez and N. B. Gomathy indict police coercion and 
threats of public exposure as the principal form of state violence.2 Police 
intimidation also makes gay men vulnerable, according to GayBombay,
a community group in Mumbai, to extortion of money and sex.3 A re-
port by the well-regarded People’s Union for Civil Liberties, Karnataka, 
“Human Rights Violations against the Transgender Community,” docu-
ments the vulnerability of hijras to, among other institutions, everyday 
police harassment, abuse, and sexual violence, further intensifying the 
need to understand policing.4
As Foucault notes in “Omnes et Singulatim,” the police as a collective 
institution is an institution of the state as well as an overall strategy of 
governance, which accounts for why activist and scholarly concerns have 
been directed at “police states” (for example, Arendt in Origins of Totali-
tarianism), with an eye to the institution as a site of violence—excessive, 
ongoing, exhibitionist, spectral, and routine.5 Feminist social scientists 
and scholars of race, ethnicity, religion, and nationalism continue to 
grapple with police violence that targets ethnic and racial minorities, 
migrants and refugees, the urban poor, women sex workers, and tribal 
communities, among others, but what is frequently missing are systemic 
analyses of the institution and its histories.6
The police is among the most opaque state institutions in India, and 
though several studies have taken to task its colonial histories and post-
colonial legacies, contemporary ethnographic accounts are still uncom-
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mon, leaving journalistic impressions to fill the void. Indeed the Delhi 
Police have a research cell that monitors aspects of the institution but 
disseminates its findings only internally. Turning to fieldwork, then, be-
comes a way of creating an archive of the state, a task made all the more 
imperative due to the impenetrability of the police. Delving into two dis-
cussion groups in Delhi, one with twenty-five constables at a Delhi Police 
station and another with some forty-five station heads, inspectors, and 
others from the middle rungs, this chapter brings representatives from 
a range of police stations in the Delhi area into the fold of research.7 Sup-
plementing this analysis are my numerous visits to police stations and 
conversations with constables that offer glimpses into the institutional 
discourses and practices governing sexuality, with the proviso that their 
perspectives are neither representative of police in India nor exhaustive 
portrayals of the Delhi Police.8
Complementing the discussion in chapter 3 on the legal archives of 
the antisodomy law, this chapter analyzes the subjective, sexualized as-
pects of law enforcement. In an added twist, I argue that policing related 
to Section 377 likely imperils those communities that are seen as inher-
ently hypersexual and criminal, especially Muslims and hijras. Although 
gay men, men who have sex with men, and lesbians are not immune to 
the brute impact of legal and extralegal policing, the Delhi Police point 
toward the ways in which law is subjectively administered or, put dif-
ferently, how the antisodomy code is routinely flexed to imperil entire 
groups regardless of their sexual practices.9 Coming to grips with these 
passions and prejudices, this chapter substantiates the argument that 
Section 377 serves to enhance law enforcement’s reach and justification, 
providing another view of how sexualized governance practices and dis-
courses help secure institutions that constitute the state. In the process 
it expands the focus on gender as normative womanhood to include hi-
jras and adds awareness of racialized religious-cultural minorities to this 
analytical mix.
However, invoking racialization in India’s present to understand po-
lice narratives linking crime committed under Section 377 and religious-
cultural minorities requires reconsidering existing analytical appara-
tuses. Although pejorative representations of Muslims by mostly Hindu 
police in Delhi would typically be explained as communalist biases—that 
they are the result of mutual sectarian prejudices and hostilities—the 
inference of reciprocity makes communalism analytically inadequate in 
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a context where some communities are at grave risk of prejudice, dis-
crimination, and violent exclusion.10 Instead race and racialization—
defined here as processes through which social inequality is rationalized 
as natural, inheritable, and enduring—help explain why and how police 
malign particular communities (not all religious groups are racialized or 
represented in similar ways) in relation to the antisodomy law.11 Building 
on Ania Loomba’s argument that religion is neither a preracial form of 
difference nor racism’s latest iteration but has been central to the devel-
opment of its modern formations across the globe, this approach shifts 
attention to sexuality and race thinking (after Arendt) in postcolonial 
India.12
While hijras may also be seen as a religious-cultural community, 
they are not typically placed alongside Hindus, Muslims, and other re-
ligious groups, and their genealogy is more directly framed in terms 
of criminality—as characteristically transgressive and predisposed to 
crime—which echoes in the discussion groups among Delhi Police. 
Mindful that hijras have long been interpellated by the antisodomy 
statute, this chapter seeks to explore the logics of policing that name 
disparate communities—Muslims, hijras, and even Sikhs—in the same 
breath and to analyze the play of culture and nature through which the 
antisodomy law facilitates the reach of policing well beyond its scope.
Internal Sovereignty and Legacies of Violence
Nothing identifies the state with coercion and violence more overtly 
than the police and the military. The distinctions between them are not 
always easily drawn, but my particular interest in this chapter is the in-
stitution of the civilian police located within a larger strategy of state-
based governance and charged with maintaining “internal sovereignty.” 
Defining sovereignty as the ability and the will to employ overwhelming 
violence and to decide on life and death, Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn 
Stepputat argue for the need to understand sovereignty as a cultural 
construction and emphasize its internal aspects, secured through the 
exercise of violence over bodies and populations.13 As I see it, civilian 
police, charged with the maintenance of law and order, are crucial to the 
safeguarding of internal sovereignty, which explains why they are also 
among the most flawed and reviled of state institutions in India.
In postcolonial India antipathy to the police occurs not only among 
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the vulnerable but also among the middle and upper classes, and the view 
that police abuse the law—through corruption, bribery, lack of respon-
siveness to public grievances—is commonly shared and supported by 
documentation. A study by People’s Watch across nine states and forty-
eight districts in India estimates that 1.8 million people are tortured by 
the police each year.14 Ordinary citizens and members of marginalized 
communities—the indigent, Dalits, scheduled castes, and hijras, among 
others—frequently do not report crimes committed against them for 
fear of police retribution. A Human Rights Watch report underscores the 
following areas of concern: police failure to investigate crimes, arrest on 
false charges and illegal detention, torture and ill treatment, and extraju-
dicial killings.15 Widespread aversion to the police also breeds contempt 
for the institution, and they are routinely characterized as ineffectual 
and incompetent, as is often the case in Hindi films (Bollywood). In a 
particularly ironic moment during fieldwork, a Hindi film was playing 
on a tv in the lobby of an office where I was waiting to meet a state offi-
cial, and security personnel and I watched the stock scene of a group of 
policemen unsuccessfully chasing the hero, further signifying the lack 
of complex understandings.
institutional histories
Tracing historical and cultural legacies of the police in India, Kirpal Dhil-
lon describes an institution that remains a product of colonial policies 
and practices and antiquated juridical systems.16 Forged by the Indian 
Police Act of 1861 and the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, the police, David 
Arnold suggests, was the outcome of techniques of control developed 
in order to strengthen the colonial state’s control over the indigenous 
society and mirrored the structures of another British colonial force, 
the royal Irish constabulary.17 He further notes that institutional hierar-
chy was distinctively racial as relatively few European officers occupied 
the highest positions out of an entrenched distrust of Indians and a low 
opinion of their abilities and character. At the same time, recruitment 
policies disaggregated people into convenient stereotypes of “martial 
races,” or “Brahmans,” giving preference to some groups over others 
and recruiting from the “low castes” only when others were unavailable 
for recruitment.18 Drawn from subaltern groups, the rank and file of the 
police were paid little and had poor working conditions and no pros-
pects of upward mobility compared to the Europeans or the inspectorate 
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drawn from the Indian middle classes.19 The failure of adequate super-
vision, petty corruption, illegal extraction, and predatory acts became 
institutionalized and further alienated the constabulary from subaltern 
communities. From its start, the role of the police was to impose and 
maintain law and order, not to provide service and security to their com-
munities, and they were accountable to the masters and not to the com-
munities, patterns that endure to date.
Although police reforms have occurred in postcolonial India, they 
have been incremental, not sweeping, leaving intact colonial structural 
flaws relating to accountability, autonomy, and inequity.20 The lasting 
colonial legacy has ensured that the police protect and defend the es-
tablishment, the wealthy and the powerful, the locally influential, while 
typically remaining indifferent and frequently oppressive to the com-
munities they watch (over). Systemic alienation of the police from the 
communities where they enforce the law and maintain order remains 
essentially unchanged, and, if anything, people’s mistrust of the police 
may have deepened. Furthermore civilian police still do not operate as 
an autonomous unit answerable to the community, despite efforts at 
fostering police and community ties in cities like Mumbai; rather the 
police are subject to the state-level political executive. While the police 
also exist at the national level (such as the Central Reserve Police Force, 
the Border Security Force, the Intelligence Bureau, the National Secu-
rity Guards), the civilian police fall under the authority and purview of 
state governance, creating a two-tier system of policing.21 The chain of 
hierarchy and accountability of the civilian police ends with the state 
executive branch via a civilian district magistrate and the state police 
chief, thereby making police at the local or district level responsible to 
the political wing of government rather than the law or communities 
they serve. The Delhi Police motto—“With you, For you, Always”—aims 
at bridging these divides, inviting the trust of the public and fostering 
a community-oriented police force, but without structural reforms ad-
dressing autonomy from political leadership, accountability to commu-
nities, and inequities within the institution, this motto falls significantly 
short of its promise.
The bulk of the police force, its constables and head constables, con-
tinue to live at the edge of poverty, working long hours in arduous con-
ditions not unlike their predecessors in colonial times.22 In Delhi police 
constables perform twelve-hour beats daily, make between Rs 3,200 
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and 4,000 ($72–110) per month, are statutorily required to be available 
twenty-four hours a day, have no fixed days off, and often return home to 
their families no more than three days a week, sleeping at the station in-
stead.23 Ventures into the restricted areas of Delhi Police stations during 
fieldwork revealed large rooms with a row of simple beds and personal 
items stowed beside them. Human Rights Watch reports even more dire 
working conditions in other cases.24 In 2008 there were an estimated 
79,000 Delhi police, of which 7 percent were women.25 Most officers are 
from the Hindu ethnic community of Jats from the neighboring state 
of Haryana. The institution is controlled by the Union Ministry of Home 
Affairs and is headed by the police commissioner. In Delhi there are 
three special commissioners of police, seventeen joint commissioners, 
seven additional commissioners, seventy-four deputy commissioners, 
and 272 assistant commissioners of police. All senior police officers are 
graduates of the elite Indian Police Service and have no experience with 
hands-on policing. They take highly competitive entrance exams with a 
selection rate of less than half a percent and start their careers by head-
ing a police district.26 The Delhi Police are divided into eleven districts 
and 177 individual police stations, known as thanas in Hindi. Thanas are 
headed by inspectors, who are university graduates, whereas constables 
are recruited locally and given training that ill prepares them to respond 
to the needs of the communities they police.
Colonial and postcolonial contexts are marked by continuities as well 
as differences, and it is important not to exaggerate either. The end of 
colonialism and a dynamic postcolonial context notwithstanding, the 
rank and file of the police still stand at the threshold of state and society 
and embody the paradox of being both state agents and subalterns, while 
practicing the enforcement of law in flawed ways. And, although Hansen 
and Stepputat argue that colonial forms of sovereignty are more spectral, 
fragmented, and racial, their traces are still discernible in the responses 
by members of the Delhi Police to my discussion questions.27
The “Nature” of Unnatural Sex
On June 10, 2005, I accompany Manjeet, an outreach worker for Naz 
Foundation, the ngo that filed the challenge to Section 377 in the Delhi 
High Court in 2001, to a police station in South Delhi. Similar to pro-
grams aimed at creating awareness among police on sexuality-related 
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issues in nations such as Kenya, Nepal, and the United States, Manjeet 
conducts hiv/aids informational and sensitization programs at police 
stations in Delhi. After going through the basics of hiv and aids, what 
causes hiv infection, and how to prevent it, Manjeet turns the group 
over to me for a discussion that lasts over an hour. I step to the front 
of the room to face twenty-five police constables, introduce myself as a 
teacher and researcher in the area of sexuality, and say that I am inter-
ested in what they know about Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code and 
how they enforce it.
“It’s to do with unnatural sex,” “Any kind of unnatural sex involving 
animals, dead bodies,” chime a few constables. “In the case of an old 
man trying to have sex with a young girl.” They speak about Section 377 
easily and participate in the ensuing discussion on the criminal law.
I ask the twenty-five constables for cases that they have encountered 
related to Section 377. The examples pour fast and freely. An old man 
raped a young boy and he came to the police; a Muslim couple, where 
the wife did not want anal sex and filed a complaint against the hus-
band. “It happens more among Mohammedans,” one constable asserts 
informatively, casually in Hindi. Manjeet, a turban-wearing Sikh, re-
proves the constable immediately, saying firmly but kindly that such 
remarks shouldn’t be made about any community (“Kisi community ke 
bare main aisa nahin kehna chahiye”). Without missing a beat, the con-
stable responds, “Your community is the second one where it happens 
the most” (“Uske baad apki community main sabse zyada hota hai”). 
Laughter explodes among the constables; none of them challenges ei-
ther statement. The constable adds in English, “Don’t mind, please,” 
and then in Hindi, “I say what I have seen.”
The twenty-five constables in the room are seated in neat rows on either 
side of a center aisle, and Manjeet and I take turns standing in front of 
the desk at the head of the room. The spacious though not large room is 
comfortably filled. A cooler, a machine that works on a combination of 
air and water, brings relief from Delhi’s dry heat while creating a back-
ground din, and the drawn window curtains shield the room from the 
midday heat. A few posters are tacked to the walls: one in English on 
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sexual harassment, one in Hindi advocating against dowry, and in the 
back of the room a fading image of a once-resplendent Madonna and the 
baby Jesus. The dull cream color of the walls, the sun-bleached curtains, 
and the posters give the room a drab, worn appearance. In contrast, the 
constables are neatly attired in their khaki uniforms. All male, their years 
of service in the police range from six to thirty-two. These policemen 
have served and continue to serve the beats—in the streets, the parks, 
the neighborhoods. Our discussion is primarily in Hindi, liberally pep-
pered with words, phrases, and sentences in English.
The constable’s assertion that “unnatural sex” happens more among 
Muslims and Sikhs is a stunning displacement of sexuality and crimi-
nality onto religious-cultural groups. It is preceded by examples of what 
constitutes unnatural sex: nonnormative and unnatural sexual practices. 
The point that such practices occur primarily among Muslims and Sikhs 
suggests powerful sentiments among the police that are not simply 
about homophobia but about the fear and (pleasure of ) hatred of par-
ticular minority religious-cultural communities. Missing from these 
initial examples is any mention of same-sex sexual activity among adult 
women or men, making the glib association between unnatural sex and 
Muslims that was reinforced time and time again in conversations with 
police constables in Delhi all the more disturbing. The use of the term 
Mohammedans rather than Muslims deepens the distance between the con-
stable and those to whom he refers, for Mohammedans was a term used by 
the British to describe the followers of Islam and is still commonplace 
in Delhi, along with Muslims (in English and Hindi) and Musselman (in 
Hindi). The scathing connotations of the constable’s statement are ex-
acerbated by the laughter of his colleagues.
Manjeet’s timely intervention is rebuffed immediately by the con-
stable. The term community that echoes in their exchange, as in the 
Hindi-English phrase apki community (your community), is partially de-
rived from the term communal in the Indian context. Had Manjeet and 
the constables spoken entirely in Hindi, they would have likely used the 
term quam (translated as community or nation). The Oxford English Dictio-
nary notes the particular association of community and the communal 
within the South Asian context, wherein community is shaped by reli-
gious and ethnic difference and intercommunal strife.28 Sudipta Kaviraj 
draws a distinction between fuzzy and enumerated communities, the 
ones that are not territorially based—caste, religion—and the ones that 
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are both about numerical strength and territory, such as nations.29 The 
exchanges on community between Manjeet and the constable are con-
densed narratives of the history of the postcolonial Indian nation within 
which religious communities became enumerated, consolidated despite 
their “fuzzy boundaries,” and grist for the discourse of communalism. 
Muslim and Sikh communities in India have indistinct boundaries and 
are characterized by internal religious, linguistic, caste, geographic, 
gender, and class differences, much like Hindus—right-wing attempts 
at homogenizing Hinduism notwithstanding.30 Still, dominant and mi-
nority religious-cultural communities are seen as the basis for struggles 
around political, economic, and cultural resources.
That these ideologies and sentiments are not limited to constables 
became clear in the group discussion with those higher up the chain of 
command, the middle rung of the police, where more than forty-five heads 
of police stations and police inspectors gathered for a training session on 
gender sensitization and gender justice on July 13, 2005, at the lecture hall 
Teen Murti Traffic Lines in New Delhi. The program was managed by 
the joint commissioner of police, women’s crime cell, who invited me to 
conduct a segment of the training session in an administrative building 
of the Delhi Police.
As I enter the nondescript room, painted in a fading grayish white, 
some forty-five members of the police including two women are seated at 
tables. It is set up like a classroom, and I face them from a platform at the 
front of the room with a blackboard behind me. Unlike the constables, 
most of the men and women are dressed in civilian clothes and hold at 
least a bachelor’s-level degree; like the previous group discussion, we 
speak in a mix of Hindi and English. To highlight the role of culture and 
history in constructing gender as unequal difference, I lead a discussion 
on the meaning of the normative categories of woman and man. The 
discussion is lively and the issues of how gender categories exercise 
constraints on personhood, conduct, roles, occupations, and so on are 
thoughtfully received, although punctuated with emphatic beliefs about 
women’s responsibility in monitoring our bodies and selves.
As the discussion turns to same-sex sexualities and Section 377, many 
of the male police repeatedly and emphatically insist that most crimes 
are committed by Muslims. As a group they are resolute in their belief 
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that most crimes under Section 377 and indeed most crimes in general 
are committed by Muslims. Some are quiet, but others assert, “Most 
unnatural sex crimes are committed by the Muslim community”; “I 
have seen that this happens more among Muslim people”; “Most com-
plaints on 377 are about these people.” No one disagrees. One of the 
two women openly concurs in Hindi, “Madam, I too have seen this.” 
Non-Hindu-identified officers listen quietly to these vehement charges 
against a minority group, perhaps cognizant of its explosiveness (one 
Sikh man wears a turban). I present the counterargument that Muslims 
do not and could not account for the bulk of crimes in a country that 
is more than 84 percent Hindu. Some remain quiet; others disagree. 
Eventually the discussion tapers off inconclusively and unsatisfactorily, 
some officers obviously restless as the allotted time comes to an end.
The question is how to account for this insistent displacement of unnat-
ural sex or sexual crimes committed under Section 377 onto Muslims in 
particular, and to a lesser extent onto Sikhs, by the Delhi Police. How to 
explain the consistent association between what are seen as abnormal 
sexual practices and religious-cultural groups?
racialized communalisms
In the Indian context, these remarks by the Delhi Police are likely to be 
ascribed to communalism; that is to say, the mostly male Hindu police 
are prejudiced against Muslim and Sikh communities. Rooted in Brit-
ish colonial administrative politics and coming into usage by the 1920s, 
the term communalism continues to be widely used in India to represent 
religion-based sectarian differences as well as mutual prejudices and 
hostilities and symbolizes loyalty to one’s community over nation and 
an impediment to patriotism. The primary challenge facing Indian na-
tionalism, it is believed, are communalism’s various iterations: inter-
communal strife, competition for resources, politicization of religion, 
violence, perceived Muslim and Sikh loyalty to faith over nation, dissi-
dence in Kashmir, and (Muslim) terrorism. But what is crucial and rel-
evant to the discussion here is that communalism is seen as both cause 
and effect of historically and socially entrenched attitudes of prejudice 
and discrimination between religious communities. Since the majority 
of Delhi Police are ethnically and religiously distinct Hindu Jats from the 
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neighboring state of Haryana, their prejudicial associations of (homo)
sexual crimes with Muslims and Sikhs could be seen as communalist.
Its history and continued significance notwithstanding, the dis-
course of communalism is increasingly inadequate to account for such 
responses by state agents or citizens who are members of a majoritarian 
religious community and an ethnic community with the political clout 
to be heavily recruited into the Delhi Police. Gyanendra Pandey notes 
that the term communalism persists despite its declining relevance in the 
Indian context because it serves as a shared language for discussion but 
also because of intellectual inertia.31 It must be why terms such as riot,
communal riot, and communal violence are repeatedly put in scare quotes, 
for typically Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and Dalits are the ones who are 
grievously hurt by majoritarian Hindu groups with the implicit and ex-
plicit collusion of state institutions and agents.32 In the past few decades 
riots and mutual conflict and hostility have expanded to genocide, po-
groms, forcible conversions to Hinduism, and torching and looting of 
the property of minority religious communities (alongside intercaste, 
interethnic, and gender-based violence).
Neither does the term communalism help explain the institutionaliza-
tion of socioeconomic inequalities and discrimination that are captured, 
for example, by the Sachar Committee report, “Social, Economic and 
Educational Status of the Muslim Community in India.” Documenting 
the widespread and disproportionate gaps in educational attainment, 
income, bank credit, and high-level government jobs across thirteen 
Indian states, the report also identifies widespread perceptions among 
Muslim communities of prejudice and discrimination toward them.33 In-
creasingly, in lieu of communalism, the politics of religion and religious 
hierarchies is represented in the lexicon of majorities and minorities, and 
riots have come to be partially replaced by the lexicon of pogroms and geno-
cide. As Rustom Bharucha writes, it is difficult to seek academic solace in 
communalism while the exclusion of Muslims escalates from a racism 
of domination to a racism of extermination.34
Needed here is a theory of racialization in India’s present to locate the 
insistence by members of the Delhi Police that unnatural sex crimes are 
mostly committed by Muslims and, to a lesser extent, Sikhs. The prob-
lem, though, is that race and racialization as categories and processes 
are typically reserved for the colonial context in India. Despite Indrani 
Chatterjee’s critical examination of racial hierarchies in precolonial In-
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dia and Loomba’s useful theorizing of religious and caste differences 
as racialized processes in India’s present, the accepted approach, if not 
articulated belief, is that race ought to be reserved for the colonial con-
text and that it does not belong analytically within the contemporary 
Indian context, for racial difference has been primarily conceptualized 
as colonial difference between Europeans and Indians, between whites 
and browns.35
Stated simply, the reluctance to use the analytics of racialization in 
India’s present is because Hindus and religious minority groups are not 
phenotypically different. Curiously, select groups self-characterize as 
racially distinct—for example, some Hindu fundamentalists and some 
Sikh political leaders—but in general race and racialization appear to 
have no analytical purchase in a phenotypically mixed national context.36
This, despite the intertwined genealogies of race and communalism in 
the Indian context, for as Pandey reasons, race was part of the same co-
lonial and naturalized taxonomies out of which came communalism.37 It 
was not unusual to identify “martial races,” the British colonial belief that 
some groups were naturally, inherently more effective for combat, which 
resulted in the recruitment of Sikhs for positions in the military and the 
police in the northern part of the territory and Muslims in the southern 
part.38 The lexicon of race, then, inflected not only the transactions of the 
rulers and the ruled but also the distinctions among religious-cultural 
communities that were in the process of being consolidated.
If communalism is distinctively or exceptionally South Asian, then 
race has a Euro-American provenance. The conceptual genealogy of race 
is drawn largely from the Atlantic slave trade and early colonial encoun-
ters in the Americas. Even though there are multiple trajectories of race, 
racial classifications, and racial discourses, race in its Euro-American ge-
nealogy has come to be about somatic differences; as Paul Gilroy argues, 
it has been about the discourses and practices of color, face, hair, skin, 
and more.39 In her critical intervention, however, Loomba questions 
these conflations of race with body that amplify Euro-American histories 
into universal definitions of race.40 Further, to see racialized difference as 
written on the body is to engage a particular genealogy of race thinking 
and racisms and lose sight of the collective insistence of critical scholars 
that race is not grounded in apparently somatic differences but in cul-
tural discourses that produce the body as the site of unequal difference. 
Constituting race and racisms across a variety of cultural settings are dis-
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courses of unequal and naturally occurring differences that are seen as “natural” 
and “transmissible”; put differently, race and racializations are wrought 
from cultural and historical regimes of classification that rationalize 
forms of inequalities on the basis of natural, extracultural difference. 
Needed, then, are multiple genealogies of race and racializations, and 
the trajectory that I am considering here is not intelligible through what 
Gilroy calls a politics of the chromatic and optical, but through cultural 
discourses of blood, psyche, and sinew.41
racializations of  blood, psyche, and sinew
Responses by members of the Delhi Police may seem to be about cultural 
difference, but they are in fact about discourses of nature and naturalized 
disparities—putatively inherent in communities and reproducible from 
one generation to another—that are widely pervasive in Hindu majori-
tarian discourses. Muslims are consistently cast as both alien outsiders, 
the descendants of Mughal invaders who proselytized Islam, as well as 
internal outsiders, the marginalized caste Hindus who converted to Is-
lam. As the largest religious-cultural minority (approximately 13 percent 
of the population), Muslims are widely (mis)represented through a com-
plex web of discourses of “blood” (read: nature or biology), “psyche” or 
religious-emotional essence, and “sinew” or physicality and prowess. 
Sustained by notions of fanaticism as a natural extension of the faith, 
differences in hygiene and diet (especially meat eating), and hypersex-
uality (polygamy, high population growth rates, and excessive sexual 
appetites, especially for Hindu women), Muslims are seen as innately 
physically and psychically different. It is not unusual to hear Hindu sen-
timents in places like Delhi that capture this troubling mix of culture and 
nature, community and inheritability in phrases such as Unki to Quam hi 
aise hai (This is the nature of their community).42
Discourses of sexuality give greater potency to such racialized projec-
tions of communal difference, for if the myth of the “over-sexed Muslim 
man and his over-fertile Muslim wife/wives” or falsehoods about the 
Muslim growth rate echo among majoritarian Hindus and other mi-
nority groups,43 the circumcised penis circulates as the embodiment of 
a community and its otherness. Analogically invoking Frantz Fanon’s cri-
tique of how black male bodies are reduced to the penis, Bharucha notes 
that in the hate literature on Muslims in India, the circumcised penis 
is equated with an unclean body, polygamy, and lasciviousness.44 Paola 
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Bacchetta extends this argument to suggest that Hindu nationalists as-
sign queer gender and sexuality to all who are “others” of the Hindu na-
tion, but especially Indian Muslims, who are cast as hypermasculine and 
hypersexual, sexually violent as well as sexually deviant.45 However, these 
racialized projections of “queer” sexuality, nonnormative and excessive, 
are not limited to the political core of Hindu nationalism but resonate 
more widely in the majoritarian populace.
That constables and their seniors would share and echo some of these 
commonplace associations between Indian Muslims and sexual deviance 
may not be unexpected but is nonetheless disturbing. The concern that 
those who are duty bound to protect all equally hold such deep-seated 
racialized prejudices is further exacerbated by the low numbers of Mus-
lims across all ranks of police in much of the nation as well as Delhi. For 
example, Omar Khalidi observes that after many Muslim rank-and-file 
police opted to migrate to Pakistan in 1947, depleting the Delhi force, no 
effort was made to recruit Muslims for decades thereafter.46 As a result by 
1991 the Delhi Police were a mere 2.3 percent Muslim.47 In her compelling 
writing on the role of the police in the violence in Gujarat, Teesta Setal-
vad asserts that the small number of Muslim police officers and those 
from the lower ranks are systematically denied positions that entail di-
rectly managing law and order, especially heading police stations and 
districts.48 The combination of flawed structures of accountability and 
forms of racism internalized within its ranks has driven police complicity 
with Hindu majoritarian groups during pogroms and genocide against 
Muslim communities. Indeed the evidence for repeated police failure to 
protect Muslim and Sikh groups under threat, either by inaction or active 
participation in violence, is overwhelming.49 Although Khalidi’s study is 
an important reminder that police can be led to prevent and stall violence 
against minorities, the constables reveal entrenched racialized beliefs 
about the sexual nature and conduct of religious minorities.
The racialized attitudes and beliefs about criminality and unnatural 
sex conveyed by the constable and implicitly endorsed by his colleagues 
in the first discussion, and more broadly endorsed in the second discus-
sion, are not simply factors of group dynamics but appear to be more 
pervasive. During my trip to another police station to gather firs on 
Section 377, a constable followed me into the Records Room, dusty 
and cramped with a couple of tables, several chairs, and metal shelves 
stacked with files and ledgers. I sat across from another constable at an 
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adjoining table, the first constable politely asked what I was doing. When 
I explained my interest in seeing the firs on Section 377, he said without 
solicitation or hesitation that it’s a crime mostly committed by Muslims. 
Unable to let it pass, I used the authority of evidence to say that the data 
do not support this claim and cited the twelve firs I had already gath-
ered, which seemed to primarily incriminate Hindus; nine out of the 
twelve were Hindu names, while only two names appeared to be Muslim 
and one was likely Sikh. Joined sporadically by the constable at the ad-
joining table, what followed was an argument about those who commit 
crimes under Section 377 that tapered off when neither of us was able to 
alter the other’s views. Perhaps most ironic, while I, a feminist scholar, 
clung to evidence, the first constable insisted that his belief was rooted 
in his experience of policing! This highlights two interrelated points: first, 
that the group discussions are not anomalies in terms of the racializa-
tion of crimes under Section 377; second, that although Muslims were 
slandered across instances of fieldwork, the group discussion with the 
constables was the only time in which Sikhs were maligned. The racial-
ization of Sikhs in India’s past and present is qualitatively and historically 
different compared to Muslims, and even though it reverberates at the 
national level, it is also peculiarly a product of Delhi as the site of bloody, 
calculated vengeance.
sikhs: racialized fluctuations from 
“ultranationalist to antinationalist”
The 1984 pogrom against Sikhs in Delhi was a turning point in dominant 
representations of Sikhs from ultranationalist to antinationalist in ways 
that resonate among the Delhi Police. In their introduction to The Delhi 
Riots: Three Days in the Life of a Nation, Uma Chakravarti and Nandita Has-
kar suggest that the pogrom produced a new minority, but its creation 
had been under way long before 1984. In contrast to the web of colonial 
and postcolonial histories constructing differences and hierarchies be-
tween Hindus and Muslims, Sikhs struggled to forge a community re-
ligiously and politically distinct from Hinduism and Hindus during the 
late colonial period.50 Sikh leaders’ aspirations for a separate Sikh state 
federated to either India or Pakistan at the time of partition in 1947 were 
not realized, but a political struggle for a linguistically defined, Punjabi-
speaking state followed. Brian Keith Axel explains that the notion of a 
sovereign Sikh nation-state first emerged in the Sikh diaspora in the 
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1970s and was embraced after the watershed of 1984, when a massive 
military offensive violated Sikhism’s most revered site, the Golden Tem-
ple, or Harmandir Sahib.51 In retaliation two Sikh bodyguards assassi-
nated Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, unleashing 
three days of brutal, orchestrated violence against Sikh communities 
by majoritarian Hindu political leaders with the participation of party 
Hindu henchmen, petty criminals, and even upper-caste and Dalit neigh-
bors in some cases, and the complicity of the police. Afterward, until 
the end of the 1990s, a protracted struggle to constitute a sovereign Sikh 
state was brutally suppressed by military and police violence, and Sikhs 
were recast in the national imaginary as an antinational minority, terror-
ists, and religious separatists.
In her fieldwork in Delhi during and in the aftermath of the 1984 po-
grom, Veena Das details the changing self-representations of Sikhs and 
dominant Hindu depictions of them.52 Das suggests that in 1981–84, 
during civil obedience campaigns led by Sikh leaders, Sikhs increasingly 
described themselves as a distinct race, whose history was written in 
the blood of martyrs and who were unambiguously masculine, militant 
Sikh literature portrayed Hindus as essentially effeminate, cunning, and 
weak. These categories were reversed in the imaginaries of majoritarian 
Hindus. Das crystallizes Hindu understandings of Sikh traits in circula-
tion at the time: that Sikhs are loyal only to their religion, fanatical to the 
point of madness, capable of betraying the closest trust, snake-like in that 
they will bite the hand that feeds them, naturally aggressive, attracted to 
violence, and incapable of observing normal social constraints. Much 
like the genocide against Muslims in Gujarat, the terror inflicted against 
Sikhs was methodically executed and the police either deliberately did 
not intervene while the murderous violence raged for three days or, in 
some cases, reportedly participated in it. The compilation of interviews 
in the book The Delhi Riots: Three Days in the Life of a Nation is replete with 
accounts of the ways police refused to stop the victimization of Sikhs.
Delhi Police involvement in the 1984 pogrom and the broader shift 
in dominant perceptions and the strengthening of these racist stereo-
types of Sikhs appears to have left an imprint on the constables in this 
group discussion. Once again cultural discourses are intensified by in-
stitutional imbalances, namely the declining representation of Sikhs 
in the Delhi Police. Historically Sikhs served in the military and police 
in numbers much higher than their share of the population (which is 
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approximately 2 percent); in 1991 they constituted an impressive 21 per-
cent of the Delhi Police.53 However, since 1984 their numbers have been 
dwindling dramatically, as confirmed by the National Minorities Com-
mission, with rumors of a ban against Sikh recruitment, according to 
Khalidi. Indeed in my numerous visits to police stations and police head-
quarters in Delhi, I was hard-pressed to find turban-wearing Sikhs. As 
Khalidi also confirms, the rank and file of Delhi Police is constituted 
largely by Haryana (Hindu) Jats. The constables’ responses in the group 
discussion indicate their ambivalence toward Sikhs due to national and 
regional histories that go unchecked by the skewed numbers in the Delhi 
Police force.
After the group discussions and other instances in which the police 
pointed to Muslims as the culprits of crimes under Section 377, I returned 
to the Delhi Police Headquarters to meet one of the senior officials for 
the third time with the intention of making him aware of the pervasive 
associations of sexual crimes with Muslims, and to a lesser extent Sikhs, 
among constables as well as the middle-rung police I encountered. But 
the official, one of only two turban-wearing Sikhs I encountered among 
Delhi Police, who had previously been helpful by authorizing the release 
of data to me, vigorously dismissed my concerns. “A few bad apples in 
the police force” was how he explained away what I sought to call to his 
attention. My point is not to argue for a monolithic view of the police or 
the reproduction of racializations but to underscore the queering of ra-
cialized religious minorities and the insistence on their association with 
criminality that so quickly rise to the surface in discussions among Delhi 
Police constables on Section 377. The extent to which these ideologies 
and sentiments are shared and acted upon during routine policing and 
the handling of complaints remains a matter for further investigation, 
but the fact that the police officers and rank and file who intervened on 
behalf of the victims in Gujarat in 2002 and Delhi in 1984 were excep-
tional is a reason to not be overly optimistic.54 Still, in their responses to 
how Section 377 is used, participants of both discussion groups empha-
sized the letter of the law, denying violence in some cases while openly 
defending it in others.
“Half Truths” 91
Criminalizing Gender Queers
I ask the constables in the group discussion about when and under what 
circumstances they use Section 377. The responses come swiftly and 
almost unanimously. “Only when there is a formal complaint”; “When 
a formal complaint is lodged and after the medical examination, then 
Section 377 may be used.” I probe deeper, asking whether they use it 
when two men or two women are strolling in a park, whether it is used 
even when both parties consent to sex. “It’s when there is no consent 
that we do something about it and only then”; “377 is used even when 
consent is there”; “It’s mostly due to a complaint being lodged and due 
to sex in public places”; “It doesn’t come up when both parties consent, 
since no complaint is filed”; “We would not stop [threaten or arrest on 
charges of suspicion] two men or a young man and a woman in a park.”
The constables easily summarize the guidelines for enforcing Section 
377—the filing of a formal complaint and a medical examination—
implying that men consenting to same-sex sexual activity (in private) 
would be practically exempt from the force of this law. At odds with doc-
umented police abuse especially of young men suspected of being sex-
ually dissident,55 these responses also do not address the fact that laws 
regulating public sex are hardly neutral, for a couple arrested for hetero-
sexual public sex would likely be charged under public nuisance or public 
indecency laws, not the harsher punitive measure of Section 377. Almost 
lost in the din, one constable’s response that the law is used regardless 
of consent—“even when consent is there”—speaks to instances of po-
lice responding to or taking what they see as preventative action against 
male-to-male sexual activity in public areas, such as parks, near urinals, 
and other cruising areas, which itself is partly a result of Delhi’s high 
population density and lack of privacy in indigent, working-class, and 
even middle-class households.
Despite the troubling reports of police abuse and one constable’s 
caution that consent is immaterial to the antisodomy law, other police 
officials also denied violence against same-sex sexualities. When I first 
tried to delve into these allegations with the presiding New Delhi Police 
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commissioner in June 2003, the interview was terminated within a few 
minutes since he wasn’t aware of the Naz Foundation writ or its status, 
even though the Delhi Police were named as respondents (chapter 2). 
What did get his attention, however, was the issue of police abuse, which 
he vehemently denied, insisting that the institution’s role is merely to en-
force the law, a point that would be hotly disputed by those who bear the 
brunt of this enforcement. The position that the police merely enforce 
the law was repeated almost to the letter two years later, in June 2005, by 
the New Delhi commissioner of police, who said, “We come into the pic-
ture only if there is something repugnant to the law. We enforce the law.” 
Even as it is possible that the constables and other police I encountered 
in my fieldwork were not personally violent toward same-sex sexualities, 
all denied using (extralegal) violence to enforce the law.
In sharp contrast, police violence was openly and unapologetically 
endorsed in the case of hijras. While the association between religious-
cultural minorities and unnatural sex crimes was suggested in the two 
discussion groups, it is not clear whether these members of the police 
are more likely to target Muslims or Sikhs in maintaining sexual and 
social order. But such ambiguities were nowhere in evidence regarding 
hijras, whom the constables target them on the grounds that “they have 
sex in public places”; “they do it for money—for Rs. 50, Rs. 200 to 300” 
(approximately $1, $4–6). They tell me to see for myself: near the do-
mestic airport, hijras attract clients and then rob them of their clothes 
and their money. In the second discussion group the more senior police 
men and women added, “They are criminals”; “They rob and steal from 
their clients”; “They are up to no good. It is our responsibility [to stop 
them]”; “They do wrong. They solicit sex.”
Perhaps the association between hijras and the antisodomy law is 
not unexpected, not least because one of the earliest cases (1884) under 
the statute had to do with a hijra, Khairati, who was charged without a 
complaint or evidence (chapter 3). More surprising is the vehemence 
and openness with which some police in Delhi alluded to and justified 
the targeting of hijras. Saying that this is “how hijras are,” the constables 
described the need for “preventative” policing—stopping hijras and de-
manding to know what they were doing, labeling them troublemakers 
and keeping an eye on them, and using violence as necessary. Anticipat-
ing complaints about police inaction from those they refer to as “people 
like me” (aap jaise log), the senior members suggest that constables are 
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being proactive by policing hijras. Representing hijras as “antipolice,” 
these members of the Delhi Police force see no difficulty in flexibly en-
forcing the antisodomy statute even when there are no complaints, vic-
tims of crime, or evidence of wrongdoing.
Yet, given the requirements for registering crime under Section 377, 
noted by the constables, policing often relies more formally on other 
legal provisions, most notably the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act (itpa)
of 1956. Aimed at curbing sex work, itpa was amended in 1986 to be 
gender-neutral, thereby encompassing hijras and other non-woman sex 
workers. Although the law does not actually criminalize sex work or sex 
workers, its enforcement is primarily targeted at soliciting sex in pub-
lic places, making hijras, sex workers, and others vulnerable. Despite 
the fact that hijras are heavily dependent on sex work and vulnerable to 
sexual violence from thugs, goons, and the police due to their extreme 
social marginalization, Section 377, itpa, and other provisions are being 
stretched, bent, and rationalized by constables and their senior repre-
sentatives in the interests of public morality and social order.
Represented in police accounts is not just the association between 
hijras and sexual transgression but also hijras’ inherent tendency toward 
crime in general, a view that derives from the colonial era. Overlaying 
the past of the antisodomy statute and hijras is their classification in the 
Criminal Tribes Act, first introduced in the northern provinces in 1871 of 
the colonial territory and then throughout British India by 1911. Mapping 
its history, Meena Radhakrishna writes that its underlying purpose was 
to suppress the “hereditary criminal” groups, for the problem of crime 
was seen as intrinsic to native society.56 Amended in 1897 to include eu-
nuchs and hijras, every aspect of their lives was criminalized and subject 
to surveillance and harassment by the police, according to Arvind Nar-
rain, and the local government was required to maintain a register of 
the names and residences of eunuchs, “deemed to include all members 
of the male sex who admit themselves, or on medical inspection clearly 
appear, to be impotent,” who might be “reasonably” suspected of kid-
napping or castrating children, or might be charged under Section 377 
of the Indian Penal Code.57
Even though hijras were eventually declassified as a criminal commu-
nity, the associations between same-sex sexual practices and a tendency 
toward crime as a group continue to endure among the members of the 
Delhi Police. Hijras were forged out of the same overarching colonial 
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taxonomic discourses that homogenized people as Muslims, Sikhs, 
Brahmans, and Dalits, among others, but setting them apart are what 
Narrain describes as colonial administrators’ perceptions that hijras 
have an innate tendency toward licentiousness leading to sexual non-
conformity and criminality.58 Delhi Police members’ justifications for 
targeting hijras also track closely with colonial standards for enforcing 
the Criminal Tribes Act, which were as low as “reason to believe” that the 
community was criminal, making the Act amenable to indiscriminate 
use.59 By rehearsing conjoined histories of same-sex sexual practices and 
petty crime, such as theft, police responses do not distinguish between 
enforcing Section 377 and policing other forms of crime putatively com-
mitted by hijras. Rather their responses allude to the ways the antisod-
omy law may be used to regulate acts and transgressions that lie well 
outside its scope or, put differently, the extent to which the statute might 
bolster and justify policing.
Fractures of Heteronormativity
I ask the constables whether Section 377 should change. Several say 
unequivocally, “Sex between men or between women is wrong”; “This 
is against our culture.” They raise concerns: “If 377 is removed it will 
increase homosexual behavior”; “What will happen to the population if 
everyone is doing unnatural sex, especially in the next hundred years?” 
But there is more. One constable says that the law should change: “Each 
person has a right to sexual satisfaction” (“Har ek ko sexual satisfac-
tion ka adhika’r hai”); “This law is wrong in the case of two adults who 
consent to sex. This law should change”; “This law should be changed 
as now we are free from colonialism”; “There should be a difference 
between forced and consensual sex.” The discussion and disagreement 
continue.
The constables have much to say on the future of Section 377, but they are 
not of one opinion. Several insist that same-sex sexual activity is inher-
ently wrong, echoing what Monique Wittig has described as securing sex 
within a heterosexual matrix. Other constables reference cultural integ-
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rity, saying that these sexual practices are against “our culture,” as does 
the same constable who racialized crimes reported under Section 377, 
and still others imply that the law should reflect the cultural injunctions 
against same-sex sexualities. Some raise concerns about the social im-
plications of decriminalizing same-sex sexual activity: increased homo-
sexual behavior and, not least, a decline in the population as a result—
ironic, given the national count of more than one billion people.
But others disagree. One constable turns toward his colleagues who 
oppose the law to resolutely say that the law is wrong when applied to 
two consenting adults and it should therefore change. Invoking the co-
lonial past and postcolonial present, another constable sees Section 377 
as a burden of colonial history that ought to removed, making law and 
culture compatible once again. The distinction between consensual and 
coerced sex turns out to be important for some constables as they con-
sider the possibility of retaining Section 377 only in cases of coercive sex. 
The discussion is lively and lasts for a while.
Perhaps most notable is the constable who says in Hindi that each 
person has a right to “sexual satisfaction,” a phrase he says in English. 
Elsewhere I have discussed the relevance of English in enabling a lan-
guage of sexuality among the urban middle and upper classes, and the 
constable’s social class notwithstanding, the phrase sexual satisfaction al-
lows him to capture the need for sexual gratification or fulfillment that 
everyone shares.60 As he says, “each person” (Har ek) has this need or de-
sire for sexual satisfaction, framing it within a language of rights (adhika’r 
in Hindi).61 While this may appear to resonate within a sexual rights 
framework, best described by Diane Richardson as the result of hetero-
sexist understandings of sexual activity and sexual pleasure giving way 
by the 1980s to the idiom of sexual identities, the constable’s response 
could be interpreted differently.62 Rather than reflecting a transnation-
ally circulating grammar of gay rights, it may well be reflecting regional 
histories of sexuality and social class in which the rural and urban elite, 
especially the landed gentry and the nobility, were considered to be en-
titled to pleasure and desire, regardless of the object choice.63 Chatterjee 
reads the presence of same-sex desire within the context of master-slave 
relations in precolonial India, while Lawrence Cohen underscores the 
presence of more than one register of the sodomite and the gay in India’s 
present, where desire exists outside the aesthetic of middle-class urban 
life.64 The disputed rights-bearing homosexual subject therefore may not 
96 chapter four
simply be accommodated within a transnational model of sexual citi-
zenship but may be about the amplification of regional and class-based 
genealogies of same-sex desire.
Muslims’, Sikhs’, and hijras’ associations with sexual perversion was 
not openly or implicitly contested in the two group discussions, but both 
groups did debate who may be entitled to sexual satisfaction and en-
dowed with the ability to consent unfettered by a colonial law. Undoubt-
edly some constables believed that same-sex consensual sexual practices 
among adults are wrong or go against the grain of Indian cultural orien-
tation, and they expressed their dissent accordingly. Yet it also became 
increasingly clear that the subject who may or may not be emancipated 
by changes to Section 377 was not necessarily the maligned religious-
cultural minorities or the gender-queers. By the time the discussion 
moved to the possibility of changes to Section 377, the subject who may 
or may not be granted the right to act on same-sex desire no longer 
seemed to be the same. Taken together, the excerpts suggest that while 
there may be some leeway in the policing of adult consenting same-sex 
sexual subjects, there is little tractability in the regulation of racialized 
queers and gender-queers; indeed the antisodomy statute may be used to 
enhance and justify governance in order to maintain social order.
Ruminations
Analyzing perceptions about the antisodomy law among the Delhi Police 
confirms the subjectivities of juridical practices of governance. Parallel 
to the inconsistencies between a law partly designed to persecute the 
sodomite and its expansive use to prosecute sexual violence on children, 
aggravated sexual assault on women, and more, policing related to the 
antisodomy law also yields an unexpectedly complex picture. In the ex-
amples of crime falling under Section 377’s ambit, constables identify 
potential examples—sex involving animals, old men trying to have sex 
with children, a wife filing a complaint against her husband—that do 
not easily align with homosexuality, or heterosexuality, for that matter. 
It is documented that police persecute same-sex sexualities, but whether 
Section 377 is its primary channel is uncertain.
Police responses associate the antisodomy law or the injunction 
against unnatural sex more closely with religious-cultural minorities, 
especially Muslims, which is to say, a law may be intended for one pur-
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pose, but law enforcement practices invoke something else altogether. 
Not surprisingly the constables take the position that they enforce the 
law as it is written, and they deny any deliberate targeting of same-sex 
sexualities under Section 377, since it requires the filing of a complaint. 
At the same time, they tightly link unnatural sex to non-Hindu subjects: 
the constable’s claims that unnatural sex is more frequent among Mus-
lims goes unchallenged by his peers, and a follow-up claim about Sikhs 
is endorsed with laughter. The question I posed initially was about the 
kinds of crimes committed under Section 377, but the discussion among 
the constables seamlessly shifted to the “who”—namely Muslims and 
Sikhs—and this racialized pejorative queering of religious-cultural mi-
norities was partly repeated in the second discussion group with the 
more senior officials.
Identifying the race thinking implicit in the police responses helps 
explain the subjectivities of policing and the endemic forms of prejudice 
that so quickly rise to the forefront in discussions on the antisodomy law, 
even though race cannot be “epidermalized” in India quite as it is the 
United States, Western Europe, South Africa, and elsewhere.65 Sharing 
his concerns about the occlusion of race among Indians in an unusual 
exchange with Amitav Ghosh, Dipesh Chakrabarty perceptively notes 
that racisms among Indians are often silenced, and accounts of “com-
munalist” behavior are often difficult to distinguish from what elsewhere 
is called racism.66 The takeaway from the police responses is not the need 
to overturn a cultural and academic history that pivots around the term 
communalism but to come to grips with its racialized connotations—
rearticulating the relationship between culture and nature to be attentive 
to the invidiousness of that which is inscribed on the body but also to 
cultural discourses that purport to be about innateness, inheritability, 
and sexuality.67
The police discussions also gesture toward the flexible uses of Sec-
tion 377 in conjunction with other provisions to capaciously target hijras, 
while bolstering law enforcement as an essential means to protect the 
social and sexual order. Unstinting and unapologetic about their deroga-
tory perceptions of hijras, seen as inherently criminal due to their gender 
nonconformity, members of the Delhi Police justify preventative actions 
and brute force against them. That Section 377 but also itpa and other 
laws may be used to this purpose became amply evident, for example, 
when police in Chennai arrested three Aravanis (the regional term for 
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hijras) and eight men who have sex with men (msm) based on allegations 
that they would routinely cruise for sex and money in a public park.68
Entrapped merely on the basis of their shared identities, the Aravanis 
and msm were not booked under Section 377 but under Section 8b of 
the itpa, since its bar is much lower and its gender-neutral language 
facilitates the policing of a range of queer subjects.69
A focus on the intensity with which crime under Section 377 is re-
corded, the extent to which it is prosecuted in the higher courts, and its 
routine enforcement provides a thoroughgoing view of biopolitical and 
juridical practices that mediate the relationship between sexuality and 
state. The antisodomy law’s history and uses bring into view not only the 
profound irrationalities and passions of governance practices but also 
the complexities and counterintuitions of how regulating sexuality helps 
secure agencies and institutions constituting the state, such as ncrb,
courts, and police. Each of these lenses complicates assumptions about 
Section 377’s detrimental effects on same-sex sexualities by indicating 
that the violence and harassment may be enacted not primarily through 
Section 377 but by juridical mechanisms; that Section 377 is part of a 
corpus of other provisions that, despite appearances, is likely affecting 
a host of other social subjects and sexual practices beyond the scope 
of same-sex consensual sex among adults; and that these biopolitical 
and juridical mechanisms deriving from the antisodomy law are help-
ing reaffirm the indispensability of law, law enforcement, and number-
crunching agencies. Going forward, these insights anticipate the dif-
ficulties of a struggle for social justice that pivots around the state, a 
narrowly conceived subject, and a focus on a specific law.
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Phase One of the Struggle  
against Section 377
By filing its challenge to the antisodomy law in the High Court of Delhi, 
Naz Foundation became the protagonist of an unparalleled struggle to 
decriminalize homosexuality in India, rendering New Delhi the epicenter 
and the state the antagonist.1 Naz Foundation worked closely with the 
Lawyers’ Collective to undo the criminalization of same-sex sexualities 
in a context facing what then appeared to be an hiv/aids pandemic. 
Even though the Lawyers’ Collective was headquartered in Mumbai, 
where the writ petition was scripted, and the Mumbai High Court had 
been a possible contender, the reach for justice gradually came to be 
centered in the capital city. Initially not widely known in Delhi or beyond, 
the writ progressively drew support from around the country but also 
early criticism that law and the state were being seen as the avenues for 
justice. As the legal process unfolded, though, the criticism gave way to 
robust support for undoing Section 377 and the battle lines solidified 
around the state.
In its early stages the Naz Foundation writ set into motion a tussle 
between sexuality and the state, or more precisely a confrontation be-
tween sexuality rights activists and the government and other state units, 
mediated by the judiciary. Over time the cast of characters and their 
positions changed, often dramatically; for instance, the government’s 
position shifted from being firmly opposed to decriminalization to im-
plicitly supporting it in the Supreme Court after 2009, and, after initially 
dismissing the Naz Foundation writ on a technicality, the Delhi High 
Court went so far as to decriminalize homosexuality. Yet the limitations 
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of a struggle encumbered by the histories, procedures, and imperatives 
of law persisted.
First, the Naz Foundation writ had to hinge on a narrow legal strategy 
aimed at showing the unconstitutionality of the antisodomy law, thereby 
letting it bear all the weight of injustice and discrimination against sex-
ual and gender minorities. Implicitly recognizing the unintended uses 
of the law, the writ sought to unhook the criminalization of same-sex 
sexualities from the prosecution of child sexual violence and sexual as-
sault against women. The writ asked for Section 377 to be “read down” 
so as to exclude adult consensual same-sexual activity from its purview. 
It became incumbent to prove that Section 377 violated constitutional 
principles, while anchoring rights and protections for same-sex sexual-
ities to the legal outcome.
Second, institutional parameters also shaped the nuances of the writ 
by influencing its angle and arguments—what would be persuasive to 
the justices, effectively reason with the government, and conform to 
legal precedence. Third, Section 377 had to become the lightning rod 
of institutionalized injustice. Criticisms of the antisodomy law were al-
ready in circulation, for a writ also filed in Delhi High Court by the aids
Bhedbhav Virodhi Andolan (abva) in 1994 had sought its repeal, and 
trailblazers such as the Mumbai-based gay activist Ashok Row Kavi had 
previously called for the removal of this colonial relic. Other criticisms 
had taken the form of signature campaigns to undo the law—in the cit-
ies of Mumbai, Kolkota, and Patna—but it was in the aftermath of the 
Naz Foundation legal challenge that Section 377 became the flashpoint 
and decriminalizing homosexuality the priority in the struggle for justice 
for same-sex sexualities.2
A central task of this chapter is to sort through the entanglements 
of a historic effort that was circumscribed by its pivot to the state. A 
critical account of the Naz Foundation undertaking and the subsequent 
legal proceedings is still to be written; this chapter focuses on the first 
phase, the period between 2001 and roughly 2006, to tell the story of the 
writ, how its orientation to the state shaped its rationale and limitations, 
the basis for its support as well as criticisms, and its evolution into a 
national-level campaign. Beginning with the Naz Foundation initiative, 
the chapter arcs through the legal proceedings, the growing campaign 
against Section 377 fueled by the writ’s dismissal in Delhi High Court in 
2004 on a mere technicality, Naz Foundation’s appeal to the Supreme 
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Court, and the subsequent apex court ruling in 2006 directing the lower 
court to decide the case on its merits. It draws on fieldwork at Naz Foun-
dation and the Lawyers’ Collective, as well as interviews with sexuality 
rights activists and visits to organizations across five major cities: Ben-
galuru, Chennai, Kolkata, Mumbai, and New Delhi.
More conceptually this chapter uncovers sexuality’s significance to the 
state, surfacing as it did in the transactions between Naz Foundation–
led efforts to decriminalize homosexuality and state units, especially the 
government. Particularly revealing were the inconsistencies of the gov-
ernment’s legal response filed in Delhi High Court in 2003 (and its later 
rejoinder to Naz Foundation’s appeal to the Supreme Court) that none-
theless cohered to help shore up the imperatives of the state and gov-
ernance by regulating sexuality. Based on my fieldwork at the Ministry 
of Home Affairs, the state unit responsible for filing the government’s 
legal response, this chapter looks beyond the reply’s inflammatory 
rhetorics and seeming confusions to uncover the mechanisms through 
which it was crafted. Illuminating the biases and ideologies riving the 
government’s response, I analyze how the perils and excesses of sexuality 
were purposefully invoked to preserve the integrity of state institutions 
and justify state intervention.
Engaging the Manichaean State: The Naz Foundation Writ
Founded in 1994 by its director, Anjali Gopalan, Naz Foundation India 
Trust is an ngo focusing on hiv/aids prevention and treatment as well 
as other matters of sexual health.3 Since its inception, Naz Foundation 
has sought external funding—from the MacArthur and Ford founda-
tions in the United States, the Lotteries Commission in the United King-
dom (now known as Community Fund), and the Standard Chartered 
Bank—to maintain distance from Indian state agencies even though 
units such as the National aids Control Organization (naco) and its 
regional counterparts rely heavily on ngos to do hiv/aids-related out-
reach work.4 As Anjali Gopalan explains, Section 377 presented an im-
pediment to this work; police would frequently use it as an alibi to harass 
Naz Foundation staff and state officials refused to distribute condoms 
in prison on account of it, leaving little choice but to seek legal recourse 
with assistance from the Lawyers’ Collective hiv/aids Unit.5
The Lawyers’ Collective was established in 1981 under the stewardship 
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of the project director, Anand Grover, subsequent to a Supreme Court 
ruling that expanded access to the courts and led to the widespread use 
of the kind of public interest litigation represented by the Naz Founda-
tion writ.6 Inspired by his rapport with Dominic D’Souza, an activist who 
was incarcerated under the Goa Public Health (Amendment) Act of 1986 
for being hiv-positive, Grover says that the experience made him aware 
of the import of sexuality and human rights, ultimately leading to the 
creation of the hiv/aids Unit in 1997 in Mumbai with financial support 
from the European Community. According to Grover, the Lawyers’ Col-
lective hiv/aids unit was interested in legal action against Section 377 
mostly because it criminalizes particular forms of sexual practices and 
undermines hiv prevention efforts.7
The collaboration between Naz Foundation and the Lawyers’ Col-
lective may have been close over the years, but its history is sometimes 
recounted differently. Shaleen Rakesh, who was initially the Naz Founda-
tion representative in Delhi High Court, suggests that they approached 
the Lawyers’ Collective because of its efforts in the area of hiv/aids:
“I think that we had actually initiated it in the sense that we had been 
looking at Section 377 as a major obstacle for our ability to do the work 
that we do. And, for that reason we were exploring what we need to do to 
challenge Section 377. We had absolutely no idea whether we need[ed] to 
go to court or whether we should go to Parliament, whether it should be 
a writ petition, whether there should be like a media advocacy campaign 
of some sort.”8 Seeing it otherwise, Vivek Diwan, who was an advocate 
with the Lawyers’ Collective, suggests that as a unit devoted to legal ad-
vocacy it was the Lawyers’ Collective that identified the need to challenge 
Section 377 and Naz Foundation as the petitioner.9
How Delhi came to be the site of the legal challenge to Section 377 is 
also understood differently, for Rakesh implies that the writ was filed 
in Delhi High Court because Naz Foundation was the petitioner, while 
Grover suggests that the writ was filed in Delhi High Court because the 
previous challenge to the antisodomy law by abva was thought to still 
be pending. Filed under the leadership of the activist Siddharth Gautam 
and in the aftermath of the public controversy over the distribution of 
condoms to prisoners in Delhi’s largest and most infamous prison, Tihar 
Jail, the abva writ sought a complete repeal of the antisodomy law.10 In 
fact the judges ordered that the two petitions to be considered together, 
until it was learned that the Delhi High Court had dismissed the abva
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writ a few months earlier, on March 22, 2001, due to nonprosecution. 
Grover notes that it would have been easier and more strategic to en-
ter the writ in Bombay High Court, which is generally regarded as more 
liberal.
Submitted to Delhi High Court on December 6, 2001, the Naz Foun-
dation writ was drafted primarily by the advocate Sharanjeet Parmar, in 
consultation with others at the Lawyers’ Collective, including Aditya 
Bondyopadhyay, and framed as a public interest litigation (pil). Refer-
ring to such writs as social action litigation, Upendra Baxi distinguishes 
between Euro-American histories of pil and the post-Emergency con-
text of India, when Justices P. N. Bhagwati and V. R. Krishna Iyer helped 
relax the rules to provide better and cheaper access to the courts, espe-
cially for the rural poor and the socially marginalized.11 Indeed the Indian 
Supreme Court’s guidelines allow as little as a letter to serve as a pil
under what are considered egregious circumstances affecting the vul-
nerable, including issues related to bonded labor, child neglect, police 
harassment and death in custody, atrocities against women, torture of 
persons belonging to socially and economically disadvantaged groups, 
and more, as long as they entail a matter of fundamental rights and are 
of public interest. 12
Since the guidelines stipulate that a pil may be entered on behalf of 
disadvantaged people who are unable to access the court or may involve 
issues of public importance, the issue of locus standi, or legal standing 
before the court, is flexibly treated. Rather than being filed only by an ag-
grieved party, a pil might be filed by anyone on matters related to public 
injury, thereby opening the door for organizations such as Naz Founda-
tion to challenge the constitutionality of Section 377. Further, since the 
writ was framed from the standpoint of the antisodomy law’s harmful 
effects on consenting same-sex adults and matters of public health, it 
could also meet the bar of public interest.
Additionally the Naz Foundation writ could be filed as a pil because of 
the changing cultural context in which it took shape (and which it helped 
change further through the course of the legal campaign). By 2001 gay, 
lesbian, and same-sex desire–oriented groups and organizations had 
mushroomed across the metropoles and the second-tier cities, and two 
works of gay and lesbian literature, Yaarana: Gay Writing from India and Fac-
ing the Mirror: Lesbian Writing from India, emerged to displace a dubious col-
lection of journalistic writing on homosexuality.13 The English-language 
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media routinely carried mostly puerile stories on gay men, hijras, and 
homosexuality, and leading magazines published dubious “sex surveys” 
that included questions of same-sex desire. But the greatest public atten-
tion occurred as a result of the controversy over Deepa Mehta’s film Fire
and the vandalizing of theaters in Mumbai by members of the right-wing 
group Shiv Sena as well as the countermovements, especially the Cam-
paign for Lesbian Rights, that heightened discourses and anxieties about 
same-sex desire while also thrusting them into the limelight.14
Nothing helped set the stage for the Naz Foundation writ more than 
the intensifying fears about hiv/aids, for India was in the grips of a 
health crisis of possibly epic proportions.15 While the Naz Foundation 
writ was being drafted, naco and individual state-based aids control 
societies were implementing the National aids Control Programme 
and targeting specific populations, including women sex workers, in-
jecting drug users, and truck drivers, but especially males who have sex 
with males (msm) and hijras. ngos such as Naz Foundation, Humsafar 
Trust (Mumbai), and Sahodaran (Chennai) expanded the reach of state 
governance by delivering services, but they also sought to protect sex-
ual and gender minorities by fostering awareness of hiv/aids and safer 
sex practices. Yet, as Lawrence Cohen has shown, at the same time they 
were producing a grammar of “indigenous” and “elite” sexual identities 
in ways that came to haunt the Naz Foundation writ (more on this in 
chapter 6).16
Along with the increasing focus on same-sex sexualities as public 
health hazards, the precarious position of hiv/aids-oriented organi-
zations affected the climate in which the Naz Foundation writ was filed. 
Mere months before the writ was filed, police in the northern city of Luc-
know arrested several men who were outreach workers for the ngo
Bharosa Trust. The offices of Bharosa Trust and its affiliate, Naz Foun-
dational International (not related to the ngo Naz Foundation), were 
raided, material was confiscated, and outreach workers were imprisoned 
for more than a month, charged, among other counts, under Section 
377. Autonomous groups, organizations, and individuals throughout the 
country rallied in support of Bharosa Trust and Naz Foundational Inter-
national, and the gathering concerns about Section 377 were amplified 
by the Naz Foundation writ.
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strategic encounters with the manichaean state
No encounter with the state remains impervious to its imaginations, 
and the Naz Foundation writ was no different in this regard from similar 
legal challenges that see the state as capable of withholding and confer-
ring rights, continuing wrongs or making right. The Naz Foundation 
writ usefully dehomogenized the state into its constituent parts, nam-
ing among its respondents national-level state institutions and agen-
cies housed in New Delhi—the Union of India, including the Ministries 
of Home Affairs, Health Welfare, and Social Welfare, and naco—and 
regional-level institutions: the Government of National Capital Terri-
tory of Delhi, the police commissioner of New Delhi, and the Delhi 
State aids Control Society. Despite its emphasis on the discrepancies 
between state institutions such as naco that work with same-sex sexu-
alities and the antisodomy law that criminalizes them, it held firmly to a 
Manichaean view of the state.17
Also at play was the widely held belief that law may be the last bastion 
of intervention into an otherwise impregnable state and, in contrast to 
the intractability of politicians and the police, courts are the most likely 
arbiters of justice. Repeating this commonly held view, Gopalan told me 
that although state bureaucracy and the government can be regressive 
and inefficient, the Indian courts have been progressive. According to 
Rakesh, the legislature was not considered a viable option for repealing 
Section 377 without the support necessary to introduce a bill and debate 
and vote on it favorably; this resulted in the choice of the High Court 
of Delhi.18
Shaped by the discourses and logics of law, the writ took a threefold 
strategy. First, anticipating the argument that Section 377 also pertained 
to sexual assault on children and women, it disengaged the criminaliza-
tion of homosexuality by asking the court to exclude private adult con-
sensual sex from the purview of Section 377, leaving the rest of it intact. 
Second, the writ hinged on the unconstitutionality of Section 377 and 
assumed the burden of proving how the law violated the fundamental 
rights of same-sex sexualities guaranteed by the Constitution, especially 
by Article 14 (equality before the law), Article 15 (prohibition of sex dis-
crimination, argued to include sexual orientation), Article 19 (funda-
mental liberties), and Article 21 (right to life and privacy).19
Third, using the twin concepts of ordered liberty and individual 
autonomy, the Naz Foundation writ reprised the well-known position 
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that, privacy is about the right to be left alone, arguing that this right 
is violated by Section 377.20 Citing Indian case law and foreign jurispru-
dence, the Naz Foundation writ argued that private consensual sexual 
relations lie at the core of intimacy and are therefore included in the 
right to privacy: “No aspect of one’s life may be said to be more private 
or intimate than that of sexual relations. Individual choices concerning 
sexual conduct, preference in particular, are easily at the core of the ‘pri-
vate space’ in which people indeed decide how they become and remain 
‘themselves.’”21 Giving privacy a spatial twist, the Naz Foundation writ 
pled that only adult consensual same-sex sexual activity conducted in 
private would be exempt from Section 377’s purview. Understood both 
abstractly and literally, privacy in this sense was used to emphasize that 
what occurs between consenting adults in private spaces ought not to be 
of concern to the state, while anticipating judges’ concerns that decrim-
inalizing homosexuality would also license sex in public. Thus in one of 
the early court hearings (January 28, 2002) Grover asked that the word 
private be inserted in the final entreaty to the judge, “for a declaration that 
Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, to the extent it is applicable to and 
penalizes sexual acts in private between consenting adults, is violative of 
Articles 14, 15, 19 (1)(a–d) and 21 of the Constitution of India.”22
If the Naz Foundation intervention had to conform to law’s parame-
ters, then it also had to be persuasive in the courts, resulting in a public 
health approach. Concurrent with the hiv/aids crisis and the unprece-
dented scrutiny on same-sex sexualities, the writ underscored the need 
to protect public interests by promoting, respecting, and protecting the 
human rights of the vulnerable, especially the gay/msm communities, 
and effectively checking the spread of hiv/aids infections. Arguing that 
Section 377 drives same-sex sexual activity underground, it reasoned that 
the law not only imperils gay men and msm but also jeopardizes the well-
being of their wives and partners and, in turn, the public: “It is submit-
ted that Section 377 serves as a serious impediment to successful public 
health interventions. Social non-acceptance of sexuality minorities de-
nies them the liberty to court or have relationships openly, thus driving 
them underground, limiting their choice and restricting their freedom to 
have safe-sex; which thereby increases the spread of hiv/aids. Having 
been driven underground, safe sex campaigns aimed at the msm and gay 
community are extremely difficult to implement.”23 Seeking to align the 
decriminalization of homosexuality with state interests, the writ gam-
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bled that the courts and the government were much more likely to be 
sympathetic if the issues were framed by the epidemiology of hiv/aids.
But it was a strategy not without consequences, for the writ implicitly 
yoked decriminalizing homosexuality to more effective governance; that 
is, narrowing Section 377 would allow the state to better regulate gay 
men and msm in the interests of public health.
The language and the logic of the writ resonated in two broad ways 
among sexuality rights organizations and individuals in the years after it 
was filed in Delhi High Court: it helped amplify wide-ranging criticisms 
of Section 377, and the writ itself drew strong criticism. By 2005, when I 
met with individuals and organizational representatives across the five 
metropoles (Bangalore, Chennai, Kolkata, Mumbai, and New Delhi), the 
need to counter Section 377’s impact on consenting same-sex sexualities 
had crystallized. There was consensus on the material harm of Section 
377 as well as its oppressive symbolism, for it was noted that the code is 
a barrier to the rights and recognition of same-sex sexual subjects in-
sofar as it inherently criminalizes them. What also resonated was the 
Naz Foundation writ’s argument that as a colonial product of Christian 
morality, the antisodomy law is inconsistent with a more diverse and 
tolerant Indian cultural history. Similarly it was strongly believed that 
Section 377 has no place in a modern society that recognizes diversity, 
and the writ’s argument that the statute is at odds with international law 
(Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 8 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms), to which the Indian state is a signatory, was 
also echoed.
Another criticism of Section 377 emphasized its instrumentality to 
the state because it pitted sexual orientation against children’s rights, as 
noted by the representative of Haq: Center for Child’s Rights, based in 
New Delhi. Dr. Ramakrishnan, a member of the Chennai-based Solidar-
ity and Action against the hiv Infection in India, observed that family 
members and acquaintances frequently cite Section 377 as justification 
for stigmatization, and others underscored that the law also accounts 
for discrimination in the workplace, housing, and other aspects of daily 
life. Even though it was acknowledged in the formal and informal dis-
cussions that Section 377 was not the only inspiration for homophobic 
practices, it was seen as an ongoing threat. Most compelling, Abha, a 
member of the Delhi-based group Jagori, underscored the fear among 
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minority sexualities simply because of the law, which is likely why the 
arrests in the city of Lucknow in 2001 were repeatedly cited in the inter-
views and discussions.24 Not surprisingly, then, the state’s arbitrary (mis)
use of the law remained the most pressing point of concern among the 
supporters of the Naz Foundation legal challenge.
concerns, criticisms, and questions 
about orienting to the state
Section 377 may have emerged as the lightning rod of institutionalized 
injustice following the arrests in Lucknow and the filing of the Naz Foun-
dation writ, but building a campaign around it initially drew only equivo-
cal support from sexuality rights–oriented organizations and individ-
uals.25 The most incisive concerns hinged on the lack of a substantial 
critique of the state, as was captured by Pramada Menon, a feminist and 
queer-rights activist based in New Delhi, in her interview. Noting that 
laws are meant to uphold and not deny rights, she said, “We need to start 
questioning the state. Section 377 needed to be questioned, but we need 
to hold the state accountable. . . . The state needs to be accountable to 
us.”26 Advancing this line of thought, members of labia, an autono-
mous feminist group in Mumbai, asserted that decriminalizing homo-
sexuality would not lessen the role of the state in regulating the lives of 
homosexuals but in fact give it greater reach and power.
Other critics honed in on the limitations of law as an instrument of 
social justice, echoing long-standing concerns of Srimati Basu, Nivedita 
Menon, and other feminists.27 Conveying their ambivalence in inter-
views and group discussions about the impact of law, these detractors 
wondered whether sexual and gender minorities would face less stigma 
and harshness at the more intimate level of the family even if homosex-
uality were to be decriminalized, a point that was also expressed among 
those who remained staunchly supportive of the Naz Foundation writ. 
For example, in their discussion group Naz Foundation outreach mem-
bers hoped that undoing Section 377 would bring relief from police abuse 
but also noted that it was unlikely to mitigate the atrocities committed 
within the family. A representative of Jagori stated that Naz Foundation’s 
focus on decriminalization articulated what sexuality rights groups and 
organizations do not want rather than offering ways of lessening cultural 
and social homophobia that are not focused on the juridical aspects of 
the state.
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The writ’s appeasement of the state in place of a fundamental rights-
based challenge to Section 377 was a related worry articulated by fem-
inist and sexuality rights–based groups. Early on, members of labia
observed that a health-based approach does not sufficiently unsettle the 
structural and institutional underpinnings of heterosexism, and they 
questioned the lack of emphasis on a civil rights approach in the peti-
tion. Sharing these concerns, representatives of Saheli, a Delhi-based 
autonomous feminist group, noted that for all its strategic emphasis on 
public health, the writ would not be able to build an adequate case for 
the recognition of civil liberties and fundamental rights, the assurance 
of equal citizenship, and protection from discrimination. And, not least, 
critics accused the writ of placating the state by introducing the rider of 
privacy, essentially leaving sex in public to the harsh effects of Section 
377 even though heterosexual activity in public carries a far lesser pun-
ishment. Their concern was that the writ ignored the implications of 
social class and feminist cautions that private zones, even the proverbi-
ally intimate bedroom, ought not to be inherently protected. The crucial 
distinctions between strategies that reinforce the power of the state and 
those that aim to undermine it were thus articulated in these initial crit-
icisms of the Naz Foundation writ.
If Naz Foundation’s orientation to the state and law were points of 
contention, the organization’s single-handedness posed another prob-
lem. By working more or less independently, Naz Foundation had as-
sumed the primary responsibility for reforming Section 377 and lost an 
opportunity to mobilize a social movement that could shift public aware-
ness and the social climate in which courts work. Members of Saheli 
saw law not as a mechanism of social change but a platform to foster 
awareness and stage political protest, making Section 377 an avenue for 
disseminating information, bringing awareness, and altering social at-
titudes toward homosexuality and gender minorities. The concern was 
that, regardless of the legal outcome, the process by which the petition 
was filed would not enable a broader social movement that would be cru-
cial for long-term gains for sexual minorities. For this reason, Deepti and 
Laxmi, representatives of Saheli, emphasized the differences between 
the abva and Naz Foundation writs: abva was a nonfunded group com-
mitted to forging coalitions and, in turn, a broader movement for sexu-
ality rights that exceeded the decriminalization of sodomy.28
Another area of consideration, and a frequently mentioned point, was 
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the lack of consultation in the process leading up to Naz Foundation’s 
petitioning the Delhi High Court. Discussion participants described 
the process abva used as democratic and inclusive, for the group had 
led a demonstration against police harassment and torture of gays and 
lesbians and widely circulated a letter inviting participation and solidar-
ity from a wide range of constituents, while in contrast Naz Foundation 
was criticized for operating autonomously and excluding constituencies 
outside of Delhi. This allegation was disputed by Rakesh, who identified 
three consultative meetings over the three-year period when the writ was 
being drafted, and a memorandum shows that one such meeting was 
held on May 16, 2000, by the Lawyers’ Collective and was attended by 
members of fifteen Delhi-based groups.29 Capturing the strategies and 
options discussed at the meeting, the memorandum recommended that 
the Lawyers’ Collective broaden the consultative process to include other 
cities and that the draft of the writ be circulated especially among groups 
working on sexual health issues, as a result of which two additional 
meetings were held outside of Delhi, in Bangalore (2000) and Mumbai 
(2001).30
Seeing these efforts as mostly superficial and insufficient, many in-
dividuals and representatives of organizations continued to echo con-
cerns about the single-handedness of an initiative of national relevance 
and great import, particularly if it were to result in an unfavorable judg-
ment, jeopardizing a fresh challenge to the law for a significant length of 
time. Participants repeatedly criticized Naz Foundation for not making 
a greater effort to include other funded and nonfunded groups, inform 
them, and dialogue with them on issues of critical political importance 
to a wide range of groups and communities. Sappho, a support group for 
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women in Kolkata, pointed out that 
they become aware of the Naz Foundation’s legal challenge to Section 377 
well after the fact, for they had no knowledge about the petition prior to 
its filing, hearing only vague reports about its being under preparation. 
Others felt that no concerted attempts were made to address the con-
cerns and questions that were raised about the petition that remained 
essentially limited to one organization and one city.
An informal coalition of lesbian, gay, bisexual, hijra, sexual rights, 
transgender rights, kothi, msm, and hiv/aids groups circulated a letter 
registering their protest against Naz Foundation shortly after the peti-
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tion was filed in Delhi High Court.31 Signed by thirteen groups based in 
Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Pune, the letter 
faulted Naz Foundation and the Lawyers’ Collective for initiating a legal 
campaign without their involvement despite their long-standing work 
and commitment to the repeal of Section 377, registered their dissent 
against the legal challenge, and demanded copies of the writ petition 
and related documents, while urging a more inclusive tack. In his written 
response, Grover, lead counsel on the writ, stressed that the process had 
been open and inclusive and refuted charges that information had been 
withheld by the Lawyers’ Collective.32 Clarifying the distinction between 
a campaign and a writ petition challenging laws, he explained that, un-
like processes for legislative amendments or the drafting of bills, the 
legal process cannot be open and exhaustively consultative, and he kept 
the focus on the law by inviting groups to support the Naz Foundation 
petition through formal interventions in the courts.
Most of the concerns and criticisms of the Naz Foundation writ stayed 
out of public view, with either strong or tacit support expressed in the 
media. Newspapers mostly published updates on the legal process in the 
months and first couple of years following the petition and interviews 
with Rakesh and others, alongside the usual fare of titillating stories on 
same-sex sexuality, including gay parties, discotheques, and “coming 
out” narratives, among others. Some sexuality rights activists wrote ar-
ticles strongly supporting the decriminalization of homosexuality, even 
as others withheld public approval, a situation that changed dramatically 
with the government’s first response, filed in Delhi High Court in 2003. 
Press coverage of the struggle to decriminalize homosexuality exploded 
as a result, and the criticisms of the Naz Foundation writ gave way to a 
rallying cry for sexual justice from the state.
The Imperatives of Governing Sexuality: 
Legal Proceedings and the State’s Response
Between December 2001 and September 2004, the Naz Foundation writ 
was listed in the Delhi High Court fourteen times. However, while the 
court listings and orders issued are documented, court proceedings are 
typically not made available, unlike in U.S. courts, for example.33 Noth-
ing substantial transpired on some of the dates when the writ was listed, 
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whereas other hearings were relevant and turned out to be decisive. On 
January 28, 2002, the Lawyers’ Collective informed the court about the 
pending abva petition, as a result of which the presiding justices or-
dered the two writs to be considered together, though it was later discov-
ered that the abva writ had been previously dismissed.
Two interventions hostile to the Naz Foundation pil were filed, the 
first on behalf of the organization Joint Action Counsel Kannur (jack), 
which was founded by Puroshothanam Mulloli in the 1970s but came 
into public visibility in the aftermath of the hiv/aids crisis.34 Taking the 
position that hiv/aids was manufactured by multinationals to forge a 
single global economy, Mulloli and his partner, Anju Singh, were espe-
cially critical of Naz Foundation and the grounds on which they were 
challenging the constitutional validity of Section 377.35 Arguing that Naz 
Foundation could not seek to test the validity of the law without report-
ing any specific injury as an organization, the jack affidavit questioned 
Naz Foundation’s locus standi to file a pil, while making the farfetched 
claims that Naz Foundation is part of an international network of market 
forces using the decriminalization of homosexuality as an avenue for 
establishing and legalizing the sex industry.36 Suggesting that sexual acts 
between consenting adults “are not always natural, normal or permissi-
ble under the law” just because they are consensual, the affidavit ironi-
cally took the position that Section 377 was helping prevent the spread of 
hiv (even though jack sees hiv as a corporate invention).37
In one crucial moment, amid a series of uneventful hearings, the 
presiding judges ordered that the chief justice of the Delhi High Court 
should preside over subsequent hearings, which is why, after many twists 
and turns, the 2009 Delhi High Court decision was crafted partly by 
Chief Justice Shah.38 The more definitive moment in the Naz Foundation–
led struggle against Section 377 finally came on September 6, 2003, 
when, after significant delay and repeated injunctions from the court, 
the government filed its response to the writ. As became evident over 
the next year, it had a polarizing effect: it swayed the first decision of the 
Delhi High Court, furnished in September 2004, against the Naz Foun-
dation writ, while precipitating widespread support for the writ among 
sexuality rights groups and organizations throughout the country and 
consolidating a struggle against the state.
Pivoting toward the State 115
the government replies
In a nutshell, the government’s response (Counter Affidavit on Behalf 
of Respondent No. 5 in the matter of Civil Writ Petition 7455/2001) did 
not support the Naz Foundation writ to modify Section 377.39 Early re-
sponses to the government’s reply dismissed it as homophobic and con-
tradictory, if not, as some critics insisted, confused. For example, in his 
essay “Getting the State out of the Bedroom,” Rakesh Shukla argues 
that the response was on shaky legal grounds and lacked substantive 
arguments while buttressing social prejudice.40 Numerous other re-
sponses, published in English-language print media and posted in list-
servs, sought to systematically demolish the government’s reply, ques-
tioning its linking of homosexuality with crime and defense of sanctions 
against homosexuality on the grounds of Indian morality and culture. 
Though such criticisms are useful, they stop short of more complex and 
layered analyses of sexuality’s relevance to the state.
The government’s reply began by casting doubt on Naz Foundation’s 
locus standi on the grounds that only those whose rights are directly 
affected by the law can question its constitutionality. Arguing that con-
sent is irrelevant to acts considered unlawful, it took the stance that “no 
person can license another to commit a crime.”41 Further, denying that 
there was evidence indicating acceptance of same-sex sexual practices 
in precolonial India, it claimed that social disapproval of homosexuality 
continued to be strong enough to warrant its criminalization. Citing the 
Law Commission of India’s 42nd Report as evidence, the government’s 
response noted that even if homosexuality was now tolerated in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, Section 377 reflects the prevail-
ing values and mores of Indian society.
For all its defense of the imperative to criminalize homosexuality, the 
reply was also laced with conciliatory logic. Emphasizing that Section 
377 is used mostly to punish child sexual abuse and to fill a lacuna in rape 
laws, it argued that Section 377 had been rarely used to penalize homo-
sexuality, that the law was always applied to the particulars of a case, and 
that courts used contemporary meanings to consider whether an offense 
fell within the ambit of Section 377. Maintaining that the law was used 
only when a victim filed a complaint, it countered that for all practical 
purposes private consensual or homosexual activity was excluded from 
prosecution under Section 377, further foregrounding the ambivalent, 
inconsistent nature of the government’s reply. Closer investigation, 
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however, cautions against reading these apparent confusions as signs 
of either an incompetent state or the condescension of power and point 
instead to the subjectivities of state structures and procedures through 
which such statements are crafted.
subjectivities of state mechanisms: 
ministry of  home affairs
The Judicial Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs (or Home Min-
istry) oversees matters related to the Indian Penal Code or the Crimi-
nal Procedure Code whenever there is a question of amending or inter-
preting a law, which is why it also responds to writs like the one by Naz 
Foundation that challenge the constitutionality of a law and names the 
government of India among the defendants. Thus what is interpreted to 
be the government’s response or the state’s response is in fact the posi-
tion of one division of one ministry, under the leadership of the home 
secretary and home minister. While the home minister is a political ap-
pointee of the government in power, bureaucrats staff the middle and 
upper layers of the Judicial Division of the Home Ministry, often for no 
more than one year.
It turns out that typically junior-level bureaucrats draft the govern-
ment’s response after some discussion within the department; in this 
case a desk officer and a deputy secretary crafted the government’s writs, 
including the one filed in September 2003. The director and the joint 
secretary review the draft, making comments and notes. When the joint 
secretary considers it appropriate, the draft is shared with the home 
minister. The interviews with the directors of the Judicial Division and 
a joint secretary confirm that as bureaucrats in the hierarchy of the de-
partment review the response in the making, they will leave their notes 
and comments in the folder, and they can also record their dissent, if 
any, to aspects of the statement.42 The final approval of the response 
comes from the minister, who may ask for it to be significantly modified 
or even reversed.
Inconsistencies in the government’s reply are partly the result of sub-
jective opinions on the challenge to Section 377 that prevailed in the Min-
istry of Home Affairs. My interviews with the two directors, the desk 
officer, and the deputy secretary at the Judicial Division confirmed that 
the decision to not support the Naz Foundation writ was endorsed by 
the home minister. However, as Director G. Venkatesh acknowledged, 
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all members of the unit did not share the view that homosexuality should 
be criminalized, but, as he put it, they were afraid to be seen promoting 
this view, even as he cautiously expressed his support for the decrimi-
nalization of homosexuality in our meeting.43 Likely, then, the seeming 
confusions and equivocations of the government’s reply were the prod-
uct of the varying views of state bureaucrats and the political appointees 
who had input, and its unwieldiness was the result of successive edits, 
inflammatory comments, and caveats that worked nonetheless to pre-
serve the state through its dominion over sexuality.
regulating sexuality, preserving the state
Underpinning the assortment of excuses for why Section 377 should not 
be modified in the government’s affidavit were discourses of sexuality as 
an object of regulation and affirmations of the state as a crucial source of 
governance. The government’s reply was notable for the way it produced 
sexuality, for example when it incited the perils of sexual practices that 
could be unleashed by the overturning of Section 377:
A perusal of cases decided under Section 377 . . . shows that it has only 
been applied on the complaint of a victim and there are no instances 
of its being used arbitrarily or being applied to cases of assault where 
bodily harm is intended and/or caused and the deletion of the said 
section can well open flood gates of delinquent behavior and be misconstrued 
as providing unbridled licence for the same. Sections like Section 377 are in-
tend[ed] to apply to situations not covered by other provisions of the 
Penal Code and there is neither occasion nor necessity for declaration 
of the said section unconstitutional [emphasis added].44
It is unclear from the response why the deletion (or really, modification) 
of the statute would unleash the “flood gates of delinquent behavior” 
or be misconstrued as “providing unbridled licence,” but there is little 
ambiguity about the picture of sexuality’s excesses.
If the inflammatory language was used to invoke the dangers of sex-
uality, then upholding Section 377 was used to endorse the role of law 
and the state: “While the Government cannot police morality, in a civil 
society criminal law has to express and reflect public morality and con-
cerns about harm to the society at large. If this is not observed, whatever 
little respect of law is left would disappear, as law would have lost its 
legitimacy.”45 In other words, law’s very legitimacy comes to rest on the 
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continued criminalization of homosexuality. The response repeatedly 
endorses the state’s role in protecting public safety, health, and morals.
The indispensability of the state in safeguarding against the ills of sex-
uality was reiterated more than once in my meetings with state officials, 
including another director of the Judicial Division, Kamala Bhasin, some 
two years after the government filed its reply. Since she had not been in 
this position for long, and in fact seemed to know little about the Naz 
Foundation writ, she turned to the folder in her possession—roughly 
four inches thick, green in color, and tied with a jute cord. Peering into 
the folder in the relative dark of her office as a result of the electric cuts 
on a hot summer afternoon, she said, “Internally, some felt that Indian 
society is laid back, resistant to change. Naz is asking for unnatural sex, 
promiscuity, and society is resisting. It is like sati; Indian society was 
resistant to change, and it would not have been abolished had the law 
not been changed. But unnatural sex is a reality; we cannot simply put 
it down. It’s very internal to human beings and will come up one way or 
another. But higher authorities felt that there is no demand in Indian 
society for change. Naz is only one organization, and change will lead to 
promiscuity. And society is not demanding change, society is not ready 
for it.”46
That sex, particularly same-sex sexual practices, is a reality that can-
not be repressed and therefore must be managed by law in the interests 
of a society unprepared for it was reiterated frequently. In another re-
vealing moment, the more senior joint secretary of the Judicial Division 
had this to say when pressed on the matter of Section 377: “I will quote 
philosophy. In our thought, the sexual act should have dignity, elegance 
to it, should be between male and female, should go by the order of 
nature—in animals as well [we] see the same thing. Why should there 
be any deviation from the order? When the first Law Commission was 
formed in 1832, it was decided that unnatural sex should be an offense. 
But what is happening now is that human nature is volatile and wants to 
express all kinds of fantasies. The question is whether individuals should 
be allowed to fantasize at the cost of society.”47 The discursive produc-
tions of same-sex sexuality as unnatural, deviant, and volatile are notable 
in this response, as are the functions of law in protecting the natural and 
social order. Sexuality may be repeatedly invoked as an object of regula-
tion but in ways that serve the imperatives of the state.
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Shifting Landscapes: Gathering Mobilizations and Legal Wranglings
Exactly a year after the government’s reply, the first phase of the struggle 
to decriminalize homosexuality came to an abrupt end with the Delhi 
High Court ruling on September 2, 2004, dismissing the Naz Foundation 
writ. Echoing the government’s stance, the court turned it down on the 
grounds that Naz Foundation did not have the necessary locus standi. 
Choosing to not treat the Naz Foundation writ as a pil, the justices 
of Delhi High Court brusquely wrote, “In this petition we find there is no 
cause of action as no prosecution is pending against the petitioner. Just 
for the sake of testing the legislation, a petition cannot be filed.”48 Citing 
a 1972 decision, Vijay Kumar Mundra v. Union of India and Others, before the 
liberalization of pils discussed earlier, the court took the position that 
Naz Foundation was not aggrieved by the law and dismissed the writ as 
merely an “academic challenge.”
The Delhi High Court ruling further galvanized the broad support 
for the Naz Foundation writ that had emerged in the aftermath of the 
government’s response. The government’s reply, its stance, inflamma-
tory language, and seemingly confused reasoning had the unintended 
but useful effect of drawing the ire of sexuality-rights activists, includ-
ing those who had previously expressed reservations about the writ. Al-
though lending support to the writ and efforts to repeal Section 377 were 
not the same until then, the government’s reply helped turn them into 
common cause and ignited a struggle for justice that was subsequently 
waged on city streets, on the Internet and television, and in print media. 
Fueling this incipient legal-political mobilization, the Delhi High Court’s 
dismissal of the Naz Foundation pil helped consolidate it into a national 
campaign and solidify opposition to the state.
Once the Lawyers’ Collective appeal (Review Petition 384 of 2004) to 
the Delhi High Court ruling was rejected on November 3, 2004, national 
consultation meetings were organized to collectively strategize on the 
next steps. Deliberations about strategy had already started to take place 
informally among activists and on Internet-based discussion groups, 
especially LGBT-India@yahoo.com, as well as formally in meetings in 
Delhi (September 13 and 16, 2003) and Mumbai (September 28, 2003).49
In sharp contrast to the circumstances in which the Naz Foundation writ 
was first filed, the Lawyers’ Collective organized consultative meetings 
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in Mumbai (March 10, 2004) and Bangalore (June 13, 2004), wherein 
a broad range of constituencies considered ways of shoring up the le-
gal challenge by demonstrating to the Delhi High Court that the Naz 
Foundation writ was widely supported and documenting the harmful 
impact of Section 377 on gender and sexual minorities. Although all of 
this was preempted by the Delhi High Court’s dismissal of the writ, these 
forums facilitated a process of collective decision making about whether 
the court’s ruling ought to be appealed in the Supreme Court, not least 
because, as Vivek Diwan of the Lawyers’ Collective suggested, the Naz 
Foundation writ entailed questions of fundamental rights.50
However, the decision to seek recourse from the apex court was nei-
ther inevitable nor without risks and was the result of three meetings 
consecutively organized in Mumbai (October 24, 2004), Bangalore (De-
cember 12–13, 2004), and then again in Mumbai (January 9, 2005).51 At 
the first meeting three main options were identified in anticipation of 
the Delhi High Court’s rejection of the appeal to reconsider its dismissal 
of the writ and then subsequently deliberated upon: (1) to not pursue the 
case any further, (2) to ask the Supreme Court to direct the Delhi High 
Court to reconsider its decision on the mere technicality of locus standi, 
and (3) to file writs against Section 377 in other high courts.52
The first alternative, to drop the case, which was seen as equivalent to 
doing nothing, was never seriously discussed, and while the third possi-
bility, to file new writs in other high courts, was considered, the discus-
sion came to rest primarily on the second and most viable option: to file 
what is known as a special leave petition (slp) to appeal of the court’s 
ruling in the Supreme Court.53 This was not without significant risk, for 
had the apex court rejected the slp, it would have effectively ended the 
legal campaign to decriminalize homosexuality for the foreseeable fu-
ture. A second and equally significant risk was that the Supreme Court 
would deliver a binding judgment on the merits of the Naz Foundation 
writ, thereby bringing the entire legal process to a definitive end. While 
some contributors at the second Mumbai meeting supported the pro-
posal, others were strongly opposed due to the risks of an adverse judg-
ment from the apex court. Even though no vote was taken, support was 
overwhelmingly in favor of filing an appeal in the Supreme Court, and 
since such appeals need to be submitted within ninety days of the high 
court’s ruling, the Lawyers’ Collective entered a petition on February 17, 
2005.54
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The Supreme Court Steps In
Following legal procedures, the Lawyers’ Collective filed an appeal (slp,
Civil, No: 7217–7218 of 2005) with the Supreme Court of India, challeng-
ing the high court’s 2004 dismissal of the Naz Foundation writ.55 A rel-
atively brief document, the Naz Foundation slp highlighted two ques-
tions for the apex court’s consideration: whether the Delhi High Court 
was right to dismiss the Naz Foundation writ on the grounds that it was 
not personally aggrieved and whether the constitutionality of Section 
377 is merely academic, especially given its salience to msm and, in turn, 
public health. Put differently, the appeal to the Supreme Court hinged 
on the arguments that the Naz Foundation writ should be legitimately 
seen as a pil and that Naz Foundation had the locus standi to file such 
a constitutional challenge. Countering the Delhi High Court’s reliance 
on a 1972 decision (Vijay Kumar Mundhra v. Union of India) to reject the 
Naz Foundation writ as a pil, the slp specified that the ruling decision 
occurred prior to the liberalization of pils and cited later higher court 
decisions to argue that courts have allowed organizations to intervene, 
especially when socially or economically disadvantaged groups, such as 
msm, cannot move the courts on their own behalf.
On the related argument of locus standi, the slp underscored Naz 
Foundation’s history and orientation as an organization and its bona fide 
interest in the constitutionality of Section 377 given the law’s impact on 
its hiv/aids-related work and outreach among sexual minorities vulner-
able to the law. Citing a series of such decisions from the higher courts, 
the slp emphasized instances when individuals and organizations not 
personally affected may challenge constitutional violations; for example 
the Supreme Court allowed a public interest group, People’s Union for 
Civil Liberties, to challenge the constitutional validity of the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act of 2002.56 Arguing that the lower court had dismissed 
the Naz Foundation pil on a mere technicality, the slp asked the justices 
simply to “remand the matter back to the Hon’ble Delhi High Court and 
direct it to hear the matter on merits.”57
As a respondent, the government was required to file a reply to the Naz 
Foundation appeal. Compared to its earlier delays and equivocations, the 
reaction was swifter and more combative.58 Reiterating its stance that 
the Naz Foundation writ could not be seen as a pil, it argued that the 
Delhi High Court was indeed right in dismissing the writ as merely aca-
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demic, for no specific evidence had been offered to support the claims 
that the criminalization of homosexuality was hampering the organi-
zation’s work and that third parties, such as Naz Foundation, could not 
invoke the courts to enforce the fundamental rights of the accused in 
matters pertaining to criminal law. Upholding the state’s obligation to 
regulate sexuality, this round of the government’s reply noted, “Even if 
it is assumed that the rights of sexual minorities emanate from a per-
ceived right to privacy, it is submitted that the right to privacy cannot be 
extended to defeat public morality, which must prevail over the exercise 
of any private right.”59
Departing from its 2003 iteration in the high court, the government’s 
reply in the Supreme Court sought to reassert the imperatives of govern-
ing sexuality by limiting the role of the judiciary. Taking the stance that 
courts have no jurisdiction over prohibited acts, it argued, “It is essen-
tial[ly] a matter of legislative policy and there are no judicially manage-
able standards by which to assess as to whether a particular act should be 
made an offence or not.”60 Seeking to safeguard institutional reach over 
sexuality, the government’s statement threw into question the right of 
the judiciary to review and decide whether particular acts should consti-
tute offenses. Invoking the recommendations of the 172nd Law Commis-
sion to widen the scope of the rape laws, make them gender-neutral, and 
delete Section 377, the response argued that any changes to Section 377 
ought to be directed by the legislature and not by a judiciary acting beyond 
the scope of its authority, thereby protecting the domain of the state.
As it turned out, the Supreme Court justices did not agree with the 
government’s statement, and a year later the justices ruled in favor of the 
appeal, instructing the Delhi High Court to reconsider the Naz Founda-
tion writ on its merits. In a succinct order passed on February 3, 2006, 
the justices wrote:
The challenge in the writ petition before the High Court was to the 
constitutional validity of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
The High Court, without examining that issue, dismissed the writ 
petition by the impugned order observing that there is no case of ac-
tion in favour of the appellant as the petition cannot be filed to test 
the validity of the Legislation and, therefore, it cannot be entertained 
to examine the academic challenge to the constitutionality of the 
provision.
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We are, however, not examining the issue on merits but are of the 
view that the matter does require consideration and is not of a na-
ture which could have been dismissed on the ground afore-stated. In 
this view, we set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High 
Court and remit Writ Petition (c) No. 7455 of 2001 for its fresh decision 
by the High Court.61
Directing the Delhi High Court to reconsider the Naz Foundation writ, 
the Supreme Court justices also invited the general public to weigh in on 
the possibility of decriminalizing homosexuality.
Provisional Thoughts on an Unfolding History
By challenging Section 377 in the Delhi High Court, the Naz Founda-
tion writ furthered what had been set in motion by abva. Despite their 
differences and the less than enthusiastic support for the Naz Founda-
tion pleas, the two writs shared a focus on hiv/aids and the demand 
to decriminalize homosexuality. Yet the Naz Foundation legal challenge 
made far more headway than abva’s due to changes in the broader cul-
tural context—public health concerns about hiv/aids, greater state 
scrutiny of sexual and gender minorities, but also increasing visibility 
as a result of English-language media, including film, television, and 
print media—to say nothing of differences in access to resources. Unlike 
abva, an autonomous nonfunded group, Naz Foundation and the Law-
yers’ Collective had access to external funding for legal advocacy, which 
allowed them to pursue a long legal process.
Naz Foundation did not pursue broad-based endorsement but pro-
ceeded single-handedly on a matter of collective significance and social 
justice for sexual minorities. Most cogently articulated by autonomous 
feminist-oriented organizations, these criticisms echoed Nivedita Me-
non’s insight that renouncing law may not be an option, but it diverts 
ethical and emancipatory impulses.62 Resonating with Srimati Basu’s 
caution that the turn to law can have both uncertain and mixed results, 
critics of the Naz Foundation writ petition saw law, at best, as a tool 
to foster public awareness of social injustices and mount political cam-
paigns.63 Shaleen Rakesh, the initial Naz Foundation representative to 
the Delhi High Court, noted that political mobilization had always been 
a component of the strategy regardless of the legal outcome, but it could 
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not be realized initially as a result of the exclusion of constituencies in 
and outside of Delhi.64
Even as the Naz Foundation plea sought to move the courts, its critical 
impulses were already blunted, to paraphrase Derrida, by having to sub-
ject itself to the very force of law.65 In the legal struggle against the anti-
sodomy statute, the state became an icon of power’s egregiousness (as 
well as beneficence) that, ironically, structured the contestation itself. 
Amplifying anxieties swirling around law, the Naz Foundation strategy 
reinforced the view that Section 377 was the primary instrument of the 
state’s symbolic and material persecution of the homosexual as sod-
omite. Ignoring the more complex histories and possibilities related to 
the exercise of the law, and the possibilities that same-sex sexualities 
are not the only ones impacted by it, Section 377 was made to carry the 
weight of showing how same-sex sexualities are unfairly targeted. Un-
able to mount an offensive deriving from the ensemble of laws, prac-
tices, policies, and discourses—vagrancy laws, policies against sex work, 
views of hijras as criminals, among others—through which sexual and 
gender minorities bear the brunt of governance, the initiative was be-
holden to procedural constraints and strategies that would likely have a 
successful outcome.
Arguing that the state has no compelling interest in criminalizing 
consensual same-sex sexual activity among adults in private, the Naz 
Foundation petition relied on the hiv/aids crisis and individual and 
public health concerns to be persuasive to the court. In effect the writ 
took the position that it would be in the collective interest to stop the 
spread of hiv/aids by decriminalizing homosexuality, and that it would 
make for more effective governance. Further, the process of filing the 
writ prevented Naz Foundation from rallying other constituents into a 
collective struggle, but it also had to avoid being seen as politicizing the 
challenge against Section 377, for that would have prejudiced the judges 
against the merits of the plea.66
Naz Foundation’s interpellation of state agencies and institutions 
triggered affirmations of the state and its reach over the perils inher-
ent to sexuality. A closer look at the specifics of the government’s first 
substantial writ in the Delhi High Court and the mechanisms through 
which it was developed by the Judicial Division of the Home Ministry 
offers a fuller view of the subjectivities that color what Sudipta Kaviraj 
has aptly called “the state of great reach.”67 It invites a fresh understand-
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ing of the ways both of the government’s replies—the one submitted to 
the Delhi High Court in 2003 and the one submitted to the apex court in 
2005—produced sexuality as essentially disorderly and given to excess 
in ways that require the tempering effects of the state on behalf of the 
public.
But such positions, as well as the Delhi High Court’s dismissal of the 
Naz Foundation writ in 2004, also had the unintended effect of rendering 
the antisodomy law the flashpoint for a national legal and political coun-
tercampaign. The early reservations of several sexuality rights–groups 
based in Bangalore, Chennai, Mumbai, and New Delhi against the Naz 
Foundation petition gave way to a collective struggle to decriminalize ho-
mosexuality as a sign of social justice for sexual and gender minorities. 
Inasmuch as there appeared to be little choice but to rally behind the Naz 
Foundation–led pivot to the state, Section 377 also became a platform 
from which to influence public attitudes and launch awareness regarding 
same-sex sexualities. It was at this moment that the National Coalition 
of Sexuality Rights formed in Bangalore, and Voices against Section 377, 
the coalition that was to impact the next phase of the struggle to decrim-
inalize homosexuality, emerged in Delhi.
C H A P T E R  6
S TAT E  V E R S U S  S E X U A L I T Y
Decriminalizing and Recriminalizing Homosexuality 
in the Postliberalized Context
Sometimes one needs to write pieces while breaking down into tears. That is the 
only way we can stay true to the fact that words are not enough to express our 
anguish and our disbelief but also our strength.
—Ponni, “Justice Will Prevail,” Kafila, December 11, 2013
With these wrenching words, Ponni gave expression to the dismay and 
distress brought on by the Supreme Court judgment issued on Decem-
ber 11, 2013, effectively recriminalizing same-sex sexual activity.1 Issued 
in response to petitions by a ragtag group of individuals and groups, the 
apex court’s ruling was all the more jarring and unexpected, overturning 
as it did the historic 2009 Delhi High Court decision decriminalizing 
homosexuality. Although the previously named respondents, especially 
the government of India and regional and national state units, did not 
appeal the Delhi High Court ruling in favor of Naz Foundation, in an 
oddity of the Indian legal system the highest court allowed other oppo-
nents to intervene in the legal process, then, implicitly siding with them, 
it undercut the bid to undo the antisodomy law.
Through a lens sensitive to states’ subjectivities, this chapter explores 
the contrasts between the two court rulings; they could not have been 
sharper, and not only in terms of their outcomes. While biases appear in 
both documents, the Supreme Court ruling is overtly skewed in terms of 
justices’ affect and prejudices, and whereas the 2009 Delhi High Court 
decision is carefully crafted and extends constitutional rights to sexual 
and gender minorities, the Supreme Court version is sloppy, perhaps 
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hastily written, and inconsistent in its legal reasoning.2 Probing these 
differences from the perspective of sexuality’s constitutive effects reveals 
the significant way in which the two judgments diverge: even as the Delhi 
High Court verdict sought to mitigate the power of the state, the highest 
court endeavored to safeguard state institutions and even expand gover-
nance through the regulation of sexuality.
Comparing the two texts also leads to the surprising insight that these 
are conflicting reactions to the imperatives of sexuality, state, and gov-
ernance in postliberalized India. Building on critical commentaries on 
the extant sociopolitical context, this chapter considers the ways neolib-
eral modalities helped imagine a reduced role of the state and advance 
an individualized, assimilationist, and transnational rights regime, as 
such enabling the Delhi High Court’s decision to overturn the antisod-
omy law. Parsing the historic as well as flawed aspects of the judgment, 
I investigate the cornerstones of the first ruling, namely principles of 
privacy, equality, and constitutional morality, from the angle of the 
complexities of governance and the antisodomy law developed in the 
preceding chapters; Section 377 is not the only law governing homo-
sexuality, and same-sex sexualities are not the only ones affected by it. 
The Supreme Court 2013 pronouncement was also shaped by the imper-
atives of postliberalization. Considering the justices’ views on the need 
to uphold the antisodomy law in a context of rapid social change, I show 
that reaffirming the state and prolonging governance through legislative 
intrusions seems more important than ever before.
Delving into the second phase of the struggle to decriminalize homo-
sexuality, in 2006–13, this chapter picks up the threads after the Supreme 
Court’s 2006 directive returned the Naz Foundation writ to the Delhi 
High Court, instructing it to reassess the plea on its merits. Setting the 
stage for the 2009 Delhi High Court decision decriminalizing homosex-
uality, the discussion highlights the influential impact of Voices against 
Section 377, a coalition of Delhi-based groups that emerged in 2004 fol-
lowing the government’s inflammatory legal reply filed in the Delhi High 
Court.3 Juxtaposing the two legal texts, I account for how they could offer 
substantially different visions of the intersections of sexuality, state, and 
nation before going on to place them within the postliberalization con-
text and analyze their limitations.
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The Delhi High Court Redux
Much changed after the Supreme Court’s 2006 injunction to the Delhi 
High Court to reconsider the Naz Foundation writ on the basis of its 
merits; the struggle morphed from a legal initiative led primarily by a 
single organization to nationally coordinated political campaigns to 
decriminalize homosexuality. Taking their measure, Sophia, a member 
of several Delhi-based groups—crea, Anjuman, Nigah, and Voices 
against Section 377—expressed her enthusiasm at the broad-based co-
alition against Section 377, while anticipating its regrettable fragmenta-
tion after the decriminalization of homosexuality.4 Among the coalitions 
to emerge was the Million Voices Campaign, aimed at documenting sex-
ual diversity as well as opposition to Section 377 on pieces of cloth to be 
quilted together. In the city of Bangaluru, the sexuality rights organiza-
tion Sangama coordinated the National Campaign for Sexuality Rights 
to forge a coalition of more than fifty organizations united against Sec-
tion 377.5 Mumbai-based organizations, including Humsafar Trust and 
labia, came together on August 16, 2005, following India’s fifty-eighth 
Independence Day to inform and educate the public about Section 377.
Underlying the numerous coalitions, public demonstrations and ral-
lies, open letters to officials, articles, press releases, and interviews were 
two interrelated legal-political strategies. Section 377 and the Naz Foun-
dation writ were being used as platforms to inform and change public 
discourse on same-sex sexualities regardless of the eventual legal out-
come, a process that was facilitated by the English-language media. Un-
til 2003 efforts to decriminalize homosexuality mostly occurred outside 
the media, but this changed dramatically after the government’s reply 
became public; then the legal process began to be routinely reported, 
along with articles intended to have an informative bent, even if that 
wasn’t always apparent to the critical eye.6 Proliferating images of sexual 
and gender minorities at queer pride parades that were becoming an 
annual feature around the country, the media helped shape a climate in 
which homosexuality was a part of public discourse that exceeded a fo-
cus on hiv/aids.7 Furthermore, since the Delhi High Court justices had 
partly dismissed the Naz Foundation writ in 2004 due to lack of evidence 
of public opinion favoring the decriminalization of homosexuality, the 
other priority was to showcase the widespread support in favor of mod-
ifying Section 377. These efforts resulted in numerous public demon-
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strations organized in cities around the country, as well as a friendly in-
tervention filed by the Delhi-based coalition Voices against Section 377, 
which provided the scaffolding for the momentous ruling Naz Foundation 
v. Government of nct of Delhi and Others.
the intermediary: voices against section 377
Drafted by the Bangalore-based Alternate Law Forum, Voices against 
Section 377 (hereafter Voices) filed an intervention supporting the Naz 
Foundation writ in November 2006 and was represented in the Delhi 
High Court by the lawyers Shyam Divan, Arvind Narrain, and others.8
Although the Voices petition paralleled Naz Foundation’s constitutional 
challenge to Section 377—for violating the fundamental rights to equal-
ity, freedom of expression, dignity, privacy, and liberty—it also exceeded 
the scope of the earlier writ in ways that reverberated powerfully in the 
2009 Delhi High Court judgment. Making the Voices plea distinctive was 
the fact that it was filed on behalf of a coalition that cut across homosex-
ual and heterosexual lines, giving it broader legitimacy.9 Demonstrating 
a range of activities, expertise, and experience related to lgbt issues and 
more, including combating violence and discrimination, child rights, 
and sexual education, it positioned the coalition as “represent[ing] a 
substantive body of public opinion which favours the decriminalization 
of consensual homosexual sex between adults.”10 The writ thus sought to 
persuade the Delhi High Court justices that decriminalizing homosexu-
ality was of interest and import not only to same-sex sexualities but to a 
broader public of all sexual and gender persuasions.
Unlike the Naz Foundation’s strategic emphasis on public health and 
effective governance, Voices provided the Delhi High Court with a two-
fold conceptual critique of Section 377. First, the Voices writ argued that 
the law impacted all adults, regardless of their sexual orientation, but 
affected sexual minorities in particular by being the cause of brutal hu-
man rights violations, an obstacle to equal citizenship for a significant 
section of the population, and an impediment to the self-worth of those 
persons who identify as lgbt. Emphasizing Section 377’s hindrances to 
self-expression and personhood, the Voices writ stated:
The history of violation and abuse . . . has as its locus the virulent 
homophobia sanctioned by Sec 377. The harm inflicted by a provision 
such as Sec 377 . . . radiates out and affects the very personhood of 
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lgbt people. Sexuality is an aspect of the human personality, which 
lies at the core of the individual. In the social climate fostered by Sec 
377 it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to publicly own and express 
one’s sexuality thereby silencing a core aspect of one’s personhood. 
Sec 377 by its very existence chills the expression of one’s sexuality 
and its presence directly relates to the sense of self, psychological 
well-being and self-esteem of lgbt persons. There are numerous 
psychological ill effects suffered by lgbt persons in India due to the 
extremely adverse social climate fostered by Sec 377.11
The Voices petition detailed the physical and psychological harm that 
resulted from Section 377, but more compellingly noted Section 377’s sti-
fling of a minority and marginalized group’s expression. Drawing atten-
tion to the intangible but no less significant harm caused by silencing a 
core aspect of personhood, the writ further argued, “Sec. 377 . . . , which 
criminalizes and stigmatizes homosexuality renders lgbt persons in-
visible and silences them. It therefore acts as a structural limit that does 
not allow for the possibility of freely exercising one’s rights of freedom 
of speech and expression.”12
This scathing assessment of Section 377 was carefully supported with 
evidence of injury to sexual and gender minorities, which turned out to 
be most persuasive to the justices issuing the 2009 Delhi High Court 
verdict. Naz Foundation v. Government of nct of Delhi and Others reproduced 
in detail instances of harm cited in the Voices writ, for example, the ar-
bitrary arrest of outreach workers from Bharosa Trust in 2001 under Sec-
tion 377 and in 2006 the unjust use of Section 377 in Bangalore to arrest 
four hijras even though they had committed no offence, as well as other 
examples of sexual violence against hijras, gay men, and lesbians.13 The 
Naz Foundation petition had underlined the risks posed by Section 377 
to all lgbt persons, keeping the emphasis on the violence experienced 
by msm, but submitted little by way of supporting evidence. By calling 
attention to specific examples of sexual, physical, psychological, and 
emotional violence experienced by these groups, the Voices intervention 
offered a more evidentiary critique while also arguing that all lgbt per-
sons are at potential risk due to Section 377, a point the justices affirmed 
in Naz Foundation v. Government of nct of Delhi and Others.
Second, the Voices writ presented the court with a critique of state 
governance. Notwithstanding the paradox of seeking intervention from 
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one arm of the state to limit another, it introduced the principle of con-
stitutional morality to argue that the state did not have a compelling 
interest to abridge same-sex sexualities’ constitutional rights to privacy, 
dignity, and autonomy. Constitutional morality was used to counter po-
sitions that homosexuality ought not to be decriminalized due to prevail-
ing (notions of ) public morality. At the same time, the petition showed 
that public opinion on homosexuality and indeed Indian culture itself 
was plural and dynamic; it cited changing attitudes and queer cultural 
traditions, such as the Aligal Thiruvizha festival derived from the Hindu 
epic Mahabharata and held annually in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, 
offering the Delhi High Court more ammunition to rule in favor of the 
Naz Foundation writ.
The gist of the Voices intervention lay in drawing parallels between 
the criminalization of same-sex sexualities and untouchability, caste 
discrimination, sati, and child marriage—all practices that have seen 
significant change in public opinion as a result of legislative interven-
tion. By creating equivalences between gender and sexual minorities and 
those who have long been recognized by the courts as vulnerable—Dalits 
and other subjects of caste discrimination, widows, and others—it 
urged the justices to see same-sex sexualities as a minority in need of 
legislative protections by extending to them the rights to equality and 
prohibition from discrimination alongside the principles of privacy and 
constitutional morality. Together these rights and principles became the 
cornerstones of Naz Foundation v. Government of nct of Delhi and Others and 
its litmus test.14
Divergent Outcomes: From Delhi High Court to the Supreme Court
Recalling the decisive moment on July 2, 2009, in the Delhi High Court 
when the justices decriminalized homosexuality, the emotional words of 
the scholar and activist Gautam Bhan evoked the profundity and power 
of the Naz v. Government of nct of Delhi and Others ruling from the perspec-
tive of those most involved in the struggle against Section 377 and most 
impacted by it:
Court one, item one on the Delhi High Court’s cause list. Ten thirty 
in the morning on the 2nd of July. A high court pass secured by a few 
dozen activists each of whom was remembering moments from the 
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last decade of fighting Sec 377. It is these simple words and an elec-
tronic pass receipt that a movement lasting decades and a legal battle 
lasting eight years came down to. In the end, it was enough. When the 
judgment was read, you could feel the emotion in the room. Our tears 
flowed not just because we had “won.” They came for the judgment 
that had set us free.15
Anticipation and optimism had been building for months and weeks 
even as many braced for an unfavorable outcome. On the day before 
the decision, Atul’s excitement was palpable as he ended his email post, 
“Best of luck to all of us ‘queers,’ ‘faggots’ and ‘dykes.’”16 As the deci-
sion reverberated beyond the courtroom, the shock of relief gave way to 
joy and bursts of emotion among untold supporters within and outside 
of India, and images, interviews, editorials spread quickly, keeping the 
verdict in the print and digital media well after it was no longer front-
page news.17
Naz v. Government was an extraordinary ruling. Issued by Chief Justice 
A. P. Shah and Justice S. Muralidhar, the judgment was crafted with the 
care and conscientiousness due a public document likely to set a prec-
edent and is impressive not only for rupturing the legal discourse on 
homosexuality by modifying the 150-year-old colonial law but also for its 
substantive and detailed arguments. Despite favorable outcomes, judg-
ments have been known to be deeply flawed and problematic in their 
reasoning, as feminist scholars have underscored, but Naz v. Government
stands apart due to its principled reasoning.18 Although Naz Foundation 
had petitioned the court to narrow Section 377, the court took the more 
radical stance of declaring it to be constitutionally invalid and reached 
beyond the writ’s emphasis on public health and more efficient gover-
nance to reframe health as a right with freedoms and entitlements.19
The Naz v. Government ruling exceeded the Naz Foundation writ in large 
part due to the Voices intervention. This is not to suggest that the justices 
might have ruled against the Naz Foundation writ or not so unequivo-
cally promoted the principles of equality and inclusiveness without the 
intervention of Voices, for that is a matter of speculation. Rather what is 
evident is that the Voices writ, as well as the legal counsel’s arguments, 
persuaded the justices of the law’s harmful effects on lgbt persons 
and provided the language and the tools with which to take a principled 
stance against it. The range of materials and references introduced by 
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Voices during the court proceedings—for example, the Yogyakarta Prin-
ciples and case law from Fiji, Nepal, and the United States—gave heft to 
the ruling as it decriminalized private, consensual adult same-sex sexual 
activity and brought sexual minorities for the first time within the fold of 
constitutional rights and protections.20
Naz v. Government’s triumph lies in its spirited emphasis on Articles 
21 (protection of life and personal liberty), 14 (equality before the law), 
and 15 (prohibition of discrimination) and the accent on the principle 
of constitutional morality as the only litmus test of compelling state in-
terest. Linking personal liberty to the elusive but important concept of 
dignity, the judges emphasized that the constitutional provision means 
acknowledging “the value and worth of all individuals as members of our 
society.” Making the verdict truly unprecedented was their position that 
sexual orientation falls within the ambit of the private space of person-
hood. Potentially impacting not just sexual minorities but all manner 
of sexual orientations, sexual choice, and activity, they reason, “it [the 
constitutional protection of dignity] recognizes a person as a free being 
who develops his or her body and mind as he or she sees fit. At the root of 
dignity is the autonomy of private will and a person’s freedom of choice 
or action.”21
A related aspect of the ruling’s significance was its creation of a le-
gal standard for recognizing same-sex sexualities under Article 15 of the 
Constitution, which prohibits discrimination based on religion, race, 
caste, sex, or place of birth. Setting a precedent, the justices wrote, “The 
purpose underlying the fundamental right against sex discrimination is 
to prevent behaviour that treats people differently for reason of not be-
ing in conformity with generalization concerning ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ 
gender roles. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is itself 
grounded in stereotypical judgments and generalization about the con-
duct of either sex.”22 The protection against discrimination shields indi-
viduals against abuses by the state and, as Arvind Narrain and Marcus 
Eldridge clarify, also from discrimination by another citizen, making it 
incumbent upon the police, for example, to intervene in such instances.23
Not least, the opinion affirmed judicial responsibility to uphold the 
principle of constitutional morality in order to protect the rights of sex-
ual and gender minorities, regardless of public opinion. Taking a firm 
stance against the government’s position challenging judicial authority, 
the justices argued that the “role of the judiciary can be described as 
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one of protecting the counter majoritarian safeguards enumerated in the 
Constitution.” Although they conceded that courts would normally defer 
to the legislature while conducting a judicial review of law, the justices 
endorsed that courts ought to exercise sovereign jurisdiction when mat-
ters of constitutional importance are involved, such as constitutionally 
entrenched human rights. Since rights fundamental to an individual’s 
humanity—namely the right to personal liberty and equality—were at 
risk, they endeavored to safeguard them: “The role of the judiciary is to 
protect the fundamental rights. A modern democracy, while based on 
the principle of majority rule, implicitly recognizes the need to protect 
the fundamental rights of those who may dissent or deviate from the 
majoritarian view. It is the job of the judiciary to balance the principles 
ensuring that the government on the basis of number does not override 
fundamental rights.”24
Taken together, these cornerstones of the Naz v. Government ruling 
vindicated an eight-year legal struggle for sexual justice that may have 
pivoted toward the state but had spilled onto the streets and into the 
media. The verdict helped brush aside any remaining differences and 
disagreements among the various sexuality rights constituencies and 
was collectively embraced as a monumental victory, inspiring numerous 
celebrations, commentaries, and efforts to inform and educate about its 
implications.25
The enthusiasm, though, gradually eroded in the following months 
due to reports of continued abuses toward sexual and gender minori-
ties within and beyond the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court and 
the realities of law’s disconnect from social life that surfaced with the 
much publicized suicide of Dr. Siras, a language professor at the premier 
Aligarh Muslim University, who was targeted due to his sexual orienta-
tion.26 Emerging criticisms and concerns about the limited implications 
of the Delhi High Court decree soon gave way to fresh apprehensions 
that it might well be overturned as numerous appellants sought legal 
redress from the Supreme Court, ironically remaking Naz Foundation 
from a plaintiff to a defendant. Finally, when the Supreme Court verdict 
was delivered, and despite the tenor of the hearings that had fueled anx-
ieties about an unfavorable outcome, it still came as a tremendous and 
unexpected blow.
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the supreme court, 2013
Ominously describing the last official act of a retiring Supreme Court 
judge, Vikram Raghavan offers an inside view of the hours before Suresh 
Kumar Koushal and Another v. Naz Foundation and Others was delivered on De-
cember 11, 2013, upholding the validity of Section 377: “On Wednesday 
morning, Justice Ganpat Singh Singhvi donned his black robes one last 
time. The judge with a smiling face had a busy day ahead of him. After 
hearing several cases, he would attend a late-afternoon retirement party 
on the Supreme Court’s lawns. But Singhvi’s first appointment was in 
the Chief Justice’s Court. Retiring judges spend their final day in that 
majestic chamber. There, a large crowd eagerly awaited Singhvi. They 
had gathered to hear his widely anticipated last judgment.”27
Dashing the hopes and aspirations of sexuality rights activists and a 
legion of supporters, Koushal v. Naz was shocking not just because of the 
Delhi High Court’s earlier ruling decriminalizing homosexuality but also 
because of the considerably greater visibility of sexual and gender mi-
norities at regional and national levels in the preceding years. Speaking 
amid the firestorm of anger, protest, and dissent contrasting sharply with 
the celebrations and sentiments following the lower court’s overturning 
of Section 377, Gautam Bhan said, “We are quite stunned. We didn’t ex-
pect this. Every trend—in everyday life, in court and jurisprudence—
was pointing in the opposite direction.”28
Koushal v. Naz was delivered in response to special leave petitions, much 
like the one Naz Foundation filed in 2005, asking the Supreme Court to 
reconsider the lower court’s decriminalization of homosexuality. Nota-
bly the appeals did not come from the government or the regional and 
national state agencies that were the focus of the original Naz Founda-
tion writ but from a motley collection of individuals and organizations, 
such as Suresh Kumar Koushal, Krantikati Manuvadi Morcha Party, 
Utkal Christian Council, and the All India Muslim Personal Law Board. 
With the exception of two opponents, B. P. Singhal and jack, these had 
not been part of the legal process thus far. Although the justices also 
entertained fresh interventions in favor of decriminalization—Voices 
against Section 377, Nivedita Menon and a number of other academics, 
and parents of lgbt children, among others—they did so without plac-
ing the burden on appellants to explain why the Supreme Court should 
accept pleas interfering in the lower court’s judgment or how they were 
affected by it.
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In direct contrast to Naz v. Government’s accent on judicial obligations 
to protect the rights of minorities, the principle driving the Supreme 
Court judgment was judicial restraint, leading to its arguable conclu-
sion that the lower court had wrongly exceeded its jurisdiction by de-
criminalizing homosexuality. Confirming that courts have an absolute 
right to review legislation, the verdict nonetheless argued that justices 
should declare laws unconstitutional or narrow them only in rare cases: 
“The Courts should accept an interpretation of constitutionality rather 
than one that would render the law unconstitutional. Declaring the law 
unconstitutional is one of the last resorts taken by the Courts.”29 Such 
an interpretation may be judicial prerogative, notwithstanding critics’ 
point that the case law cited in Koushal v. Naz does not actually support its 
arguments, but what needs to be accounted for is why the ruling seems 
so intent on castigating the Delhi High Court justices and defending the 
criminalization of homosexuality.
The apex court’s opinion found fault with Naz v. Government on the 
grounds that the Naz Foundation writ had not provided factual evidence 
supporting its constitutional challenge or its argument that Section 377 
permits state-based discrimination of sexual minorities. This position 
could be reached only by purposefully ignoring the substantial evidence 
first submitted by Voices in 2006 and added to by others during the Su-
preme Court proceedings. Drawing a false comparison of numbers—
that sexual minorities are but a “minuscule fraction” of the population 
and relatively few cases have been prosecuted under Section 377 over a 
150-year period—the justices used biopolitical logic to refute the inter-
pretation that it violates Articles 14, 15, and 21. Whereas the Delhi High 
Court ruling implied that the law’s small archive was a reason to undo a 
little-used statute and uphold the constitutional rights of sexual minori-
ties, the Supreme Court justices used it to dismiss sexual minorities as 
too few to warrant protections (!) and ignored the law’s wider potential 
impact across sexual orientations.
That Koushal v. Naz is a decree in search of arguments is perhaps no-
where more evident than in the discussion on Article 21, where it pur-
ports to take up the issue of rights to privacy, dignity, bodily integrity, 
and sexual choice, but in ways that are left unreconciled (or could even be 
understood as favoring the decriminalization of homosexuality). Quot-
ing extensively from legal cases that confirm these fundamental rights, 
the judgment merely juxtaposes several citations, for example, one argu-
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ing that compelling state interest abridges women’s right to terminate a 
pregnancy with another unequivocally confirming the right to live with 
dignity, without offering any interpretation or reasoning of how Naz v. 
Government is on the wrong side of these precedents. But then, abruptly 
noting that police may misuse Section 377 to harass, blackmail, and tor-
ture, and diverging sharply from the Delhi High Court’s interpretations, 
it infers that the problem does not lie with the law itself.
Koushal v. Naz has invited much criticism not just because of the out-
come but because its shoddiness and biases mark the tone and texture 
of this almost hundred-page text, belying law’s putative objectivity. As 
legal scholars have usefully noted, the ruling has factual errors, quotes 
with missing legal citations, and several inconsistencies between how 
legal precedents are used even though their outcomes do not actually 
support the justices’ interpretations.30 These subjectivities also organize 
the structure, arguments, and language of the opinion in ways that were 
anticipated by the hearings, for in contrast to the unofficial transcripts of 
the Delhi High Court hearings (September–November 2008), the notes 
for the Koushal v. Naz proceedings (February–March 2012) frequently 
include observations on the odd nature of the justices’ questions and 
affect.31 These differences are the result of the sometimes overtly and 
sometimes implicitly editorial nature of the unofficial transcripts avail-
able for both hearings, but they also speak to the peculiarities of how 
the Supreme Court justices sought to educate themselves about homo-
sexuality, the scope of the antisodomy law, and the differences between 
abnormal and unnatural sex. Further, it is not that the Naz v. Government
transcripts do not record the justices’ affect—their frustrations with 
the various parties, their personal opinions—but where those hearings 
are primarily focused on the histories, complexities, and nuances of the 
antisodomy law and the arguments pertaining to it, the Supreme Court 
proceedings lead a note-taker to write, “The justices are starting to enjoy 
the case. Ok, perhaps that’s not a respectful way of putting it, but there’s 
definitely a sense from today’s report that they are getting interested 
in the issue and also intrigued by some of the more bizarre aspects of 
s.377.”32
Almost half of Koushal v. Naz is devoted to reviewing the appeals and 
positions of the various litigating parties, but its more substantial discus-
sion begins with an overview of the relevant sections of the penal code. 
In an odd move, the judgment juxtaposes the now amended Sections 
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375 and 376 with the antisodomy law, while failing to address how this 
law is no longer necessary to prosecute aggravated sexual assault that 
exceeds the scope of rape. (Also completely neglected is any mention of 
the provisions specifically addressing sexual violence against children, 
passed only months before, that further reduce the onus on the law.)33
More peculiarly it sees fit to introduce Black’s Law Dictionary definitions 
of buggery, carnal, carnal knowledge, and nature that, along with a cursory 
and incomplete review of the history and case law of Section 377, allows 
for the following deduction: “It is true that the theory that the sexual 
intercourse is only meant for the purpose of conception is an outdated 
theory. But, at the same time it could be said without any hesitation or 
contradiction that the orifice of mouth is not, according to nature, meant 
for sexual or carnal intercourse. Viewing from that aspect, it could be 
said that this act of putting a male-organ in the mouth of a victim for the 
purposes of satisfying sexual appetite would be an act of carnal inter-
course against the order of nature.”34
Revealing as this language is about the justices’ personal biases, it 
also indicates their affect by registering, as Pratiksha Baxi incisively 
notes, “the shudder of disgust that grips the judicial body” as they weigh 
in on the antisodomy law.35 These judicial dispositions and passions con-
firm the thoroughly subjective aspects of law and facilitate more critical 
understandings of the two texts and the complexities of sexuality, ju-
ridicality, and the state underlying their differences. Koushal v. Naz may 
have elicited much criticism, in contrast to the mostly laudatory readings 
of Naz v. Government, but there is more room for deeper and more nu-
anced analyses of both texts and their limitations.
Competing Visions, Shared Contexts
In a nutshell, Naz v. Government attempted to mitigate state regulation of 
same-sex sexualities, thereby decriminalizing homosexuality and argu-
ably reducing the state’s influence, whereas Koushal v. Naz represented 
an effort to reinforce the state through its continuing control over sexu-
ality. The Delhi High Court ruling may have unwittingly reaffirmed and 
even expanded aspects of the state—the relevance of the constitutional 
charter and the role of the judiciary—but it did endeavor to remove con-
senting same-sex sexual practices from being subject to the institutional 
reach of law. It may have offset decriminalization by bringing sexual mi-
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norities under the law’s rights and protections in new ways, and yet it 
is hard to ignore the symbolic and material implications of declaring 
the antisodomy law invalid for same-sex consenting adult sexual activity. 
Further, insofar as the antisodomy statute became the symbol of state 
and social injustice, its undoing did matter, despite the complexities of 
Section 377. Thus at least in one meaningful and unparalleled way the 
Delhi High Court justices tried to curb governance, diminishing, in ef-
fect, the prospect of the state.
Koushal v. Naz’s withering criticisms of the Delhi High Court ruling 
and its interpretations, however, are most fruitfully understood as an 
attempt to reinforce the state and, more specifically, the legislature’s 
purview over sexuality, which also explains why the court seemed so con-
cerned about overstepping judicial boundaries. Defending the legisla-
ture’s role over the making and amending of laws, Koushal v. Naz reasoned 
that lawmakers best understand the needs of the people, a position that 
is particularly difficult to sustain for a colonial relic authorized by a body 
that was hardly representative of the people it was governing. Begging 
a thoughtful consideration of the antisodomy law, the justices sought 
refuge in the inaccurate assertions that Parliament had repeatedly re-
fused to reconsider Section 377 even though the Indian Penal Code had 
been amended some thirty times since independence, most recently in 
2013 to incorporate changes in sexual assault laws, and the 172nd Law 
Commission Report had recommended its deletion. On the contrary, 
the antisodomy statue had not repeatedly come up for debate, which was 
one reason abva and Naz Foundation sought recourse in the high court, 
nor did it feature prominently in debates on modifications to rape laws, 
which explains why the justices offered no specific evidence to support 
their reading of the legislature’s disposition.36
Beyond merely shoring up the role of the legislature in general, the 
ruling governs matters of same-sex sexualities in particular. Not con-
tent to weigh in on the merits of the lower court’s verdict, Koushal v. Naz
is generative on matters of same-sex sexuality, drawing sharp distinc-
tions between those “who indulge in carnal intercourse in the ordinary 
course” and those “who indulge in carnal intercourse against the order 
of nature.” Even though the apex court justices argued that Section 377 
does not discriminate against any group of people, they defined sexual 
minorities as a separate class of people. Despite the crucial fact that the 
government, acting on behalf of the various state agencies first named 
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as respondents in the Naz Foundation writ petition, chose not to appeal 
the Delhi High Court ruling, the matter was turned over to the legisla-
ture for further deliberation. The most crucial player in the legal process, 
the Home Ministry, entered an affidavit on March 1, 2012, on behalf of 
the government, stating that it was not contesting the decriminalization 
of homosexuality, yet the justices were reluctant to undo the antisod-
omy law and at pains to uphold the regulation of same-sex sexualities 
as the preserve of the state. Concluding, “Notwithstanding this verdict, 
the competent legislature shall be free to consider the desirability and 
propriety of deleting Section 377 from the statute book or amend the 
same as per the suggestion made by the Attorney General,” they allow for 
modifications in the antisodomy statute, but not without implying the 
importance of the state and its mechanisms of governance.
Alongside other recent changes in laws related to managing sexu-
ality, the impulse to preserve legislative aspects of the state and pro-
long governance is evident. Legislative changes have resulted in more 
capacious definitions of sexual assault, a wider understanding of sexual 
violence—including acid attacks on women and stalking—and harsher 
punishment. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act of 
2012 represents even greater state intervention and governance for it in-
troduced laws that are specific to children, explicitly criminalizing sexual 
assault and other offenses against them, including sexual harassment, 
pornography, and abetting in such crimes, and also details criminal pro-
cedures and the setting up of special courts. A hard-won victory by chil-
dren’s rights activists, the upshot of this Act may well prove to be useful, 
but it is part of a broader trend toward more legislation that is being 
reinforced by the Supreme Court justices’ decision to not decriminalize 
homosexuality. Indeed while the judgment makes a passing reference to 
the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2013, it does not include so much 
as a nod to the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act and uses 
the antisodomy law to endorse the legislature and legislative action.
The paradox is that mitigating rather than reaffirming state regula-
tion of same-sex sexualities is traceable to the same postliberalization 
context, where law assumes ever greater prominence in mediating con-
flict.37 Indeed “law struggles,” through which ordinary people or groups 
pin their aspirations on new and better-enforced laws in the postlib-
eralization context, are what predisposed Naz Foundation to focus on 
Section 377 as the starting point of a movement for sexual justice.38 Seen 
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through the prism of sexuality, these law struggles help identify the ways 
ongoing economic and political changes—especially trends toward the 
gradual undoing of the developmental state as a means of social redis-
tribution, privatization of infrastructure, greater access to transnational 
finance, the rise of ngos—allow justices to alternatively reduce and re-
inforce the state.39 But more attention to the judgments’ sociopolitical 
context encourages analyses of how, despite its praiseworthy attempt 
to attenuate governance, the Naz Foundation opinion is constrained by 
neoliberal logics and Koushal v. Naz is understood as a forward-looking 
endorsement of the arguably beleaguered state.
neoliberal logics and their limits
Naz v. Government could in fact imagine a diminishing of the state by 
drawing on a neoliberal understanding of gay rights that, particularly in 
the context of India, has gained currency in the shadow of the hiv/aids
crisis and postliberalization policies. Vigorously challenged by critical 
scholars and activists as a universalizing, individualizing, and privatiz-
ing discourse emanating from the Euro-American West, often beginning 
with decriminalization and geared toward assimilation and inclusion, 
this rights regime hinges on the relationship between the individual and 
the state, typically mediated by law, while sidestepping the urgencies of 
economic, cultural, and social justice.40 Equally important, it obscures 
colonial histories, for this version of gay rights is not simply exported to 
postcolonial contexts such as India but gets uniquely associated with is-
sues of national modernity and progress in ways that were previously in-
dexed by “women and development.”41 Advanced by the Naz Foundation 
writ and embraced by the Naz v. Government ruling, this approach called 
for the retrenchment of the state from the lives of sexual minorities, but 
just as not all women were seen as symbols of modernizing states, not all 
disenfranchised groups and communities were equally included in the 
vision of a plural democratic nation—an analysis that becomes increas-
ingly evident through careful consideration of Naz v. Government.
fault lines of privacy
As discussed in chapter 5, the Naz Foundation writ introduced the idea 
that privacy—in the sense of personal liberty and autonomy—is inte-
gral to the sanctity of personhood and that consenting same-sex sex-
ual activity conducted in private spaces ought to be free from the state’s 
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intrusions, arguments that subsequently became a cornerstone of Naz 
v. Government. Deriving from the Voices writ’s discussion of privacy as 
including the right to make decisions related to the intimate aspects of 
life, the justices went on to offer a nuanced and robust understanding of 
the discursive aspects of privacy as a fundamental right due to sexual and 
gender minorities. Persuaded that sexual orientation should be a matter 
of privacy, personal liberty, and autonomy, they defined it as a “private 
space in which man may become and remain himself.”42 They ceded that 
the Indian Constitution does not offer a specific right to privacy, citing 
earlier decisions in Indian case law that provide for the “right to be left 
alone” and allow for the abridging of personal rights only if compelling 
state interest can be shown.43 Noting these landmark decisions as well 
as U.S. jurisprudence, they summarized:
The sphere of privacy allows persons to develop human relations 
without interference from the outside community or from the State. 
The exercise of autonomy enables an individual to attain fulfillment, 
grow in self-esteem, build relationships of his or her choice and fulfill 
all legitimate goals that he or she may set. In the Indian Constitution, 
the right to live with dignity and the right of privacy both are rec-
ognised as dimensions of Article 21. Section 377 . . . denies a person’s 
dignity and criminalises his or her core identity solely on account of 
his or her sexuality and thus violates Article 21 of the Constitution.44
The judgment relied heavily on the Voices intervention to present 
an understanding of privacy not as a matter of private places but more 
broadly about self-autonomy and personhood, in ways that would have 
had considerable ramifications for Indian jurisprudence.45 Yet in the last 
instance the judgment narrowed decriminalization to same-sex sexual 
activity in private spaces, leaving same-sex sexual activity in nonprivate 
spaces still prosecutable under Section 377 (rather than falling under 
the scope of indecency laws and such similar to heterosexual activity 
in public). More important, it raised questions about the limitations of 
using privacy to safeguard rights, a point that resonates with Katherine M. 
Franke’s critique that the U.S. Supreme Court territorialized the right 
to intimacy within the bedroom and strengthened a de-radicalized and 
domesticated vision of sexual rights among gay communities with the 
Lawrence v. Texas decision.46
Much like Lawrence v. Texas, the rider of privacy papers over pertinent 
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gender and class differences among queer groups.47As Ponni, a member 
of the Delhi-based groups Anjuman and Nigah, suggested in her 
interview, Section 377 does not impact all queer groups equally or in the 
same way, and the Naz Foundation writ does not spell out clearly how the 
law impacts those who are differently gendered, for even if women do 
not cruise in public parks, they are affected by Section 377.48 Even though 
msm and other socially disadvantaged groups were the basis on which 
the Naz Foundation writ moved the Delhi High Court, working-class gay 
men and msm are the ones least likely to have access to the privacy of a 
home or a hotel, leaving them exposed to the threat of Section 377.49 In fact 
sexual contact, especially among working-class, non-English-speaking 
males, kothis, and hijras, frequently occurs in public settings such as 
parks and urinals, which adds to their vulnerability from the police and 
cancels privacy in the sense of safety from intrusion.50
Thus self-responsibilization (after Nikolas Rose), or in this case hav-
ing to assume the burden of ensuring one’s personal liberty, mediates 
the decriminalization of homosexuality in the Naz v. Government judg-
ment, in keeping with concerns about the neoliberal (mis)uses of em-
powerment especially among vulnerable communities.51 Mindful of the 
implications of this approach, the Voices intervention deliberately omit-
ted the privacy clause and some closely involved with the Naz Foundation 
writ regretted including it, but ultimately the ruling could not and did 
not sidestep a contradiction haunting the legal process: the initial focus 
may have been on working-class gay men and msm, but privileged gay 
men would likely have been the chief beneficiaries had homosexuality 
been decriminalized.
constitutional moralities 
and the hazards of  individualism
Constitutional morality, a concept introduced by the Voice writ and bor-
rowed from the framer of the Indian Constitution and Dalit activist Dr. 
B. R. Ambedkar, was used in the Naz v. Government verdict as a bulwark 
against claims of public morality. Public morality was used repeatedly, 
most notably in the government’s 2003 response in the Delhi High Court 
to oppose the Naz Foundation bid on the grounds that Indian society 
disapproves of homosexuality enough to criminalize it and attitudes in 
India have not sufficiently changed to justify the modification of Section 
377. In another hostile intervention, this one filed in 2006 by B. P. Sin-
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ghal, an individual who positioned himself as an able representative of 
the “Indian masses,” the argument was that public morality was strongly 
opposed to homosexuality for it represented a threat to the sanctity of 
the family and the nation.52
Offering the principle of constitutional morality, first invoked by 
Ambedkar in a speech delivered on November 4, 1948, to enshrine the 
independent nation as a liberal democracy, the 2006 Voices writ coun-
tered arguments of public morality by arguing, “In fact there is a large 
body of opinion which favours the reading down of [Sec] 377, on the 
precise grounds that Sec 377 is an affront to a constitutional morality 
based on the protection of rights.”53 Reasoning that public morality is an 
inadequate reason to curtail the rights to dignity, autonomy, and, for that 
matter, privacy, the Voices intervention called on the justices to affirm 
and uphold the secular and constitutional principles on which liberal de-
mocracies are based.54 Persuaded by these arguments, the justices firmly 
contradicted the government’s position that public morality is grounds 
for restricting fundamental rights: “Popular morality, as distinct from a 
constitutional morality derived from constitutional values, is based on 
shifting and subjecting notions of right and wrong. If there is any type 
of ‘morality’ that can pass the test of compelling state interest, it must 
be ‘constitutional’ morality and not public morality. This aspect of con-
stitutional morality was strongly insisted upon by Dr. Ambedkar in the 
Constituent Assembly.”55
But the concept of constitutional morality is also profoundly tied 
to the sanctity of the individual over the collective in ways that do not 
travel well across time. Ambedkar may have used it to defend the Draft 
Constitution against criticism that it was based on a Western model and 
give primacy to the individual over what he called village republics—dens 
of provincialism and communalism that were ruining India—declaring, 
“I am glad that the Draft Constitution has discarded the village and 
adopted the individual as its unit.”56 Yet whereas individualism may 
have promised liberation over the forms of caste, religious, and gender 
oppressions wielded at the community level in the years following 
independence, it looks suspect in the context of postliberalization. 
Rather than offering protections and rights to the marginalized, it results 
in an uneven distribution of justice by working in favor of those who are 
already advantaged—as is clear in the earlier discussion on privacy.
Furthermore individualism’s potentials have not been realized in pre-
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venting ongoing caste-, communal, and gender-based violence, and it 
is unlikely to shield most sexual and gender minorities who are perse-
cuted not as individuals but as members of communities, especially un-
der laws with much lower thresholds than Section 377’s. In other words, 
the violence of law and law enforcement and forms of social stigma are 
profoundly attached to what are perceived as pejorative characteristics 
common to a group—hijras, kothis, gays, and others—in ways that I 
gestured to in chapter 2 and made starkly evident in chapter 4 (when po-
lice inflict preemptive violence on hijras or entrap them simply because 
of their identity). In his reflections on intensified policing of hijras in 
the city of Bangalore in the aftermath of the Naz v. Government judgment, 
Arvind Narrain suggests that the most crucial lesson to be drawn is that 
decriminalizing the antisodomy law has little impact on the most vulner-
able gender and sexual minorities.57
pitfalls of equality
Naz v. Government was exalted as both sign and effect of a liberal demo-
cratic national state for upholding the values of a democratic nation and 
equal citizenship and providing a pathway for additional constitutional 
protections to all vulnerable minorities, including Muslims, Christians, 
women, tribals, Dalits, and disabled persons.58 The legal scholars Law-
rence Liang and Siddharth Narrain compared it to Roe v. Wade and Brown 
v. Board of Education to suggest that the ruling will likely have an impact 
well beyond its apparent legal scope.59 Laying the foundations for the 
principles of equal rights and citizenship endorsed in the ruling, the 
Voices writ implored the justices to place same-sex sexualities on par 
with Dalits, religious-cultural communities, and other minorities al-
ready afforded constitutional protections, a view then reinforced by the 
justices’ position that courts ought to take the lead on behalf of sexual 
minorities much as they had done by abolishing forms of discrimination 
such as untouchability, caste discrimination, sati, and child marriage.
Although the principles of equality and inclusion are held to be 
among the most promising and perhaps far-reaching aspects of the Naz 
v. Government judgment, they are tempered by the disconnect between 
formal equality and extant inequality that has been a long-standing fem-
inist concern.60 Further, if formal equality cannot ensure justice, then the 
equivalences between sexual minorities and other groups implied in the 
judgment are no guarantee that all minorities will be seen as emblems 
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of national modernity.61 Noting that the term minority is restricted to re-
ligious groups in official terminology, Zoya Hassan cautions that despite 
discourses of religious pluralism, constitutional bindings of equality 
have not translated into the lives of Muslim communities.62 The gravest 
issue is that demands for equality for religious-cultural groups are his-
torically and presently constructed as a threat to the national fabric and, 
especially in the case of Muslim communities, seen as antimodern and 
somehow more prone to sexual deviance. At issue, then, is not only the 
gap between equality’s formal provisions and its substantial absences 
but also the frequently heard concerns that some religious-cultural mi-
norities are not deserving of inclusion, and the reverse logic that equality 
for some religious-cultural minorities (read: special treatment) under-
mines the integrity of the modern democratic nation. Thus Naz v. Gov-
ernment is not immune from cautions that neoliberal logics distinguish 
between citizens—those who contribute the essentials of enterprise and 
modernity—and populations who are seen as unworthy of the privileges 
of citizenship.63
sexuality and the seemingly imperiled state
After December 11, 2013, the lower court judgment’s pronouncements 
became moot but all the more heroic because of the apex court’s re-
instatement of the antisodomy law. Seen in light of this binding deci-
sion, the regional high court’s reliance on neoliberal logics, with all of 
their flaws and biases, seems far more palatable and preferable to the 
draconian alternative that reaffirms the criminalization of homosexual-
ity. However, despite the disturbing outcome, deeply flawed reasoning, 
and endorsement of an archaic law in contradistinction to the lower 
court, the Supreme Court’s position does not represent a throwback to 
the past but, parallel to the lower court’s opinion, an urgency of the pres-
ent and the path ahead, a view that is amply reflected in the text and also 
anticipated in the hearings for Koushal v. Naz.
Throughout the hearings the justices emphasized the changing nature 
of Indian society, especially in response to appellants’ claims that same-
sex sexual activity is against the natural order of things, and pointed in-
stead to new technologies such as blood and sperm donation and in vitro 
fertilization. They underscored the mutability of words such as unnatural
a number of times during the hearings, and also, according to the un-
official transcripts, sought to analyze the relevance of Section 377 in the 
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modern context. The senior justice and the author of the fateful verdict 
took a dynamic view of sexuality, noting that same-sex sexual activities 
were recognized in India and represented in art well before the advent of 
the British and the colonial law. Continuing this thread, the judgment 
sought neither to restore India to an ageless past nor to consign it to an 
unchanging present, thus raising the question of how to contextualize 
its unequivocal stance on criminalizing homosexuality.
Quoting at length from a precedent on capital punishment, the jus-
tices underscored the imperatives of staying on a path best suited to In-
dia. Highlighting the differences between what are characterized as so-
cial conditions as well as general intellectual levels across India and the 
West, they argued that India cannot risk “experiments” such as abolish-
ing capital punishment or, by extension, the antisodomy statute. Further 
raising the specter of following Western sexual mores, this time by turn-
ing to a previous ruling upholding the customs of arranged marriage, 
they cautioned against circumstances when legal changes elsewhere are 
“blindly followed in this country without a critical examination of those 
principles and their applicability to the conditions, social norms and 
attitudes existing in this country.”64 Thus the injunction against homo-
sexuality may be a Western import, but, according to the justices, its con-
tinued criminalization by the state in a context overrun by Coca-Cola and 
fashion parades even at the village level is best suited to India.65 In other 
words, where Naz v. Government responded to the dynamics of sexuality, 
political economy, and nation in the present moment by decriminalizing 
homosexuality, Koushal v. Naz found a reason to recriminalize it.
Fragments
Naz Foundation’s legal challenge to Section 377 gradually coalesced into 
a political campaign for decriminalizing homosexuality that, as a result 
of the twists and turns in the courtrooms, has precipitated a nascent sex-
uality rights movement in India. This shift in mobilization, kindled by 
the government’s reply to the Delhi High Court in 2003 and fueled by the 
court’s dismissal of the Naz Foundation writ in 2004, meant collectively 
embracing a struggle whose flashpoint was the antisodomy statute. If 
that meant becoming complicit with law, in the sense of what Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak has described as folded togetherness, which is to 
say breathing new life into Section 377 to show its detrimental effects 
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on same-sex sexualities, it also enabled broader critiques of law and gov-
ernance, signaled by the Voices intervention in the Delhi High Court in 
2006.66
While transnational flows of a liberal gay rights approach, particularly 
resonant in the wake of the hiv/aids crisis and liberalization policies 
in the Indian context, informed the Naz Foundation writ, the Voices in-
tervention was driven by a more radical and instructive vision of queer 
politics, reflected in the words of its primary author, Arvind Narrain: 
“A queer vision is not merely about equal rights for lgbt persons but 
about loosening up the rigid structures of caste, gender, and compul-
sory sexuality. It is about questioning notions of purity, muddying rigid 
boundaries and opening up a space for those at the margins of hege-
monic structures which make up our society. What a queer vision also 
calls for is an open-ended political project which has the capacity to be 
self-reflexive and take on new concerns.”67 And whereas the Naz Foun-
dation writ focused narrowly on law and was shaped by what Jacques 
Rancière has called the partition of the perceptible, that is, the internal 
frontiers created within marginalized groups for fear that some among 
them would weaken the arguments for equal rights, the Voices interven-
tion sought to use the courts to mount a vision of rights and protections 
due sexual minorities that exceeded decriminalization.68 Yet both these 
writs are also fruitfully understood as products of their time, marking 
shifts in a political consciousness that was forged in an unfolding legal 
campaign.69 Many of those closely associated with the Naz Foundation 
writ came to ally themselves more firmly with Voices’ vision, blurring 
ideological lines. But it is also true that these two writs reflect endur-
ing differences in a common political struggle between a discourse of 
gay rights and what might be called a discourse of the disadvantaged, 
whereby justice for sexual minorities is entwined with other social equi-
ties, including caste, class, religion, and gender.
Issued at their crosshairs, the Naz v. Government verdict was both his-
toric and unfinished. Building on what was initiated by the Naz Foun-
dation intervention and advanced through the Voices plea, the justices 
reduced the reach of governance by decriminalizing homosexuality. A 
closer analysis of the text, however, shows that it could not sidestep the 
structural constraints plaguing the quest for reform, pivoting around 
one law and one putative subject. Unable to contain the differences of 
social class and gender expression that mediate the antisodomy law’s 
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effects on same-sex sexualities, the ruling circumscribed the rights of 
sexual minorities through the principle of privacy. Since Section 377 and 
a host of other laws, policies, and practices of governance affect hijras, 
kothis, and others collectively, the individualized rhetoric of constitu-
tional morality would likely also have fallen short of its promise. And, 
ignoring the antisodomy law’s potential impact on religious-cultural 
minorities, the ruling raises the question of whether some sexual mi-
norities can portend the possibility of postcolonial progress while other 
minority groups are ignored by modernity.
In contrast to the more nuanced interpretations encouraged by Naz 
v. Government, Koushal v. Naz has little to recommend it, not only because 
the outcome is on the wrong side of history but because of the reason-
ing through which it arrives at this position. The lower court used the 
antisodomy law to bring sexual minorities into the fold of Indian gay 
history, but the apex court’s ruling sought to reaffirm the history and 
structures of governance that pertain to and extend beyond the scope of 
this law. The antisodomy law may not have been used much, and sexual 
and gender minorities may nonetheless have been implicated by it, but 
that was not reason enough for the Supreme Court to deliver justice or 
weigh in on the side of the lower court. Revealing a remarkable sense of 
discomfort with same-sex sexual practices in the hearings as well as the 
decision, the justices ignored the spirit of Naz v. Government to fault it for 
overstepping judicial restraints, even though the same qualms did not 
seem to apply in other cases on which the senior judge ruled.70 Insist-
ing that the judiciary must modify laws only in the rarest of cases, they 
opened the door for further legislative intrusions, which is all the more 
concerning since they believe that the legislature has thus far shown no 
interest in decriminalizing homosexuality. Amplifying legislative activity 
related to sexual violence, such as the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 
and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (which could 
make Section 377 defunct), they charged the legislature with the task of 
determining the interests of a nation amid rapid changes that are filter-
ing down “even” to the village level, thereby endorsing the sanctity of the 
state and miscarrying sexual justice.
A F T E R L I V E S
Uncovering sexuality’s constitutive effects on states through struggles 
playing out in the Indian context is the central charge of this book. De-
naturalizing the image of a measured monolithic entity, it suggests that 
the mandate to regulate sexuality helps reproduce states and that cares 
and considerations related to sexuality impact the spaces, discursive 
practices, and rationalities of governance. Spotlighting the more than 
decade-long struggle to decriminalize homosexuality through fieldwork 
conducted among state institutions, sexuality rights organizations, and 
activist networks, this investigation underscores sexuality’s salience in 
shifting the grounding framework for understanding the state.
Coming to grips with sexuality’s effects on states cautions against as-
sumptions about the declining relevance of states as a result of neoliberal 
policies or transnational forms of governmentality. Indeed focusing on 
the antisodomy law and the shutting down of dance bars indicates the 
tenacity of sexual discourses, practices, and imaginations that continu-
ally breathe life into the idea of the state. State-based governance may 
be receding in some areas, but sexuality’s putative threat to lineage and 
inheritance, marriage and family, work productivity, the socialization of 
children and their conduct, life and heath helps perform states ontolog-
ically as coherent, rational, asexual, and indispensable.
Pressing against ontologies of the state draws attention to the discur-
sive practices that give it substance and force. Focusing on them during 
visits to ncrb yielded fresh insights into the potency of routinized bu-
reaucratic procedures, how sexual concerns parse statistics and how 
they structure the agency’s spaces and interpersonal relations. Similarly 
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repeated calls to the Ministry of Home Affairs revealed that the govern-
ment’s responses to the Naz Foundation writ issued from the ideologies 
of sexuality embedded in institutional processes. Honing in on the forms 
and methods of governance exposed the inconsistencies that keep it sup-
ple and expansive. Recall, for instance, that Section 377 has been flexibly 
used to prosecute child sexual assault, and case law archives a steadily 
expanding interpretation of sexual offenses. Such a view also reveals that 
biopolitical, juridical, and neoliberal modalities do not supplant one an-
other but continually and unevenly play out at various (blurred) levels 
of the state—in the streets and in regionally based policy, national dis-
courses, institutional practices of national-level agencies that are none-
theless located in the neighborhoods of the capital city, and more.
At the same time, a close look at these subjective, sexualized practices 
of governance confirms that those marginalized on the basis of social 
class, caste, gender affiliation and expression, sexual orientation, reli-
gion, and, as will become clearer below, nationality are disproportion-
ately affected. Speaking passionately, if pejoratively, Delhi police reveal 
that enforcing Section 377 more likely imperils the underclasses that they 
encounter on the streets and the beats, particularly the racialized and 
gendered minorities among them. These revelations also suggest the 
need to marshal more thoroughgoing appraisals of the state, accounting 
for the biases, desires, and passions of power as much in terms of sexu-
ality as race, gender, social class, and caste.
Grappling with questions of states’ desires from this perspective leads 
to the key findings of this book: that it is not one law or another but an 
entire corpus of laws, practices, policies, and discourses directed toward 
managing sexuality that helps produce states and that not only generic 
gay subjects are impacted by the antisodomy law, therefore complicating 
and implicating reform-oriented struggles for sexual justice. Such en-
deavors inevitably animate the sexual state by returning repeatedly to the 
judicial sphere as the more progressive arm of the state and, especially 
in the case of the efforts to decriminalize homosexuality, assuming Fou-
cauldian histories of the homosexual subject. Seeking justice through 
litigious interventions and therefore working within the institutional 
parameters already set in place, these efforts were obligated to focus on 
only one law and an equally narrow understanding of who is impacted 
by it. Missing, then, was a broadly conceived strategy impaling gover-
nance by taking on the nexus of laws, policies, and practices, among 
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them the law against castration that affects hijras, the Immoral Traffic 
(Prevention) Act, the abuses of policing against multiple constituencies, 
and more. Responding to such omissions, the coalition Voices against 
Section 377 took on some of the battles deferred by the Naz Foundation 
writ, establishing evidence of a more systemic pattern of institutional 
discrimination against same-sex sexualities.
In response the Delhi High Court ruling decriminalized homosexual-
ity and rightly brought sexual minorities under constitutional protection 
but was subsequently overturned. The verdict can be seen as a symbolic 
diminishing of the state, except that its recourse to gay rights as a marker 
of India’s successful transition into modernity left out those who are 
most vulnerable to the vagaries of law. Yet this ruling looks less dire in 
comparison to the Supreme Court decision recriminalizing homosex-
uality and, in effect, renewing Section 377 as the scene of the battle for 
sexual justice. Setting back expectations of a legal victory as a sign of and 
threshold to more gains due sexual minorities, the Koushal v. Naz ruling 
unequivocally upholds the role of the state, especially the legislature, at a 
moment when the nation and state appear to be flailing under economic 
and social liberalization.
The role of courts in advancing or mitigating the integrity and im-
portance of states in the Indian context continues to unfold on more 
than one front. Months after the crushing Koushal v. Naz decision was 
issued, the Supreme Court delivered a breathtakingly different ruling, 
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others (hereafter nalsa
v. Union), impacting transgender persons, hijras, and other gender-
based minorities in India.1 Likewise issued by a bench of two justices, 
K. S. Radhakrishnan and A. K. Sikri, nalsa v. Union unequivocally con-
firmed the legal right to choose gender identity for those transitioning 
between male and female and, in an exceptional gesture, established 
that hijras and all those who do not subscribe to a binary frame could 
identify as third gender.2 A relief, a victory, a bold judicial vision writ-
ten in two parts seeking to correct society’s moral failure to embrace 
different gender identities and expressions by extending social justice 
to those long oppressed and denied. Noteworthy about the judgment 
is that it distills gender from biological sex as well as sexual orientation 
to recognize a broad spectrum of trans/gender subjects and critically 
assesses a range of international conventions and foreign case law to 
conclude that gender identity and expression ought to be protected by 
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the Indian Constitution. In further contrast to the ruling recriminalizing 
homosexuality, nalsa v. Union interprets the legal recognition of gender 
minorities within the ambit of the constitutional rights to equality before 
the law (Article 14), prohibition of discrimination based on sex (Article 
15), freedom of speech and expression (Article 19), and protection of life 
and personal liberty (Article 21). What’s more, it openly presses against 
Koushal v. Naz’s troubling logic of small minorities by noting that gender 
minorities may be numerically insignificant but are nonetheless entitled 
to their rights.
And yet, despite its substantial differences from Koushal v. Naz and the 
fact that it unambiguously seeks to deliver justice to transgender persons 
and other gender minorities, or really because of how the justice is to be 
delivered, nalsa v. Union too shores up the role of the state. Even though 
the justices see gender identity as part of the moral prelegal entitlements 
due all persons, its arbiters are regional- and national-level state agencies 
and institutions. These are the units charged with determining and im-
plementing procedures for legal identity recognition, leading Aniruddha 
Dutta to express concern about haphazard, regionally varied procedures 
to come and the overall trend toward bureaucratic hurdles and require-
ments over simpler, community-based processes.3
In another twist the government of India or, more precisely, the 
national-level Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment subsequently 
petitioned the Supreme Court seeking clarity and modification on cer-
tain aspects of nalsa v. Union, revealing in the process the complex ways 
governance proliferates. Asking for greater clarity on parsing transgen-
der from third gender, rightly suggesting the deletion of references to 
the term eunuch, and aptly questioning the collapsing of lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual persons into the category of transgender, the writ also takes 
up the justices’ sweeping directives that states have to go beyond legal 
gender identity recognition. These include extending affirmative action 
policies to gender minorities; providing them adequate and separate 
medical care, public toilets, and other facilities; introducing welfare 
initiatives; addressing their social vulnerability; and ensuring their so-
cial integration. Undoubtedly crucial, these interventions nonetheless 
raise the conundrum of the extent to which social justice is routinely fil-
tered through the imagination of the state. Ironically the ministry’s writ 
wonders at the practicality of extending caste-based affirmative action 
policies to transgender and third gender persons since, according to its 
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logic, caste is fixed at birth! Clarifications and modifications by the apex 
court are pending at this time and administrative procedures continue. 
Perhaps this ruling will slowly bridge the gap between law and life, all 
the while enabling the expansion of governance.
Rather than legal outcomes, then, the lasting political gains of ef-
forts to ensure justice to gender and sexual minorities lie in forging 
movements that in the case of decriminalizing homosexuality have (re)
emerged from failures in the courts—the social and political firestorm 
that followed in the wake of Koushal v. Naz, public demonstrations, scath-
ing op-eds, angry blogs, and interviews criticizing the apex court’s deci-
sion, keeping it in the limelight for many months. A Global Day of Rage 
inspired outpourings against the legal outcome from within India and 
numerous cities and organizations elsewhere, and for the first time 
many political and elected officials expressed support for decriminaliz-
ing homosexuality. In a complete volte-face from its earlier position, the 
government, as well as Naz Foundation, Voices against Section 377, and 
other parties to the legal proceedings, filed a review petition asking the 
Supreme Court to reassess the decision on technical grounds. Dismissed 
without so much as a hearing, the review petition has been followed by 
a more rarely exercised option, the curative petition, that can be filed on 
the grounds that a ruling represents a gross miscarriage of justice.
Even as sexuality rights supporters pursue law to its last possibility, 
increased political visibility, an expanding grammar of rights and jus-
tice for same-sex sexualities, more attention (especially from the me-
dia), and additional spaces for political activism and cultural expression 
are among the palpable changes that have occurred alongside and as 
a result of the focus on Section 377. Such engagements are helping to 
overcome legal defeats and inspiring criticisms of legal victories repre-
sented by nalsa v. Union that promise dignity to trans/gender minorities 
while criminalizing same-sex sexual activity. Rather than shortsightedly 
focusing on one law or one subject, the best of these engagements are ar-
ticulating broader visions for social justice that bring together the most 
vulnerable, whether on the basis of sex, gender and gender expression, 
racialization, sexual orientation, caste, religion, or social class.
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The State’s Many Sexual Lives: Issues of Sexual Violence
In the spirit of juxtaposing the struggle to decriminalize homosexuality 
alongside other contestations, I sift two additional sites through a cri-
tique of the sexual state: sexual violence and immigration. While I stay 
within the Indian context, these issues reverberate widely across other 
settings as well.
Since December 2012 demands for the government to address sexual 
violence in India have occupied public discourse at an unprecedented 
scale. Triggered by the sexual assaults on Nirbhaya, a twenty-three-year-
old woman, by six men and her subsequent death, these protests are 
against the pervasive sexual violence that women in Delhi and elsewhere 
in the country endure because of region, caste, religion, class, and gen-
der.4 Yet it was the sexual assault on Nirbhaya by a group of unknown 
men that prompted demonstrations in Delhi. Even as details of the as-
sault filled the newspapers and digital media, the rallies as well as the 
public discourses of which they were a part hinged largely on the state’s 
role in preventing and punishing sexual assaults on women.
The thrust of the demands has been to argue for better governance in 
order to deter sexual crime against women and ensure greater account-
ability from state institutions, including the police, law, state-run hospi-
tals, and elected officials implicated in the safety and security of women. 
Much ire is rightly directed at the police, for they often do not follow 
established guidelines when sexual assault is reported. Moralism and 
bigotry on the part of police officers—for example, the notion that re-
spectable women ought not to report sexual assault—often make them 
reluctant to record crime reports and gather and report evidence prop-
erly and make them more likely to be punitive toward survivors of sexual 
assault. The need for improved legal protocol in trying cases of sexual 
violence galvanized the spirit of protest as well. A legal process that tries 
accusers rather than the accused and is marred by loopholes, pervasive 
judicial sexism, and a glacial pace compound state ineffectiveness in 
preventing and prosecuting sexual violence. For the most part demands 
were focused on better laws, improved law enforcement, and harsher 
punishments, including the death penalty or at least chemical castration. 
Such approaches, however, are likely to yield uneven or unsatisfactory 
results at best, for they encourage an enlargement of existing structures 
of governance rather than their overhaul. Accordingly sexual violence 
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cannot be seen primarily as either a failure of the state or the unfortunate 
result of a lack of adequate governance. Instead state governance needs 
to be viewed through the lens of sexual violence.
“justice j. s. verma committee report”
More effective responses, of which the “Report of the Committee on 
Amendments to Criminal Law” is a case in point, have taken sexuality’s 
significance to governance as a point of departure to issue more thor-
oughgoing critiques of the state rather than call for its expansion.5 Better 
known as the “Justice J. S. Verma Committee Report,” furnished by a 
committee of three—two retired justices, Leila Seth and J. S. Verma, and 
Gopal Subramanium—this 630-page document compellingly reframes 
the persistent split between state and sexuality.6 A collective archive pro-
duced at the threshold of state and society, the report is the outcome of 
contributions from a variety of women’s groups from around the coun-
try, including Kashmir and the Northeastern States under military im-
position, lesbian and gay constituencies, children’s rights activists, legal 
experts and intellectuals from within and outside of India, research and 
support provided by young lawyers and academics, and, not least, over 
seventy thousand responses solicited from the general public.
Although the committee was charged with suggesting amendments 
to criminal law that would make for speedier trials and enhanced pun-
ishment, the input from women’s groups working at the forefront of sex-
ual, caste-, political-, and military-based violence led to a more sweep-
ing indictment of governance. In contrast to the populist demands for 
increased governance, the committee’s report is critical of legislative 
expansion by taking the position that earlier interventions, such as the 
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (2005), have had un-
even consequences, failing to stop the disempowerment of women. In-
deed the report indicts the very structures and practices of governance 
for not ensuring gender equality and, worse, contributing to ongoing 
sexual violence by discriminating on the basis of sex or gender. In lieu 
of reinforcing a dichotomy between state and society, the recommenda-
tions emerge at their dense intersections.
Taking institutional histories, practices, and policies as its point of 
departure, the “Justice J. S. Verma Committee Report” advocates for their 
overhaul. It devotes an entire chapter to police reforms, spanning the 
modernization of the force, a significant reorientation of the relation-
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ship between police and community, and measures aimed at the welfare 
of those who police. Elsewhere the report recommends a review of the 
Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1958) and similar provisions that allow 
military and paramilitary forces to commit sexual violence on women 
in areas under occupation—Chattisgarh, Kashmir, Northeastern States, 
among others. Most notably a chapter on electoral reforms takes issue 
with the procedures that allow candidates accused of, charged with, or 
convicted of some form of sexual violence to contest elections. In a con-
text where almost a third of the members of Parliament faced criminal 
charges and where members of Parliament, members of legislative as-
semblies, and candidates enter the electoral process even though they 
have been charged with sexual violence or crimes against women, this 
indictment is overdue.
The report also expands the definition of sexual violence by seeing it 
as a consequence of a view in which women embody religious and caste 
groups. Exceeding the conventional view that only respectable hetero-
sexual women are to be protected from sexual violence, it incorporates 
lesbian, gay, and transgender people within the purview of nondiscrim-
ination and safeguards from sexual violence. The definition of sexual 
violence is further expanded beyond rape as coercive penile-vaginal 
penetration to include sexual harassment at work, sexual harassment in 
public places, acid attacks, stalking, sex trafficking, and, perhaps most 
significant, marital rape. Even more expansive is the link to the biopol-
itics of nationally skewed sex ratios, particularly egregious in the states 
of Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan, to underscore the mix of cultural 
practices and state ideologies and failures that contribute to women’s 
vulnerabilities. Limited access to land rights, resources, social services, 
education, and employment are identified in the report as contributing 
to women’s vulnerability and implicitly being forms of sexual violence 
themselves.
Building on the extensive work conducted by women’s and children’s 
rights groups as well as feminist scholarship, the report reverses the re-
lationship between sexuality and governance. Rather than serving as a 
mere commentary on how state institutions should tackle the difficulties 
of sexual violence, the report implies and implicates a deeply subjective 
state and criticizes institutional exploitations of sexuality and gender. 
Thus, cutting across the putative divide between state and society, sug-
gested remedies include the dismantling of extraconstitutional bodies 
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of governance, such as the Khap Panchayats and the Katta Panchayats, 
through which sexual violence against women is frequently arbitrated at 
the village level.7 In place of the death penalty or chemical castration, the 
report emphasizes the need for education starting early in the informal 
and formal school curriculum and also encompassing state institutions. 
State institutions are seen as having a role to play in the curbing of sexual 
violence, but the report asserts that such a role will not be effective with-
out a holistic review of governance, the sociocultural, and the gender and 
sexual biases that mark these institutions
Yet the split between state and society is not so easily undone. The 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2013, inserting changes in the rape 
laws and criminal procedures, was hastily passed by Parliament and ap-
proved by the president even though it violates the spirit and recom-
mendations of the “Justice Verma Committee Report.” The Indian Penal 
Code was amended to punish police failure to register grievous hurt, the 
purview of harm was expanded to include acid attacks, definitions of 
sexual harassment were revised, the employment of trafficked persons 
was penalized, rape laws were modified to include sexual assault, a pro-
vision for gang rape was included, and, contrary to the “Justice Verma 
Committee Report,” the death penalty was instated in cases where sex-
ual assault leads to death or a “persistent vegetative state.” But because 
the Act elides a review of governance, gender inequality, and structural 
factors contributing to sexual violence, the modifications will produce 
uneven results at best and will strengthen governance rather than over-
haul it.8 As Ratna Kapur notes, in its eagerness to “do something” the 
government has issued an ordinance that does nothing to further wom-
en’s sexual autonomy and bodily integrity while expanding a security 
regime to further regulate sexual conduct.9
Stirring the Sexual State and Anti-Immigrant Discourses in Delhi
Security regimes are enacted through sites overtly identified with sex-
uality but also terrains that are less obviously so marked. To explore 
the broad-based relevance of a critique of the sexual state, I turn to dis-
courses of migration. India’s reputation as a nation of emigrants not-
withstanding, I focus on it as a site of immigration from neighboring 
Bangladesh.10
In May 2001, just months before the Naz Foundation plea was filed, 
afterlives 159
another public interest litigation, Civil Writ Petition No. 3170 of 2001, 
found its way to the Delhi High Court. On the surface the two writs had 
little to do with each other, not least because of the difference in focus, 
but much like the Naz Foundation writ, the petitioner Chetan Dutt a 
Delhi-based advocate, sought state intervention to criminalize and de-
port migrants and prevent further migration specifically from Bangla-
desh: “A petition by way of Public Interest Litigation seeking directions, 
orders or appropriate writs from this Hon’ble Court whereby the influx 
of illegal migrants from Bangladesh into the capital of India could be 
checked/stopped and effective steps taken to remove the illegal migrants 
already in Delhi.”11
Dutt’s emphasis on Delhi rehearsed earlier histories of anti-immigrant 
discourses that have played out most acutely in the nation’s capital, even 
though it does not represent the highest concentration of immigrants 
from Bangladesh. As Sujata Ramachandran notes, by the early 1990s 
Bangladeshi migrants in Delhi were the target of political vitriol and the 
active use of state capacities for deportation, even though many had lived 
in the city’s slums for more than two decades.12 As a result of this po-
liticization by Hindu right-wing organizations and the ruling Congress 
Party’s capitulation to their political rhetoric, Operation Pushback (1992) 
forcibly deported thousands of Bengali Muslims to Bangladesh. A sub-
sequent Action Plan vested authority in local police to identify and detain 
unauthorized migrants.13 Dutt’s writ sought judicial directives that would 
continue these earlier initiatives by requiring the police and other rele-
vant state agencies and institutions to identify and deport migrants from 
Bangladesh, stalling further unauthorized cross-border movements.
Dutt’s rationale for the writ was twofold: the stresses on the social 
fabric and social services, as well as risks to the security of Delhi and 
its residents. Consistent as his fears were with Hindu nationalist con-
vergences on Muslims as imminent threats to national security and sov-
ereignty, he subsumed them under the pressures on the city’s social in-
frastructure from extralegal migration. Suggesting that Delhi was home 
to some three million unauthorized migrants from Bangladesh, the 
writ goes on to claim that such migrants have overburdened the city 
by creating slum dwellings serving as hubs for a variety of criminal ac-
tivities, namely drugs, sex, pornography, contraband liquor, and illegal 
guns, impacting numerous neighborhoods. By overloading civic facilities, 
threatening law and order, creating more slum dwellings, encroaching on 
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scarce open land, engaging in fraudulent political participation, drain-
ing precious resources, and making welfare schemes ineffective, these 
migrants, the writ maintains, jeopardize the well-being of the capital 
and its people.
Biopolitical rationalities and sexual anxieties drive the scant evidence 
on which anti-immigrant discourses are based. This evidence is quotes 
from fourteen articles published between April and May 2001 in the Hin-
dustan Times, the Pioneer, Times of India, and the Financial Times. What is 
striking about these articles is their shared emphasis on how unautho-
rized migration from Bangladesh jeopardizes the well-being of Delhi’s 
presumably authorized residents. These biopolitical logics—that the 
welfare of Delhi’s population is at risk because of voter fraud, unautho-
rized slums, criminal activity, and violence—are fueled by attention to 
unauthorized migration’s impact on local demographics and, implic-
itly, sexuality. As elaborated in chapter 2, demographic indices—births, 
deaths, population growth, fertility rates, among others—reflect the ob-
ligations of managing sexuality as much at the individual as the collective 
level. A Hindustan Times article, “Bangladesh Used Us as a Punching Bag,” 
cited as evidence in the writ, suggests, “We are playing host to no less 
than 15 million illegal immigrant Bangladeshis. They are a drain on our 
resources apart from the fact that they have disturbed the demographic 
balance. But political parties are busy increasing their vote bank through 
their support.”14
The sexual imperatives of anti-Bangladesh rhetorics were further am-
plified in a meeting with Dutt. Reluctant to meet with me at his office, he 
agreed to a neutral, nondescript location to discuss his motivations for 
petitioning the Delhi High Court. Describing unauthorized immigration 
from Bangladesh as “voluminous,” Dutt had much to say about all the 
ways he thinks migrants are “eating into the major resources” and pre-
senting “an economic load on public facilities.” Racializing the migrants 
as inherently “antisociety” because of their involvement in crime and 
violence, low level of education, and immoral practices, Dutt further un-
derscored their significant demographic impact especially in certain ar-
eas of the city. He contemptuously likened immigrants from Bangladesh 
to fungus that will continue to grow until checked. Bringing sexuality 
directly into the equation, he lamented immigrants’ ostensible propen-
sity to have many children: “India is trying to restrict birth rate, but they 
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think that all offspring are God’s gift. For them, the more they procreate 
the better [for they are able to make demands on existing resources].”15
A series of subsequent court orders by Delhi High Court justices in 
favor of Dutt’s writ gives some measure of its success.16 But it was field-
work in the Foreigners Regional Registration Office, the state institution 
regulating temporary and long-term residence in New Delhi, that pro-
vided insight into why institutional concerns with sexuality are so easily 
activated. In our meeting the officer in charge of authorizing deportation 
of migrants highlighted numerous cases in which women from Bangla-
desh were being purchased as wives due to the skewed sex ratios in the 
proximate states of Haryana, Rajasthan, and Punjab. Casting the issue of 
unauthorized migration primarily in terms of the trafficking of women, 
the officer saw deportation as an act of intervention on behalf of the 
women from Bangladesh.17 In another instance, Mumbai police detained 
some two hundred women from Bangladesh on account of their being 
allegedly trafficked as bar dancers. Despite feminist reports suggesting 
that the vast majority of women are not trafficked, nor are they foreigners 
(chapter 1), in this and other instances the state’s ongoing preoccupa-
tion with sexuality echoed familiarly across different sites. By continually 
“doing something” about the perils of sexuality, whether in relation to 
dance bars, immigration, sexual violence, Section 377, or other social 
problems, the state is actively constituted and state governance enacted.
Even as struggles for justice hang in the balance, sexual states in their 
various iterations continue to thrive. Reformist struggles as well as sex-
ually oriented forms of governance sustain these states, and their rele-
vance applies not only to India but to myriad other settings grappling 
with similar issues as well as sex trafficking, sex education, state-related 
sex scandals, health and disease, demographics, and more. Indeed the 
insights derived from the Indian context open up new questions and 
lines of inquiry in settings such as the United States and Europe, re-
versing the wisdom that these are the theaters of knowledge production 
(rather than more accurately being seen as cases that are elevated to the 
status of theory). These takeaways also implicitly trouble the fact that 
state sexuality remains under theorized, asking why, for example, Mar-
got Canaday’s fine analysis of the expansion of the bureaucratic state 
and the regulation of homosexuality in the twentieth century becomes 
virtually unimaginable in the contemporary United States.18
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Therefore I close by briefly extending the approach developed in this 
book to the Russian context, specifically to its infamous national law 
against the “propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations” passed by its 
parliament in 2013. Widely known in the international English-language 
press and social media as the ban against gay propaganda, this law was 
indicted as draconian, Russia’s war on gays, and the unleashing of state 
homophobia. Coming mere months before the 2014 Winter Olympics in 
Sochi, it was primarily attributed to President Vladimir Putin’s attempts 
to reaffirm traditional Russian cultural values in opposition to Western 
liberalism, symbolized by support for gay civil rights. While Putin was 
undoubtedly a key player in passing the law, the focus on him has been in 
lieu of a more systematic analysis of the Russian state leading to a thicker 
understanding of the legislation.
In her analysis Marie Mendras points to a fundamental paradox char-
acterizing the national state in Russia, the illusion of strong centralized 
statism and the reality of dysfunctional institutions and practices and 
privatized concentrations of power, thereby paving the way for a differ-
ent reading of the 2013 homophobic law.19 This is to say, the edict can be 
more usefully seen as an attempt to reconcile this paradox and shore up 
the role and relevance of the national Russian state, a point that is also 
borne out Laurie Essig’s history of Russian state intervention in sexual-
ity.20 In other words, understanding the anti–gay propaganda law as an 
instantiation of governance that helps strengthen the illusion of statism 
and centralized control directed toward the good of the nation enables 
new possibilities of critical inquiry. It would also be useful to place this 
injunction alongside the corpus of laws, policies, discourses, and prac-
tices regulating sexuality that help bolster the state—for instance, the 
decree prescribing imprisonment for offending religious feelings that 
was passed by the Russian parliament immediately after the edict against 
gay propaganda as a means to limit the feminist queer political protests 
of the group Pussy Riot. And it would help to be mindful of the vari-
ous constituencies, especially the Russian Orthodox Church and state 
television figures, who supported the ban against gay propaganda while 
actively fanning the idea and indispensability of the state.21
Engaging sexual states in a variety of contexts and through a variety 
of sites means reexamining foundational assumptions about sexuality as 
an object of governance and reorienting toward thoroughgoing analyses 
of governance practices, laws, policies, and discourses. If we are serious 
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about loosening the state’s grip on sexuality, especially in the interests 
of disenfranchised subjects, then the imaginations of states and expres-
sions of governance have to be front and center in our analytics, as do our 
complicities in preserving the state or preemptively declaring its demise. 
Future critical assessments would attend to the afterlives of sexual states 
that persist well beyond the specific lenses through which they manifest.
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with feminist thought, sexuality, and governance, see Puri, “States’ Sexualities.”
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tures of state and space. The list includes Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, 
and Gordon Macleod.
17. Lefebvre, “Space and State,” 94.
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28. For Hacking’s useful discussion on the origins of statistics as moral sci-
ence, especially in France, see “How Should We Do the History of Statistics?” 182. 
Extrapolating from Sanjay Nigam’s work, Appadurai addresses the differences in 
the use of statistical measures in the colonies (“Number in the Colonial Imagina-
tion,” 318). 
29. Nigam, “Disciplining and Policing the ‘criminals by Birth.’”
30. Appadurai, “Number in the Colonial Imagination,” 319.
31. In their overview of the constructionist approach to social problems Hol-
stein and Miller underscore, “They are the interpretive processes that constitute 
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book 4, chapter 15, p. 215. For a discussion of the Offences against Persons Act of 
1828 and the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885, see Cohen, Talk on the Wilde 
Side, chapter 4. 
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planting of English law in India (“Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code of 1862”). 
23. Kolsky, “Codification and the Rule of Colonial Difference.”
24. Singha, A Despotism of Law.
25. Macaulay, “Introductory Report upon the Indian Penal Code,” 322, 432.
26. See Goldsmith’s discussion of Bentham’s writing, which appears to have 
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178 notes to chapter 4
seemed well suited for warring and policing. These groups were described as phys-
ically strong, fearless, and loyal to British interests and were recruited for the mil-
itary and police. The groups varied regionally. British administrators grouped to-
gether various ethnic and caste groups as “Brahmans” or “low castes” in a related 
strategy of reducing and enumerating the tremendous cultural, religious, class, 
and caste-based differences in the subcontinent.
19. Arnold, “Bureaucratic Recruitment and Subordination in Colonial India.”
20. Dhillon, Police and Politics in India; Subramanian, Political Violence and the Police 
in India; Verma, The Indian Police.
21. In his discussion of political violence and the police, Subramanian suggests 
that the two-tier system of policing may be attributed to tensions between state 
control of civilian police and paramilitary forces under central control (Political Vi-
olence and the Police in India, 65).
22. Arnold, “Bureaucratic Recruitment and Subordination in Colonial India”; 
Dhillon, Police and Politics in India; Pathak, “The Beat(en)”; Subramanian, Political 
Violence and the Police in India.
23. Pathak, “The Beat(en).”
24. Human Rights Watch, “Broken System.”
25. Ghosh, “Only 7% Women in Delhi Police.”
26. Verma, The Indian Police.
27. Hansen and Stepputat, introduction to Sovereign Bodies, 4.
28. See the oed for a discussion on the adjacent terms communal and communalism.
29. Kaviraj, “The Imaginary Institution of India.”
30. Given the innumerable differences in Hindu religious sects and practices, 
languages, geography, history, castes, and more, there is no single “Hindu” reli-
gious holiday that is observed across the country. Similarly the right-wing parties, 
the Shiv Sena in the state of Maharashtra, the Vishva Hindu Parishad with a stron-
ger hold in the central and northern parts of the country, and the Tamil Protection 
Movement in the state of Tamil Nadu have numerous ideological differences and 
do not speak in a single voice.
31. Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India.
32. This is not to discount the formations of complex alliances in which Hindu 
Dalits are at the forefront of the violence against Muslims and Christians, for ex-
ample, incited by upper-caste Hindu groups. See Chatterji. Violent Gods, for an in-
sightful discussion.
33. The complete report is available online at Government of India, “Social 
Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India.”
34. Bharucha, “Muslims and Others,” 4246.
35. Chatterjee, Gender, Slavery and Law in Colonial India; Loomba, “Race and the 
Possibilities of Comparative Critique.”
36. The relationships between minority communities and the abstract major-
itarian Hindu community or the state are characterized by different histories and 
notes to chapter 4 179
imperatives. While Sikhs have felt the need to delineate physical and biological 
differences from Hindus (and Muslims), Muslims, often accused of being aliens, 
have not developed a political grammar of physical or biological differences.
37. Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India.
38. Arnold, “Bureaucratic Recruitment and Subordination in Colonial India.”
39. Gilroy, Against Race; especially see the chapter, “The Crisis of ‘Race’ and 
Raciology.”
40. Loomba, “Race and the Possibilities of Comparative Critique.”
41. On the point about the multiple genealogies of race and racisms, see Gold-
berg, Anatomy of Racism; Macedo and Gounari, Globalization of Racism; Moore et al., 
Race, Nature, and the Politics of Difference.
42. For example, in his ethnography of the 2002 genocide of Muslims in Gu-
jarat, “Ahimsa, Identification and Sacrifice in the Gujarat Pogrom,” Ghassem-
Fachandi notes that meat eating, excessive sexual appetites—especially for Hindu 
young women—and excessive violence is consistently ascribed to Muslims by ma-
joritarian Hindus. See also Ghaseem-Pachandi, “The Hyperbolic Vegetarian.”
43. See Jeffery and Jeffery, “Saffron Demography.” Despite the fact that fertility 
rates among Muslims have decreased over time, the Hindu right has twisted data 
and reports to fan fears about an explosive fertility rate among Muslims, pejora-
tively called the Muslim growth rate, especially after the release of reports from the 
2001 census. On this, see Bose, “Beyond Hindu-Muslim Growth Rates”; Gupta, 
“Censuses, Communalism, Gender, and Identity”; Gill, “Politics of Population 
Census Data in India.” 
44. Bharucha, “Muslims and Others,” 4239.
45. Bacchetta, “When the (Hindu) Nation Exiles Its Queers,” 143.
46. Khalidi, Khaki and Ethnic Violence in India.
47. V. N. Rai, quoted in Khalidi, Khaki and Ethnic Violence in India, 78.
48. Setalvad, “When Guardians Betray.”
49. Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India; Das, Life 
and Words; Setalvad, “When Guardians Betray”; Pandey, “In Defence of the Frag-
ment”; Pandey, “Hindus and Others”; Wilkinson, “Introduction.” The violence 
unleashed in Gujarat in 2002 was preceded by instructions from none other than 
the director general of police, the highest-ranking police official in the state, to all 
police stations to gather detailed information on Muslims and Christians, whereas 
no such information was gathered on Hindu communities (Varadarajan, Gujarat).
50. Kapur, Sikh Separatism.
51. Axel, The Nation’s Tortured Body.
52. Das, Life and Words.
53. Khalidi, Khaki and Ethnic Violence in India, 78.
54. For example, see Setalvad’s “When Guardians Betray.”
55. Gupta suggests that when police encounter those they perceive to be homo-
sexual, they are likely to solicit money or sex, thereby committing the crimes 
180 notes to chapter 4
that they are supposed to be preventing (“Section 377 and the Dignity of Indian 
Homosexuals”).
56. Radhakrishna, Dishonored by History, 2.
57. Narrain, Queer, 59.
58. Hereditary criminality is hard to account for a group that does not repro-
duce internally and must rely on socializing young and adult outsiders.
59. Radhakrishna, Dishonored by History, 55.
60. Puri, Woman, Body, Desire in Post-Colonial India.
61. The Mahendra Caturvedi Practical Guide to Hindi-English Dictionary associates adhi-
ka’r with right, entitlement, and even jurisdiction and occupation.
62. Richardson, “Constructing Sexual Citizenship.”
63. I owe this point to a personal conversation with Maitrayee Chaudhuri.
64. Chatterjee, “Alienation, Intimacy, and Gender”; Cohen, “What Mrs. Besa-
hara Saw.”
65. Engaging Frantz Fanon’s discussion of “epidermalization” in Black Skins, 
White Masks, Gilroy explains that it is about a historically specific system that makes 
bodies intelligible by endowing them with qualities of “color” (Against Race, 46).
66. Ghosh and Chakrabarty, “A Conversation on Provincializing Europe.”
67. Balibar analyzes comparable forms of racisms, such as anti-Semitism, as 
“culturalist” racism, the kind that does not rely on the pseudo-biological concept 
of race as its driving force (“Is There a Neo-Racism?” 24). In “Race and the Possi-
bilities of Comparative Critique” Loomba explains that Balibar’s reference point is 
the racism directed largely at Muslim immigrants in Europe, but that this racializa-
tion of religion is hardly new and has deep historical roots. My purpose here is not 
to collapse the differences between unambiguously naturalized representations of 
race and the ones that naturalize qualities as innate to faith, but to connect their 
similarities. 
68. Field notes, Chennai, July 2005. Aravani is the term preferred over hijra
among some in the Chennai area. The arrests followed a report in the English-
language daily Indian Express, itself based on complaints from middle-class resi-
dents in the area. 
69. Section 8 b reads, “Solicits or molests any person, or loiters or acts in such 
manner as to cause obstruction or annoyance to persons residing nearby or pass-
ing by such public place or to offend against public decency for the purpose of 
prostitution.”
Chapter 5
1. Civil Writ Petition 7455 of 2001.
2. In Mumbai a coalition including the Forum against the Oppression of 
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